Import the wilm endpoint-monitor and channel-distribution work

Everything on origin/wilm that is not on the published main, applied as one
change because the published history has rewritten hashes: per-commit
cherry-pick conflicts against our main even though the squashed diff applies
clean.

Contents: endpoint monitor catalog + policy attachment + warn-only drift
reconciler, operator issue reports from the tray, agent launch-path allowlist,
and the GHCR channel-image distribution path for dev workstations.

NOT READY FOR main. Open items:
  - 10 new routes are absent from docs/api-inventory.json, so
    test_api_inventory_parity fails. That gate SKIPS on the published mirror
    (the test ships, its data file is scrubbed), which is why wilm never saw it.
  - dev-bootstrap.ps1 and Start-ShopDBDev.ps1 hardcode the ge-aero GitHub org.
  - plugins/endpoints/plugin.py carries a whitespace-only re-indent.

Scope: product
This commit is contained in:
cproudlock
2026-09-02 10:05:44 -04:00
parent 1480b30e8c
commit 27b2817fd7
76 changed files with 5930 additions and 173 deletions

View File

@@ -94,7 +94,15 @@ EXEMPT_ENDPOINTS = {'knowledgebase.track_click', 'users.update_user',
# kill switch. Enqueue (WebUI -> operator) IS permission-gated
# on endpoints.command and IS swept. Contract in
# plugins/endpoints/AGENT-CONTRACT.md section 7.
'endpoints.report_command_result'}
'endpoints.report_command_result',
# Agent-facing operator issue report upload. Authenticated by
# the endpoints collector API key (same shape as the exempt
# collector blueprint), not JWT+role: the tray hands the
# screenshot and note to the service, which uploads on the
# collector key it already holds. The human-facing read and
# image-serve routes ARE permission-gated on endpoints.view
# and ARE swept.
'endpoints.upload_operator_report'}
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)

View File

@@ -96,6 +96,14 @@ PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS = {
'endpoints.download_app_package',
'endpoints.download_app_package_by_app',
'endpoints.download_script_body',
# The endpoint agent fetches its server-resolved monitor watch-list (the
# processes/services site policy attaches to its PC type) on each telemetry
# cycle. Authenticated inside the handler by the endpoints collector API key
# - the same shape as claim_next_command - because a bay has no user session.
# It is a read of already-scoped policy output, not an authority: attaching a
# monitor is gated on the policy editor, audited with the requesting user.
'endpoints.resolved_monitors_for_agent',
}
# Reads that need a LOGIN but no named permission, because the handler decides