eb4d067f12
Groundwork for replacing a Telesis pinstamp with a SIC Marking e10 while
keeping the existing eDNC/MarkTelesis operator workflow. MarkTelesis has a
hardcoded marker-type enum and eDNC is serial-only, so the plan is a
translator that impersonates a Telesis controller on a COM port. These are
the pieces that translator will be built from, all verified against a real
e10 (a P63, firmware "E10 P63 (20140924)").
scripts/e10-client.py
e10-V6 protocol client. Marking path and file transfer both use the BINARY
protocol: the text protocol uses space as its delimiter, so it cannot carry
a field cleared to a single space nor the space runs in real marked text,
and it has no checksum. Includes fault decoding against the manual's fig 1,
and a guard that refuses to overflow a variable's declared buffer.
scripts/make-e10-pattern.py
Builds marking files with DECLARED variables. The controller's own protocol
cannot create one: NEWFILE/INSERTTEXTLINE/SAVEFILE writes the reference but
leaves the variable count at zero, and SETVAR then fails. Template-based,
copying through byte-for-byte everything the format notes do not explain.
scripts/simulate-ednc.py
Parses a part program, substitutes tokens and emits the byte-exact frames
MarkTelesis would send, then translates them for the e10 and can drive one.
The wire format came from disassembling MarkTelesis.exe rather than from a
capture: frame builder at 0x401cf0, and the type letters at their call
sites. Note there is no station ID, unlike the Backup470 dialect.
scripts/fake-telesis.py
Answers as a Telesis controller so MarkTelesis will hold a conversation
long enough to be recorded, with switches to force NAK and timeout paths.
reference/e10/
52-file snapshot off the bench controller, used as the corpus for reversing
the MARK_V5.0 format and for testing without hardware. ConfigCtrl is
excluded and gitignored - it stores the supervisor password in cleartext.
GE part programs are excluded for the same reason.
Three hardware findings worth knowing:
- The controller TRUNCATES SILENTLY to a variable's declared buffer size
while SETVAR still answers ok, and GETVAR echoes the full value back so
it cannot detect this. Guarded client-side against the size in the file.
- It refuses to mark when a referenced variable is unset, which makes an
unset field fail loudly rather than marking the previous part's data.
- Setting variables does not modify the stored file, so backups will not
churn on every marked part.
129 lines
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129 lines
3.8 KiB
Plaintext
# Large binary files — download/build these, don't commit them
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*.deb
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*.zip
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*.wim
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*.iso
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*.efi
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*.sdi
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# OneDrive download artifacts
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OneDrive_*/
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# Error folders from OneDrive download
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__*/
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___*.txt
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# Original OneDrive folder structure (reorganized into autoinstall/ and playbook/)
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WestJeff*/
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# Duplicate at root (canonical copy in unattend/)
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/FlatUnattendW10.xml
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# Offline packages (built by download-packages.sh)
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offline-packages/
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# Boot tool binaries (built by prepare-boot-tools.sh)
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boot-tools/
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# Track the Blancco GRUB config as source-of-truth for grubx64.efi rebuilds.
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# prepare-boot-tools.sh rebuilds grubx64.efi from this file via grub-mkstandalone.
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!boot-tools/blancco/grub-blancco.cfg
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# WinPE boot files (wimboot, boot.wim, BCD, ipxe.efi, etc.)
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boot-files/
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# Exception: track undionly.kpxe (open-source iPXE BIOS-mode NBP for
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# legacy PXE clients, ~70KB, from boot.ipxe.org). Makes air-gapped USB
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# build self-contained without a separate fetch step.
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!boot-files/undionly.kpxe
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# Python wheels for offline install (built by download-packages.sh)
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pip-wheels/
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# Deployment images (imported via webapp or USB)
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geastandardpbr/
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# OS files
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.DS_Store
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Thumbs.db
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# Python
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__pycache__/
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*.pyc
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*.pyo
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venv/
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# MOK Secure Boot signing keys (contains private key)
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mok-keys/
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# Secrets
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secrets.md
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**/eMxInfo*.txt
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*.ppkg
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enrollment/
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drivers-staging/
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bios-staging/
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.claude/
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# Secrets and credentials (defensive)
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.env
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.env.*
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!.env.example
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!.env.*.example
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*.pem
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*.key
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id_rsa
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id_rsa.*
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*.ppk
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*.p12
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*.pfx
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secrets.json
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secrets.yaml
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secrets.yml
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*_secret
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*_secrets
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credentials.json
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# GE-internal WiFi / 802.1X profiles - contain SSID + trusted-root thumbprint.
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# Staged on PXE share at /srv/samba/enrollment/MachineAuth/ and copied to
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# bays during imaging. Never check these into git.
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AESFMA.xml
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8021x.xml
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BLUESSO.xml
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WiFi-Profile.xml
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*.wlanprofile
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*.lanprofile
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# Pre-staged binary (142 MB) - track via LFS or stage on PXE server, not in regular git
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playbook/shopfloor-setup/Shopfloor/PrinterInstallerMap.exe
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# Keyence VR-6000 InstallShield payload (560 MB). InstallShield MSIs split
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# the compressed payload into Data1.cab; without it next to the MSI, msiexec
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# exits 1603 with "SECREPAIR: Failed to open Data1.cab" (see
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# /home/camp/pxe-images/keyence/Logs/Keyence/install.log for the signature).
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# Canonical source on the GE-Enforce SFLD share:
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# tsgwp00525\sfld$\v2\shared\dt\shopfloor\gea-shopfloor-keyence\apps\Data1.cab
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# before building the USB image.
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playbook/shopfloor-setup/gea-shopfloor-waxtrace/captured-binary/
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# Keyence per-model installer payloads - too big for git, staged via sync-keyence.sh
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playbook/shopfloor-setup/gea-shopfloor-keyence/vr3000/installers/Data*.cab
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playbook/shopfloor-setup/gea-shopfloor-keyence/vr3000/installers/*.msi
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playbook/shopfloor-setup/gea-shopfloor-keyence/vr5000/installers/Data*.cab
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playbook/shopfloor-setup/gea-shopfloor-keyence/vr5000/installers/*.msi
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playbook/shopfloor-setup/gea-shopfloor-keyence/vr6000/installers/Data1.cab
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# Part Marker (Telesis) utility password - secret, deployed via the enrollment
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# share from the working tree, never committed.
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playbook/shopfloor-setup/gea-shopfloor-partmarker/PartMarker/Mark/utilpassword.txt
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# HeatTreat per-machine DNC .reg exports (6601-6604) - contain DNC FtpPasswd
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# credentials. Deployed via the enrollment share from the working tree.
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playbook/shopfloor-setup/gea-shopfloor-heattreat/reg/*.reg
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# SIC e10 controller config files carry the programmer/supervisor password
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# in cleartext. Never commit them. See reference/e10/README.md
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reference/e10/**/ConfigCtrl*
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reference/e10/**/*.kind1
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# GE part programs carry part numbers and marking content. Keep them out of
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# git; they live in ~/pxe-images/e10-testing/partprograms/
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reference/e10/partprograms/
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