Import the wilm agent store and WINC adoption work, with four fixes
Eleven commits from the sister site: a reversible Maximo/WINC machine-adoption import, a versioned agent binary store with upload and rollback, remote-BuildKit CI, tray version reporting, and UI fixes. Applied as a patch again - the published mirror rewrites hashes, so the branches have unrelated histories and git refuses to merge them. Reviewed by three agents before merging. Four things fixed here. THE PUBLISH WORKFLOW WAS DEAD. The new remote-BuildKit step in publish-images.yml sits at column 0 instead of indented under steps:, so the whole file is invalid YAML and GitHub would refuse it. Their entire GHCR distribution channel - which Start-ShopDBDev.ps1 and the compose files consume - was broken at the source and clearly never run. Indented; all five workflows now parse. THE IMPORT'S APPROVAL CHECK COULD NOT FAIL. commit() built the plan and the approval packet from the same upload and then asked the writer whether they matched, so packet_matches_plan compared a hash against itself. The documented contract - "a human approves a specific, frozen plan, and the writer can prove nothing drifted" - did not exist in the web path: an admin could preview file A and commit file B, gated only by the needs-create group NAMES they ticked. The preview's planhash is now required at commit and checked against a freshly rebuilt plan. Their tests committed without previewing, which is what let this through; they go through the real flow now, and three new tests pin it - all confirmed to fail with the check stubbed out. endpoints.agentpackage QUIETLY GREW. It used to mean "wrap the staged exe in a ZIP"; with the upload routes it also means "choose the executable every future package installs and runs as SYSTEM". Before this, staging needed filesystem access to the server. The permission description still said only "generate and download a package", so an admin granting it could not see what they were granting. Reworded. NOTHING RECORDED WHAT WAS STAGED, OR BY WHOM. The manifest held version, size and timestamp; re-uploading a version replaces the bytes in place under the same label. A sha256 of the stored file is now recorded, and the upload is audit-logged with it - after an incident there was previously no answer to who put that binary on the fleet. Also documented the nine new routes in docs/api-inventory.json (that gate cannot run on the mirror, so it falls to us at promotion time again), regenerated the spec and the project map, and kept our own docs where they conflicted: docs/ is scrubbed from the mirror, so their DEV-BUILD-TEST.md still had the dev-be channel mapping we corrected, and their PLUGIN-HOOKS.md was a new 45-line file rather than our 737-line canonical one. Their journal section is appended to ours. Contract version comes across as 0.30.0 for a genuinely additive surface. Suite 2369, frontend 324, gate green. Scope: product
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cproudlock
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ CURATED_EVENT_IDS = frozenset(EVENT_CATALOG)
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KNOWN_PAYLOAD_KEYS = frozenset({
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'hostname', 'adopt', 'loggedinuser', 'serialnumber', 'pctype',
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'machinenumber', 'vendorname', 'modelnumber', 'osname', 'ipaddress',
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'agentversion', 'lastboottime', 'uptimeseconds', 'idleseconds',
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'agentversion', 'trayversion', 'lastboottime', 'uptimeseconds', 'idleseconds',
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'cpupercent', 'memorypercent', 'services', 'ports', 'interfaces',
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'scheduledtasks', 'applications', 'events',
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})
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@@ -167,19 +167,40 @@ class EndpointsPlugin(BasePlugin):
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# running a staged script or pushing an installer is a strictly
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# heavier grant than a routine service/process toggle.
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('endpoints.deploy',
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'Run staged scripts and push application installers to endpoints', 'endpoints'),
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# Packaging the agent is a heavier grant than deploying to one, and
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# it is not the same job either: the generated ZIP carries a live
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# collector key stamped into its install script, so whoever holds
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# this can mint a distributable artefact containing the fleet-wide
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# command-channel credential. It was require_role('admin'), which
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# this codebase otherwise reserves for the few genuinely
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# role-shaped checks - and a role cannot be granted to one person
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# for one job the way a permission can.
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('endpoints.agentpackage',
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'Generate and download an agent or adoption-tool package '
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'(contains a live collector key)', 'endpoints'),
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# Collector service scope for the endpoint agent. A managed token
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'Run staged scripts and push application installers to endpoints', 'endpoints'),
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# Packaging the agent is a heavier grant than deploying to one, and
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# it is not the same job either: the generated ZIP carries a live
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# collector key stamped into its install script, so whoever holds
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# this can mint a distributable artefact containing the fleet-wide
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# command-channel credential. It was require_role('admin'), which
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# this codebase otherwise reserves for the few genuinely
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# role-shaped checks - and a role cannot be granted to one person
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# for one job the way a permission can.
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# It now also governs SUPPLYING the binary, not just wrapping it.
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# Before the agent store, the exe could only be staged by someone
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# with filesystem access to instance/siteagent/; the upload routes
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# put that behind this same grant, so a holder chooses the file
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# every future package installs and runs as SYSTEM. Whoever grants
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# this has to be able to see that from the description.
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('endpoints.agentpackage',
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'Upload the agent binary the fleet installs, and generate or '
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'download an agent or adoption-tool package (supplies an '
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'executable that runs as SYSTEM; the package contains a live '
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'collector key)', 'endpoints'),
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# Pushing an agent REPLACEMENT to running endpoints is a distinct,
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# heavier job than either packaging (endpoints.agentpackage) or
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# pushing an ordinary application installer (endpoints.deploy).
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# Kept separate on purpose: the agent runs as SYSTEM and is the
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# command channel itself, so replacing it is self-modifying the
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# control plane. Folding it into endpoints.deploy would let anyone
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# who can push an app silently swap the agent; folding it into
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# endpoints.agentpackage would let a packager who only mints ZIPs
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# also force a live fleet-wide swap. A future Operator role can
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# hold upload without this, or this without upload.
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('endpoints.agentupdate',
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'Push agent/tray binary updates to running endpoints '
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'(replaces the SYSTEM agent)', 'endpoints'),
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# Collector service scope for the endpoint agent. A managed token
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# scoped to ONLY this authorizes the endpoints collector and nothing
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# else, so rotating/revoking it stops endpoint-agent traffic without
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# touching computers/geenforce collectors. Minted from the settings
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@@ -575,6 +596,7 @@ class EndpointsPlugin(BasePlugin):
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},
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'loggedinuser': {'type': 'string'},
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'agentversion': {'type': 'string'},
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'trayversion': {'type': 'string'},
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'lastboottime': {'type': 'string', 'format': 'date-time'},
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'uptimeseconds': {'type': 'integer'},
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'idleseconds': {'type': 'integer'},
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@@ -786,6 +808,8 @@ class EndpointsPlugin(BasePlugin):
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state.loggedinuser = payload.get('loggedinuser')
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if 'agentversion' in payload:
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state.agentversion = payload.get('agentversion')
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if 'trayversion' in payload:
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state.trayversion = payload.get('trayversion')
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if 'lastboottime' in payload:
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state.lastboottime = _parse_dt(payload.get('lastboottime'))
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if 'uptimeseconds' in payload:
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