Document the ten new endpoint routes and undo the stray re-indent
Two of the three things holding the wilm import out of main. The monitor CRUD, the two resolver reads and the three operator-report routes had no entry in docs/api-inventory.json, so test_api_inventory_parity failed. The gate cannot run on the published mirror - the test ships but its data file is scrubbed, and it skips on the file's absence - which is why the branch that added the routes never saw it. Cost lands here at promotion time instead. /api/endpoints is registered both with and without a trailing slash and both forms are served, so both are described rather than guessing which one counts. Spec regenerated: 353 paths, 504 operations. plugins/endpoints/plugin.py had a contiguous run of continuation lines shifted by one space. Python accepted it and git diff -w showed nothing, but it put deletions in a diff that is otherwise purely additive. Restored; the file now differs from the published main by additions only. Scope: product
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@@ -167,19 +167,19 @@ class EndpointsPlugin(BasePlugin):
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# running a staged script or pushing an installer is a strictly
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# heavier grant than a routine service/process toggle.
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('endpoints.deploy',
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'Run staged scripts and push application installers to endpoints', 'endpoints'),
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# Packaging the agent is a heavier grant than deploying to one, and
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# it is not the same job either: the generated ZIP carries a live
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# collector key stamped into its install script, so whoever holds
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# this can mint a distributable artefact containing the fleet-wide
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# command-channel credential. It was require_role('admin'), which
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# this codebase otherwise reserves for the few genuinely
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# role-shaped checks - and a role cannot be granted to one person
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# for one job the way a permission can.
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('endpoints.agentpackage',
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'Generate and download an agent or adoption-tool package '
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'(contains a live collector key)', 'endpoints'),
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# Collector service scope for the endpoint agent. A managed token
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'Run staged scripts and push application installers to endpoints', 'endpoints'),
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# Packaging the agent is a heavier grant than deploying to one, and
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# it is not the same job either: the generated ZIP carries a live
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# collector key stamped into its install script, so whoever holds
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# this can mint a distributable artefact containing the fleet-wide
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# command-channel credential. It was require_role('admin'), which
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# this codebase otherwise reserves for the few genuinely
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# role-shaped checks - and a role cannot be granted to one person
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# for one job the way a permission can.
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('endpoints.agentpackage',
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'Generate and download an agent or adoption-tool package '
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'(contains a live collector key)', 'endpoints'),
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# Collector service scope for the endpoint agent. A managed token
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# scoped to ONLY this authorizes the endpoints collector and nothing
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# else, so rotating/revoking it stops endpoint-agent traffic without
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# touching computers/geenforce collectors. Minted from the settings
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