feat(sbom): ship a CycloneDX bill of materials with every build
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An air-gapped site cannot be scanned from anywhere else, so when a CVE lands the
only way to answer 'is that component here, and at what version' was to RDP in
and go looking. The frontend was the real blind spot: nothing recorded which
version of leaflet, dompurify, jspdf or html2canvas ends up inside the compiled
SPA.

scripts/generate_sbom.py emits CycloneDX 1.6 covering both ecosystems - every pin
in requirements.txt with the sha256 the installer enforces, and every package in
package-lock.json. Build-only npm packages are marked scope 'excluded' rather
than dropped, so 'not here' stays distinguishable from 'not looked for'.
Dependency edges are real: uv's '# via' comments give the Python graph and
package-lock gives the npm one.

Hand-rolled rather than cyclonedx-py plus cyclonedx-npm because both inputs are
already pinned and committed - this is a format translation, not a scan - and
because the build box may be a work PC with nothing but Python and Node. It is
deterministic by construction: same inputs, byte-identical output, so
regenerating does not churn.

Staged into the application tree by both builders, so it installs onto the
server with the app. shopdb-admin.ps1 verify reports it and searches it by
component name, which is the question actually being asked.

Packages appearing at several depths in package-lock (node_modules/vite and
node_modules/vitest/node_modules/vite) are merged, and a copy reachable outside
the dev tree makes the component count as shipped. Emitting both produced
duplicate bom-refs, which CycloneDX forbids and scanners reject; getting the dev
merge backwards would have hidden a shipped package from a CVE search.

Not covered by bundle-lock.json on purpose: its provenance is git, not the
third-party payload.
This commit is contained in:
cproudlock
2026-08-03 13:15:27 -04:00
parent 1bf3cb2e1c
commit 3606d8d696
6 changed files with 579 additions and 0 deletions

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@@ -139,6 +139,32 @@ For the West Jefferson production server specifically, this is a **migration, no
an upgrade** - prod runs Python 3.13 against a hand-built deployment, so it needs
a deliberate window, a database backup, and web.config reconciled by hand.
## Bill of materials
Every build stages a CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM at `sbom.cdx.json`, inside the
application tree, so it installs onto the server with the app. Both ecosystems,
in one document:
- **Python** — every pin in `requirements.txt`, with the sha256 the installer
enforces. Environment markers are ignored: a `sys_platform == 'win32'`
dependency still installs on the target.
- **npm** — every package in `frontend/package-lock.json`. Build-only packages
are marked `scope: excluded` rather than dropped, so "not here" is
distinguishable from "not looked for".
It ships to the server because an air-gapped site cannot be scanned from
anywhere else. When a CVE lands, the answer is already on the box:
```powershell
shopdb-admin.ps1 verify # counts, and which bundle this is
shopdb-admin.ps1 verify -Path leaflet # is that component here, at what version
```
Generated by `scripts/generate_sbom.py` from files that are already pinned and
committed, so it is a translation rather than a scan — no network, no extra
toolchain on the build box, and byte-identical output for the same inputs. It is
deliberately not in `bundle-lock.json`: its provenance is git, not the payload.
## Client IP addresses
IIS does not set `X-Forwarded-For` on its own, and HttpPlatformHandler connects

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@@ -166,6 +166,15 @@ if (Test-Path $cfgSrc) {
Copy-Item $cfgSrc (Join-Path $AppOut 'deploy\windows') -Force
}
# A CycloneDX SBOM of everything this tree depends on, Python and npm together.
# Staged INTO the tree so it installs onto the server with the application: an
# air-gapped site cannot be scanned remotely, so the only way to answer "are we
# exposed to this CVE, and where" is for the answer to be sitting on the box.
Step 'Generating SBOM'
& $python.Source (Join-Path $RepoRoot 'scripts\generate_sbom.py') $RepoRoot `
-o (Join-Path $AppOut 'sbom.cdx.json') | ForEach-Object { Say " $_" 'White' }
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { Die 'SBOM generation failed' }
# Stage the profile INTO the tree: `flask plugin apply-profile` at provisioning
# reads the same profile the tree was staged from, so the installed plugin set
# and the shipped plugin code cannot drift.

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@@ -496,6 +496,39 @@ function Invoke-Verify {
Say ' no bundle-lock.json recorded (installed before payload locking, or by hand)' 'Yellow'
}
# The SBOM travels with the application, because a server on a vaulted
# network cannot be scanned from anywhere else. When a CVE lands, this is
# what answers "is that component here, and at what version" without needing
# the build box, the internet, or anyone's memory.
$sbom = Join-Path $AppRoot 'sbom.cdx.json'
if (Test-Path $sbom) {
try {
$b = Get-Content $sbom -Raw | ConvertFrom-Json
$shipped = @($b.components | Where-Object { $_.scope -eq 'required' }).Count
Say (" components : {0} ({1} shipped), CycloneDX {2}" -f `
$b.components.Count, $shipped, $b.specVersion)
Say (" bill of materials: {0}" -f $sbom) 'DarkGray'
Say ' search it with : shopdb-admin.ps1 verify -Path <name>' 'DarkGray'
} catch { Say ' sbom.cdx.json is present but unreadable' 'Yellow' }
# A named component turns this into the actual question being asked.
# Guarded on $b: an unreadable SBOM leaves it unset, and querying it then
# would report 'none', which reads as "you are not affected".
if ($Path -and $b) {
Say ''
Say (" matches for '{0}':" -f $Path) 'Cyan'
$hits = @($b.components | Where-Object { $_.name -like ('*' + $Path + '*') })
if (-not $hits) { Say ' none - this server does not carry it' 'Green' }
foreach ($h in $hits) {
$tag = if ($h.scope -eq 'required') { 'SHIPPED' } else { 'build only' }
Say (" {0,-40} {1,-14} {2}" -f $h.name, $h.version, $tag) `
$(if ($h.scope -eq 'required') { 'Yellow' } else { 'DarkGray' })
}
}
} else {
Say ' no SBOM recorded (installed before SBOMs shipped, or by hand)' 'Yellow'
}
# pip's own audit. It re-reads the metadata of what is actually installed and
# reports anything missing or version-inconsistent, which is the part that
# can still drift after install - a hand-run `pip install` on the server.