Promote the 2026-08-30 review security fixes and supplies ordering to main

This commit is contained in:
2026-08-31 09:24:13 -04:00
parent 6680c3c5de
commit 0e3d5a6226
30 changed files with 991 additions and 98 deletions

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@@ -656,13 +656,17 @@ def upload_application_package(app_id: int):
@applications_bp.route('/package/<path:filename>', methods=['GET'])
@require_permission('applications.view')
@require_permission('applications.download')
def serve_application_package(filename):
"""Download an uploaded installer.
Authenticated, unlike the image: this is licensed vendor software, and an
open URL would publish it to anything that can reach the site. Always sent
as an attachment so a browser saves it rather than trying to render it.
Gated on applications.download, not applications.view: a guest may be
granted the metadata permission, and "an open URL would publish it" is just
as true of a URL any anonymous visitor can reach.
"""
return send_upload(_apppackage_dir(), filename, as_attachment=True)

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@@ -196,11 +196,15 @@ def upload_script_body(script_id: int):
@scripts_bp.route('/body/<path:filename>', methods=['GET'])
@require_permission('applications.view')
@require_permission('applications.download')
def download_script_body(filename: str):
"""Operator-facing script body download (JWT/RBAC).
The endpoint agent uses the collector-authenticated plugin route instead;
this one is for humans reviewing what a script does.
Gated on applications.download, not applications.view: this serves the
SYSTEM-context PowerShell a site pushes to its bays, and a guest may be
granted the metadata permission.
"""
return send_upload(_script_dir(), filename, as_attachment=True)

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@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ from shopdb.core.models import (
from shopdb.core.api.settings import get_cached_settings
from shopdb.core.services.spellfix import Vocabulary
from shopdb.utils.responses import success_response
from shopdb.utils.authz import require_permission
from shopdb.utils.authz import require_permission, caller_holds
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -1233,22 +1233,42 @@ def global_search():
results = []
search_term = f'%{query}%'
# Run all search domains
results.extend(_search_applications(query, search_term))
results.extend(_search_knowledgebase(query, search_term))
results.extend(_search_guides(query, search_term))
results.extend(_search_employees(query, search_term))
results.extend(_search_assets(query, search_term))
results.extend(_search_measuringtools(query, search_term))
results.extend(_search_usbdevices(query, search_term))
results.extend(_search_printeditems(query, search_term))
results.extend(_search_customfields(query, search_term))
results.extend(_search_notifications(query, search_term))
results.extend(_search_hostnames(query, search_term))
results.extend(_search_vendor_model_type(query, search_term))
# Every domain answers only to a caller who holds ITS permission.
#
# The route is gated on assets.view alone, and that used to be the whole
# check: one permission then queried twelve domains, so it read out of the
# staff directory, the USB checkout history, the notification log and the
# network inventory to anybody who could look up an asset number. The
# SEARCH_DOMAINS settings are feature toggles a site sets, not authorization,
# and were never doing this job.
#
# caller_holds rather than require_permission: a search that refuses the
# whole request because one domain is off-limits is useless. Each domain
# simply contributes nothing.
domains = [
('assets.view', _search_assets),
# Emit asset results routed to an asset page, so they belong to the
# same grant as the assets themselves.
('assets.view', _search_customfields),
('assets.view', _search_vendor_model_type),
('applications.view', _search_applications),
('kb.view', _search_knowledgebase),
('guides.view', _search_guides),
('employees.view', _search_employees),
('measuringtools.view', _search_measuringtools),
('usb.view', _search_usbdevices),
('printedparts.view', _search_printeditems),
('notifications.view', _search_notifications),
('computers.view', _search_hostnames),
]
for permission, search in domains:
if caller_holds(permission):
results.extend(search(query, search_term))
# IP-specific searches
if classification['is_ip']:
# IP-specific searches. An address and the subnet it sits in are network
# inventory, and knowing what answers on 10.20.x is a different question
# from looking up an asset number.
if classification['is_ip'] and caller_holds('network.view'):
results.extend(_search_by_ip(query, search_term))
results.extend(_search_subnets(query))

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@@ -351,19 +351,20 @@ def update_role(roleid: int):
# Update permissions
if 'permissions' in data and role.rolename != 'admin':
# The guest role is anyone with no account, so what it may hold is
# bounded: reads, plus the handful of writes a plugin has explicitly
# declared safe to do anonymously. Refused at the door rather than
# warned about - a checkbox that quietly makes deleting an asset
# anonymous is not a warning anybody reads twice.
# bounded to what core or a plugin has explicitly declared grantable.
# Refused at the door rather than warned about - a checkbox that
# quietly makes deleting an asset anonymous is not a warning anybody
# reads twice.
if role.rolename == Role.GUEST:
allowed = guest_grantable_permissions()
refused = sorted(set(data['permissions']) - allowed)
if refused:
return error_response(
ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
'The guest role cannot hold {}. A guest may be granted any '
'view permission, and only writes a plugin has declared '
'safe to do without an account.'.format(', '.join(refused)))
'The guest role cannot hold {}. A guest may only be '
'granted permissions core or the owning plugin has '
'declared grantable, which is a code change rather than a '
'setting.'.format(', '.join(refused)))
old_perms = [p.name for p in role.permissions]
perms = Permission.query.filter(Permission.name.in_(data['permissions'])).all()
new_perms = [p.name for p in perms]