fix(installer): correct a false security claim, and clear the should-fix list

CLIENT IP / SPOOFABILITY. docs/geenforce-api-cutover.md claimed that removing the
IIS rewrite rule made the allowlist fail closed and that it does NOT become
spoofable. The opposite is true. IIS never sets X-Forwarded-For on its own; the
rule is the only thing that does. Remove it and IIS still forwards whatever
X-Forwarded-For the CALLER sent, waitress trusts it because it arrives from
127.0.0.1, and remote_addr becomes attacker-controlled - so a token-less caller
can fetch manifests from anywhere on the network. The document and the
_trusted_client_ip docstring now say so, waitress runs with
--trusted-proxy-count=1, and stage 5 checks the rule is actually live rather than
assuming it. The wizard question is rephrased to something an operator can verify
with their network team instead of guessing at.

NON-ASCII. The style gate only ever checked .py/.vue/.js/.ts, so documentation
accumulated em-dashes, arrows and box-drawing characters against this repo's own
convention - including in files added this week. Cleaned, and the gate now uses
INCLUDES_ALL so Markdown, JSON and YAML are covered.

PLUGIN DEFAULTS. The wizard pre-ticked measuringtools and printedparts, both of
which ship default_enabled=false, so every site taking the defaults installed and
enabled them against their manifests. Inno has no JSON parser so the list must be
hardcoded, but tests/test_installer_defaults.py now fails when it drifts.

UPGRADES. The payload copy merges, so a plugin dropped from a site's profile kept
its code forever - which defeats a lean build and leaves core's optional-import
guards succeeding for a plugin the site no longer has. Stale plugin directories
are now deregistered and removed before the copy.

add-plugin used 'plugin install', which for the five default_enabled=false
plugins left them installed but DISABLED - and printed a green success line
anyway. It now goes through apply-profile, and the success line is gated on the
exit code. Invoke-Flask records its own exit status, because $LASTEXITCODE keeps
a stale value when flask.exe is missing and no native command runs.

CHARSET. The utf8mb4 compiler hook lived inline in migrations/env.py, so it
covered the CORE chain only: plugin baselines inherited the server default, which
on a latin1 server means two charsets in one database. It is now
shopdb/utils/mysql_charset.py, imported by both, and preflight reports the
database's default charset.

BACKUP HONESTY. The dump was described as 'all of your asset data'. Uploaded
branding and floor-map images live in instance\ on disk, not in the database, so
a restore from the .sql alone comes back with no map. backup now archives
instance\ alongside it and says both are needed.

VERSIONING. AppVersion was hardcoded at 0.9.0 while the product, the frontend and
the newest tag said 0.7.0 - and 0.9.0 collides with a retired contract version.
Both builders now generate version.iss from shopdb/__init__.py.

Smaller: rollback overwrites .env before deleting it, as uninstall already did;
appcmd unlocks are scoped to this site's location rather than server-wide, with
the wide unlock as a fallback; DEVELOPMENT-SETUP says Python 3.14; the README
plugin list gains printedparts; prune-schema --force is documented as
first-provisioning-only; HTTPS is documented as not-the-default with the steps to
add it; the DBA SQL is on the wizard's database page; the features page says
unticking does not remove an installed feature; and the installer README states
that bundle-lock cannot vouch for the exe itself - that needs signing or an
out-of-band hash, neither of which is wired up.

plugins/geenforce/api/routes.py

@@ -52,12 +52,23 @@ def _trusted_client_ip():
     Uses request.remote_addr, NOT the raw X-Forwarded-For header. Proxies APPEND
     to X-Forwarded-For, so its first hop is attacker-controlled: parsing it (as
     _client_ip does for rate-limiting) would let any caller send
-    'X-Forwarded-For: <allowlisted-ip>' and bypass the token. remote_addr cannot
-    be forged here - behind IIS the URL-Rewrite rule overwrites X-Forwarded-For
-    with the real TCP peer and waitress (--trusted-proxy=127.0.0.1
-    --trusted-proxy-headers=x-forwarded-for) derives remote_addr from it; a
-    client hitting waitress directly is not a trusted proxy, so its remote_addr
-    is its own real peer address. Either way remote_addr is the true client.
+    'X-Forwarded-For: <allowlisted-ip>' and bypass the token.
+
+    DEPLOYMENT DEPENDENCY, not a property of this function. remote_addr is only
+    trustworthy because of what sits in front:
+
+      - Behind IIS, the URL-Rewrite rule OVERWRITES X-Forwarded-For with the real
+        TCP peer, and waitress (--trusted-proxy=127.0.0.1
+        --trusted-proxy-headers=x-forwarded-for) derives remote_addr from it.
+      - Remove that rule and IIS still forwards whatever X-Forwarded-For the
+        CALLER sent. waitress trusts it because it comes from 127.0.0.1, so
+        remote_addr becomes attacker-controlled and this allowlist is bypassable
+        from anywhere on the network. It does NOT fail closed.
+      - A client reaching waitress directly is not a trusted proxy, so there
+        remote_addr is its own peer address.
+
+    The rule is the control. See docs/geenforce-api-cutover.md; the Windows
+    installer enables it and verifies it is live at the end of an install.
     """
     return request.remote_addr or ''