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Make main the lean product a site receives

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main was 16 days and 259 commits behind the line the product is actually built
on, at contract 0.30.0 against 0.35.0, with no per-PC credential code at all. It
was neither current nor curated - just stale. This brings it forward and, at the
same time, makes it mean something: main is what a receiving site installs, and
nothing else.

WHAT IT CARRIES. Twelve plugins - backups, computers, endpoints, guides,
knowledgebase, machines, network, notifications, printers, slides, tools,
warranty - plus applications, which is manifest-less core and always ships. The
only manifest dependency inside that set is endpoints on computers, and both are
in it, so the closure is self-contained.

WHAT IT DOES NOT. employees, geenforce, measuringtools, printedparts and usb
stay on the site line. So do the Windows installer tree, the VM rehearsal
helpers, the agent tooling config, one site's data loader, the internal audit
and findings records, and the planner spreadsheet. 1,135 tracked files against
1,438.

A REMOVAL THAT BREAKS THE APP IS NOT A REMOVAL, and two nearly shipped:

deploy/site-profile-universal.json still named all seventeen plugins. It is the
file docs/DEPLOY.md tells a site to provision from, so a fresh install would
have failed at `flask plugin apply-profile` with PluginError - the first thing a
receiving site does, broken by the branch meant to serve them. It now names the
twelve that exist, and its comment says the two must agree.

agent/ was never refreshed. Whoever populated this branch copied shopdb/,
plugins/, frontend/ and tests/ from the site line and left the agent tree at its
September state: 22 C# and PowerShell sources missing, including AgentCredentials,
EnrollmentService, AgentHttpFactory and the fleet-alert client, plus one file the
site line had deleted still present. The old tree is internally consistent, so it
compiles, and nothing in CI builds it - every gate was green over a server that
speaks enrollment and per-PC credentials to a bundled agent source that cannot.
Resynced whole.

DECISIONS THIS ENCODES, rather than defers:

- The plugin-authoring lab builds printedparts, whose manifest depends on
  employees, so it could not stay. The lab remains on the site line and main
  ships no build-along tutorial. That is a real loss for an adopting developer
  and is recorded here rather than discovered later.
- Recognition, Training and Recertification notifications are no longer seeded.
  Each splits one notification into a card per employee and renders a photo,
  which needs a plugin this branch does not bundle. Seeding them would offer an
  author a type that cannot resolve anybody. A site that installs employees gets
  them from that plugin's own seed.
- Windows/IIS is documented as the legacy path throughout, and the README leads
  with Docker, because that is what a receiving site gets.

The API description is regenerated for THIS branch - 347 paths and 483
operations, down from 415 and 573 - so the published contract describes what is
here rather than what the site line serves. docs/CONFIG.md lost the two
measuring-tool label keys the code no longer declares, which two lanes had
decided opposite ways.

Suite: 3124 passed, 6 skipped. Naming and style gates pass. The docs gates run
rather than skip, and every index line count is derived from the file it names.
This commit is contained in:
cproudlock
2026-09-19 11:24:40 -04:00
parent cb3975049c
commit 534f179ee6
675 changed files with 115759 additions and 60239 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

163
plugins/computers/api/policy_routes.py
View File

@@ -14,18 +14,91 @@ allowlist, so a bad tree or an unknown action never reaches the database.
from flask import request
from shopdb.api import (db, AuditLog, success_response, error_response,
ErrorCodes, require_permission)
ErrorCodes, require_permission, caller_holds)
from .routes import computers_bp
from ..models import (ConfigurationPolicy, ConfigurationPolicyAction,
BusinessPolicy, BusinessPolicyItem, POLICY_SOURCE_LOCAL,
POLICY_SOURCE_AUTOAPP, POLICY_SOURCE_SHIPPED,
ACTION_MODE_DESIRED, ACTION_MODE_GATE)
from ..policyflag import policy_flag_enabled
from ..services.apppolicy import disown_if_generated
from ..services.policyscope import validate_scope, ScopeError
_MODES = {ACTION_MODE_DESIRED, ACTION_MODE_GATE}
def _elevated_denial(actionnames):
"""Refuse unless the caller may author every elevated action in actionnames.
A policy is a deferred instruction to run something. Gating only the enqueue
route left authoring wide open: computers.edit alone could author a policy
carrying run_script and let the agent execute it, which is the whole point of
splitting the big four undone. The permission to CAUSE an action must be the
same permission required to RUN it.
caller_holds, not current_user.haspermission: a scoped personal token is a
narrower caller than its owner, and asking the owner is the exact bypass
require_permission exists to prevent.
"""
from plugins.endpoints.commands import elevated_permission_for
missing = []
for name in sorted(set(actionnames)):
elevated = elevated_permission_for(name)
if elevated and not caller_holds(elevated) and elevated not in missing:
missing.append(elevated)
if not missing:
return None
return error_response(
ErrorCodes.FORBIDDEN,
'This policy carries actions you may not author. Missing: '
+ ', '.join(missing),
http_code=403)
def _requested_actionnames(actions):
return [(row.get('action') or '').strip() for row in actions or []]
def _policy_actionnames(policy):
return [a.action for a in policy.actions]
def _composed_actionnames(configpolicyids):
"""Every action reachable through a set of configuration policies.
Composition is an authoring act: adding a configuration policy to a business
policy causes its actions to run on everything the business policy targets,
without the composer ever naming those actions.
"""
names = []
for cpid in configpolicyids:
policy = db.session.get(ConfigurationPolicy, cpid)
if policy:
names.extend(_policy_actionnames(policy))
return names
def _changes_effect(data, policy=None):
"""Whether this payload changes WHAT a policy does, rather than how it reads.
Scope widening, reactivation, priority and composition all change the effect
of an already-authored action without touching the action list, so gating the
action payload alone would leave every one of them open. Renaming a policy or
editing its description changes nothing that runs, so it stays ungated.
"""
for field in ('actions', 'items', 'scopejson', 'priority'):
if field in data:
return True
if 'isactive' in data:
# Only reactivation matters. Deactivating a policy cannot widen anything,
# and refusing it would strand a live policy nobody present can switch off.
was = getattr(policy, 'isactive', False) if policy is not None else False
return bool(data['isactive']) and not was
return False
def _feature_gate():
"""Return a 404 response when the policy feature is off, else None."""
if not policy_flag_enabled():
@@ -155,6 +228,10 @@ def create_configuration_policy():
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
f'Invalid scope: {exc}')
denial = _elevated_denial(_requested_actionnames(data.get('actions')))
if denial:
return denial
policy = ConfigurationPolicy(
name=name,
description=data.get('description'),
@@ -183,12 +260,30 @@ def update_configuration_policy(policy_id: int):
if not policy:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND,
'Configuration policy not found', http_code=404)
if policy.source != POLICY_SOURCE_LOCAL:
# An autoapp row is generated from an Application's "Required on all PCs"
# checkbox and IS editable: editing it is precisely how an admin takes
# ownership. A shipped row is editable for the same reason - the product
# ships a starting point, not an opinion about one site's floor - and keeps
# source='shipped' so provenance survives the edit. Genuinely external
# sources (a future managed owner) stay read-only.
if policy.source not in (POLICY_SOURCE_LOCAL, POLICY_SOURCE_AUTOAPP,
POLICY_SOURCE_SHIPPED):
return error_response(ErrorCodes.CONFLICT,
'Policy is managed externally and is read-only',
http_code=409)
data = request.get_json() or {}
# Both sides. The incoming actions are what the caller is asking to cause;
# the existing ones are what a scope widening or reactivation would newly
# unleash on machines that were never in range before.
if _changes_effect(data, policy):
names = list(_policy_actionnames(policy))
if 'actions' in data:
names.extend(_requested_actionnames(data['actions']))
denial = _elevated_denial(names)
if denial:
return denial
if 'name' in data:
newname = (data['name'] or '').strip()
if newname and newname != policy.name:
@@ -215,6 +310,10 @@ def update_configuration_policy(policy_id: int):
if err:
return err
# Hand-editing a generated policy transfers ownership: from here on the
# application checkbox will not delete it, it will warn instead.
disown_if_generated(policy)
AuditLog.log('updated', 'ConfigurationPolicy', entityname=policy.name)
db.session.commit()
return success_response(_configpolicy_dict(policy),
@@ -231,7 +330,11 @@ def delete_configuration_policy(policy_id: int):
if not policy:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND,
'Configuration policy not found', http_code=404)
if policy.source != POLICY_SOURCE_LOCAL:
# As with update: a generated or shipped row is the site's to remove, an
# externally managed one is not. A site that does not run MTConnect should
# be able to delete its monitor policy outright rather than carry it.
if policy.source not in (POLICY_SOURCE_LOCAL, POLICY_SOURCE_AUTOAPP,
POLICY_SOURCE_SHIPPED):
return error_response(ErrorCodes.CONFLICT,
'Policy is managed externally and is read-only',
http_code=409)
@@ -242,6 +345,11 @@ def delete_configuration_policy(policy_id: int):
ErrorCodes.CONFLICT,
f'Cannot delete: used by {inuse} business policy item(s)',
http_code=409)
# Deleting a gate policy REMOVES a restriction, so it changes what endpoints
# will run just as surely as authoring one does.
denial = _elevated_denial(_policy_actionnames(policy))
if denial:
return denial
db.session.delete(policy)
AuditLog.log('deleted', 'ConfigurationPolicy', entityname=policy.name)
db.session.commit()
@@ -324,6 +432,12 @@ def create_business_policy():
priority=data.get('priority', 100),
source=POLICY_SOURCE_LOCAL,
)
requested = [row.get('configurationpolicyid')
for row in data.get('items') or []]
denial = _elevated_denial(_composed_actionnames(
[cpid for cpid in requested if cpid is not None]))
if denial:
return denial
err = _apply_items(policy, data.get('items'))
if err:
return err
@@ -349,6 +463,20 @@ def update_business_policy(policy_id: int):
'Policy is managed externally and is read-only',
http_code=409)
data = request.get_json() or {}
# Composition is the quiet escalation: attaching a configuration policy runs
# its actions everywhere this business policy reaches, without the composer
# naming a single one of them.
if _changes_effect(data, policy):
cpids = [it.configurationpolicyid for it in policy.items]
for row in data.get('items') or []:
cpid = row.get('configurationpolicyid')
if cpid is not None:
cpids.append(cpid)
denial = _elevated_denial(_composed_actionnames(cpids))
if denial:
return denial
if 'name' in data:
newname = (data['name'] or '').strip()
if newname and newname != policy.name:
@@ -387,6 +515,10 @@ def delete_business_policy(policy_id: int):
return error_response(ErrorCodes.CONFLICT,
'Policy is managed externally and is read-only',
http_code=409)
denial = _elevated_denial(_composed_actionnames(
[it.configurationpolicyid for it in policy.items]))
if denial:
return denial
db.session.delete(policy)
AuditLog.log('deleted', 'BusinessPolicy', entityname=policy.name)
db.session.commit()
@@ -405,16 +537,29 @@ def list_policy_actions():
Returns command actions tagged kind='command'. Monitor attachments are not
listed here: the UI builds that branch from the endpoints monitor catalog
(endpointsApi.monitors) so newly created monitors appear without a reload.
Actions the caller may not author are marked rather than hidden. Hiding them
would make the editor look like the capability does not exist; marking them
says it exists and is not yours, which is the difference between a confusing
UI and an honest one. The authoring gate is enforced server-side regardless.
"""
gate = _feature_gate()
if gate:
return gate
from plugins.endpoints.commands import COMMAND_ALLOWLIST
return success_response([
{'action': name, 'label': meta.get('label'),
'description': meta.get('description'), 'kind': 'command'}
for name, meta in COMMAND_ALLOWLIST.items()
])
from plugins.endpoints.commands import (COMMAND_ALLOWLIST,
elevated_permission_for)
catalog = []
for name, meta in COMMAND_ALLOWLIST.items():
elevated = elevated_permission_for(name)
catalog.append({
'action': name,
'label': meta.get('label'),
'description': meta.get('description'),
'kind': 'command',
'requiredpermission': elevated,
'mayauthor': not elevated or caller_holds(elevated),
})
return success_response(catalog)
@computers_bp.route('/policies/effective/<int:asset_id>', methods=['GET'])