Split the fleet roster from per-endpoint reads, and stop offering controls nobody can use
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Twelve endpoints routes shared one permission, which made a reasonable policy
impossible to express. A site that wants signed-out visitors to see live status
on a PC page had to hand them the entire fleet - including every logged-in
username on the floor - because the per-asset panels and the fleet-wide list
were gated on the same string.

endpoints.fleet now gates the list and the three dashboard routes.
endpoints.view keeps the per-asset reads: status, services, processes,
interfaces, events, command history.

The name is load-bearing. guest_grantable_permissions() opens any '.view' or
'.read' permission to the guest role, so calling this one 'endpoints.fleet'
rather than 'endpoints.fleetview' is what keeps the roster off the public
surface while per-asset telemetry stays grantable. Verified both ways.

Also: the services panel emitted Start/Stop row actions to every reader,
because row_actions_for() never consulted the caller. Clicking was always
refused server-side, so nothing was exploitable, but showing a read-only viewer
controls over a shop-floor PC is the wrong signal - and it stops being cosmetic
the moment a site grants that panel to guests.

That needed a contract addition rather than a local check: caller_holds() on
shopdb.api answers whether THIS caller holds a permission without refusing the
request, which is the complement to require_permission for a surface that
serves everyone but should only offer what the caller can act on. Guests are
included, since a signed-out visitor holds whatever the guest role was granted.
Reaching into shopdb.utils.authz instead would repeat the ADR-002 violation the
contract gate caught earlier in this branch. Contract 0.24.0 -> 0.25.0.

DEPLOYMENT: endpoints.fleet is a new permission. Run 'flask seed permissions'
and grant it to the roles that should keep seeing the Fleet page. Until then
that page is admin-only, since admins bypass every check - a safe direction,
but not an automatic one.

Full suite 2124 passed, naming and contract gates green, map and spec
regenerated.
This commit is contained in:
cproudlock
2026-08-28 21:14:27 -04:00
parent 4ef22b6579
commit 54f0857e13
7 changed files with 72 additions and 13 deletions

View File

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ never by editing this file.
| series | value | governed by |
|---|---|---|
| product `__version__` | `0.12.0` | ADR-007 |
| plugin contract `__contract_version__` | `0.24.0` | ADR-002 |
| plugin contract `__contract_version__` | `0.25.0` | ADR-002 |
They move independently. A contract bump is not a release.
@@ -90,6 +90,6 @@ Manifest-less directories under `plugins/` are core frontend surface and always
## Size
- test functions defined: **1448** (parametrised cases collect higher)
- test functions defined: **1449** (parametrised cases collect higher)
- documented API paths: **331** (`docs/openapi.json`, regenerate with `scripts/gen_openapi.py`)