Make main the lean product a site receives

main was 16 days and 259 commits behind the line the product is actually built
on, at contract 0.30.0 against 0.35.0, with no per-PC credential code at all. It
was neither current nor curated - just stale. This brings it forward and, at the
same time, makes it mean something: main is what a receiving site installs, and
nothing else.

WHAT IT CARRIES. Twelve plugins - backups, computers, endpoints, guides,
knowledgebase, machines, network, notifications, printers, slides, tools,
warranty - plus applications, which is manifest-less core and always ships. The
only manifest dependency inside that set is endpoints on computers, and both are
in it, so the closure is self-contained.

WHAT IT DOES NOT. employees, geenforce, measuringtools, printedparts and usb
stay on the site line. So do the Windows installer tree, the VM rehearsal
helpers, the agent tooling config, one site's data loader, the internal audit
and findings records, and the planner spreadsheet. 1,135 tracked files against
1,438.

A REMOVAL THAT BREAKS THE APP IS NOT A REMOVAL, and two nearly shipped:

deploy/site-profile-universal.json still named all seventeen plugins. It is the
file docs/DEPLOY.md tells a site to provision from, so a fresh install would
have failed at `flask plugin apply-profile` with PluginError - the first thing a
receiving site does, broken by the branch meant to serve them. It now names the
twelve that exist, and its comment says the two must agree.

agent/ was never refreshed. Whoever populated this branch copied shopdb/,
plugins/, frontend/ and tests/ from the site line and left the agent tree at its
September state: 22 C# and PowerShell sources missing, including AgentCredentials,
EnrollmentService, AgentHttpFactory and the fleet-alert client, plus one file the
site line had deleted still present. The old tree is internally consistent, so it
compiles, and nothing in CI builds it - every gate was green over a server that
speaks enrollment and per-PC credentials to a bundled agent source that cannot.
Resynced whole.

DECISIONS THIS ENCODES, rather than defers:

- The plugin-authoring lab builds printedparts, whose manifest depends on
  employees, so it could not stay. The lab remains on the site line and main
  ships no build-along tutorial. That is a real loss for an adopting developer
  and is recorded here rather than discovered later.
- Recognition, Training and Recertification notifications are no longer seeded.
  Each splits one notification into a card per employee and renders a photo,
  which needs a plugin this branch does not bundle. Seeding them would offer an
  author a type that cannot resolve anybody. A site that installs employees gets
  them from that plugin's own seed.
- Windows/IIS is documented as the legacy path throughout, and the README leads
  with Docker, because that is what a receiving site gets.

The API description is regenerated for THIS branch - 347 paths and 483
operations, down from 415 and 573 - so the published contract describes what is
here rather than what the site line serves. docs/CONFIG.md lost the two
measuring-tool label keys the code no longer declares, which two lanes had
decided opposite ways.

Suite: 3124 passed, 6 skipped. Naming and style gates pass. The docs gates run
rather than skip, and every index line count is derived from the file it names.

shopdb/utils/apitoken_auth.py

@@ -190,8 +190,9 @@ def service_token_authorized(scope):
     Touches lastusedat on success.
 
     The single contract-surface entry point for unattended SERVICE tokens
-    (collector.ingest, geenforce.fetch, ...), so plugins authorize a service
-    token without reaching into core token internals. Returns False on any
+    (collector.ingest and any permission a plugin declares for a machine caller
+    of its own), so plugins authorize a service token without reaching into core
+    token internals. Returns False on any
     miss; the caller returns its own 401.
     """
     return authorized_service_token(scope) is not None

shopdb/utils/authz.py

@@ -125,6 +125,32 @@ def caller_holds(permission_name: str) -> bool:
     return True
 
 
+def caller_is_role(rolename: str) -> bool:
+    """Whether THIS caller holds a role, without refusing the request.
+
+    The body-answering counterpart to require_role, for a route that serves
+    everyone but treats one class of caller differently - break-glass override
+    being the case that prompted it.
+
+    A scoped personal token is ALWAYS refused here, matching require_role: scopes
+    gate individual permissions, not roles. This is the invariant that keeps a
+    leaked scoped agent token from inheriting override authority just because the
+    token's owner happens to be an admin. A scoped PAT is a narrower caller than
+    its owner, including when that owner is an admin.
+
+    Guests hold no roles, so an unauthenticated caller is always False.
+    """
+    user = currentuser()
+    if user is None:
+        return False
+    try:
+        if get_jwt().get('patscopes') is not None:
+            return False
+        return user.hasrole(rolename)
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+
+
 def require_permission(permission_name: str):
     """Gate a route behind a single permission. Admin role bypasses.
 
@@ -182,11 +208,11 @@ def require_permission(permission_name: str):
 def require_any_permission(*permission_names):
     """Gate a route behind ANY ONE of several permissions. Admin bypasses.
 
-    For a read that two different rights should reach. GE-Enforce and Slides
-    are the cases: a GET was gated on the MANAGE permission, because managing
-    was the only thing anybody did there. Splitting a read permission out would
-    have locked out every existing manager, so a read now accepts either, and
-    the read permission is the one a site can hand to a guest.
+    For a read that two different rights should reach. Slides is the case: a
+    GET was gated on the MANAGE permission, because managing was the only thing
+    anybody did there. Splitting a read permission out would have locked out
+    every existing manager, so a read now accepts either, and the read
+    permission is the one a site can hand to a guest.
 
     A scoped PAT must carry one of the names, and its owner must hold that same
     one - the intersection rule of require_permission, applied per name.

shopdb/utils/badges.py

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 """What a scanned badge looks like, in one place.
 
-Two kiosks read the same physical badges and disagreed about them. The parts
-kiosk understood both shapes a scanner emits; the USB kiosk took the string
-raw and compared it to an SSO, so the wrapped form was simply "not recognized".
-An operator whose keyboard-wedge scanner emits `0270015376BZ` could take a
-3D-printed part and could not check out a drive - with the same badge, at two
-cabinets a few metres apart.
+Two callers read the same physical badges and disagreed about them. One
+understood both shapes a scanner emits; the other took the string raw and
+compared it to an SSO, so the wrapped form was simply "not recognized". The
+same operator, with the same badge, was recognised at one screen and not at the
+next. Anything that turns a scan into a person uses this module, so there is
+one answer to the question.
 
 The shapes:
 
@@ -17,9 +17,9 @@ of NON-ASCII digits is not, however much it looks like one: Arabic-Indic digits
 pass Python's str.isdigit(), and a badge written in them was accepted, stored as
 the employee's SSO, and joined to nothing afterwards.
 
-This lives in core rather than in either plugin because a plugin may not import
-another plugin, and because a badge is a property of the site, not of a
-cabinet.
+This lives in core rather than in a plugin because a plugin may not import
+another plugin, and because a badge is a property of the site. Its consumer
+today is the notifications plugin, which resolves an employee by SSO.
 """
 
 import re

shopdb/utils/cmmc_usb_db.py

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-"""Connection helper for the CMMC USB check-in/out database.
-
-Credentials are pulled from app config (env-backed, see Config.CMMC_USB_DB_*),
-never hardcoded. Used by the USB plugin to track device check-in/out against a
-separate MySQL database (cmmc_usb), mirroring the read-only employee-directory
-pattern in employee_db.py. Unlike the employee DB this one is read-write, so
-callers commit their own writes and close the connection in a finally block.
-"""
-
-import pymysql
-from flask import current_app
-
-
-def _setting_or_config(setting_key, config_key):
-    """Non-secret config: a saved Setting wins, else the env-backed app config.
-
-    Lets the setup wizard edit host/name/user without touching .env, while the
-    password stays env-only.
-    """
-    from shopdb.core.models import Setting
-    try:
-        row = Setting.query.filter_by(key=setting_key).first()
-        if row and row.value:
-            return row.value
-    except Exception:
-        pass
-    return current_app.config[config_key]
-
-
-def cmmc_usb_connection():
-    """Open a pymysql connection to the cmmc_usb DB."""
-    return pymysql.connect(
-        host=_setting_or_config('cmmc_usb_db_host', 'CMMC_USB_DB_HOST'),
-        user=_setting_or_config('cmmc_usb_db_user', 'CMMC_USB_DB_USER'),
-        password=current_app.config['CMMC_USB_DB_PASSWORD'],
-        database=_setting_or_config('cmmc_usb_db_name', 'CMMC_USB_DB_NAME'),
-        cursorclass=pymysql.cursors.DictCursor,
-    )

shopdb/utils/import_mode.py

@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@ needs two things the normal API withholds:
 
   1. Preserve each row's original createddate/modifieddate instead of stamping
      "now" on insert/update.
-  2. Backdate event history such as USB checkouts to when they really happened.
+  2. Backdate event history - a notification acknowledgement, an endpoint
+     event - to when it really happened rather than to the import run.
 
 Both are gated. The caller must BOTH be an admin AND send the request header
 `X-Import-Mode: true`. Outside import mode every helper here is a no-op, so

shopdb/utils/ipallowlist.py

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+"""Network-position allowlists for unauthenticated kiosk routes.
+
+A kiosk route writes without a login. The device token (see the kiosk views)
+covers unattended screens an administrator provisions once, but it does not fit
+the other caller: somebody opening the kiosk page on their own PC, who never
+logs in and whose browser nobody provisioned. Per-browser provisioning would
+mean touching every PC on the floor and losing it again on the next reimage.
+What those callers have in common is where they are on the network.
+
+Fails closed, in every direction that matters:
+  - an empty or absent setting matches nothing (the feature is off),
+  - an unparseable caller address matches nothing,
+  - a malformed entry in the list is skipped rather than widening the match.
+
+SPOOF RESISTANCE IS A DEPLOYMENT PROPERTY, NOT A PROPERTY OF THIS CODE.
+The caller address comes from client_ip(), which reads remote_addr and never
+the raw X-Forwarded-For header - reading that header directly would let any
+caller send 'X-Forwarded-For: <allowlisted-ip>' and walk straight through.
+remote_addr is only the real client because of what sits in front of the app:
+behind IIS the URL-Rewrite rule overwrites X-Forwarded-For with the real TCP
+peer and ProxyFix resolves it into remote_addr (TRUSTED_PROXY_COUNT). Remove
+that rule and IIS forwards whatever the caller sent; waitress trusts it because
+it arrives from 127.0.0.1, remote_addr becomes attacker-controlled, and every
+allowlist built on this becomes bypassable from anywhere on the network. It
+does NOT fail closed in that case. The rewrite rule is the control, and every
+allowlist a plugin builds on this helper inherits that dependency.
+
+Callers store plain CIDR strings rather than references to subnet records: a
+site that does not run the network plugin still has to be able to configure
+this, and a stored allowlist must not break when an inventory row is deleted.
+"""
+
+import ipaddress
+
+from shopdb.utils.clientip import client_ip
+
+
+def ip_in_cidrs(address, rawcidrs):
+    """True when `address` falls inside any CIDR in the comma-separated list.
+
+    Pure and side-effect free so it can be tested without a request context.
+    """
+    raw = (rawcidrs or '').strip()
+    if not raw:
+        return False
+    try:
+        caller = ipaddress.ip_address((address or '').strip())
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+    for part in raw.split(','):
+        part = part.strip()
+        if not part:
+            continue
+        try:
+            if caller in ipaddress.ip_network(part, strict=False):
+                return True
+        except ValueError:
+            continue
+    return False
+
+
+def request_ip_allowlisted(request_obj, rawcidrs):
+    """True when the request's client address is inside the allowlist."""
+    return ip_in_cidrs(client_ip(request_obj), rawcidrs)