ADR-013 Phase 2: enforcement + signed shelf + adopt
Completes the marketplace security model. Verification stops being advisory: a plugin only loads or migrates when its tree matches a trusted signature, and plugins are pulled from a signed shelf with anti-rollback and revocation. Enforcement (default OFF - existing deploys unchanged): - verification.py PluginVerifier, shared by the loader (verify-at-load, before plugin.py is imported) and the migration manager (verify-at-migrate, before any DDL). Fail-closed: an unsigned/tampered/wrong-key plugin does not run. - Gated by PLUGIN_REQUIRE_SIGNED. PLUGIN_DEV_TRUST_DIRS exempts named dirs but only under DEBUG/TESTING; production ignores it. - flask plugin stamp-bundled writes provenance into in-tree plugins so verify-at-load applies to bundled plugins too (image build step). - tier:core manifest guard: uninstall/disable refuse a core-tier plugin. Shelf (shelf.py): - Signed shelf-index.json (+ .sig): monotonic serial (a site refuses an older index - anti-rollback), revoked list carried across builds, per-entry version/tier/core_version for browse. Index is a browse layer only; adopt reads security-bearing fields from the verified artifact. - flask plugin shelf-build / shelf-list / adopt / audit. adopt verifies index + artifact (signature + every file hash), unpacks to staging, re-verifies, then atomically moves into place and installs+enables the closure. Refuses a downgrade without --force-downgrade. Anti-rollback serial stored in instance/shelf-state.json. - config PLUGIN_SHELF_DIR; the app only reads the folder, never speaks a network. .env.example + docs/PLUGIN-SIGNING.md document the flow. 22 tests: verifier policy (off / no-keys / signed / tampered / wrong-key / dev-exempt), verify-at-load + verify-at-migrate integration, tier guard, index sign/verify + tamper/wrong-key, serial state, revocation, version resolution, verified atomic unpack + tamper refusal. Live-smoked keygen->pack->shelf-build ->list->adopt->audit + serial guard. 1050 pass, naming green.
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@@ -70,6 +70,25 @@ class Config:
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if path.strip()
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]
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# When true, a plugin only loads/migrates if its tree matches a trusted
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# signature (verify-at-load, verify-at-migrate). Default false = existing
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# behavior. Turn on only after stamping plugins + pinning keys.
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PLUGIN_REQUIRE_SIGNED = os.environ.get(
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'PLUGIN_REQUIRE_SIGNED', 'false').lower() == 'true'
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# Directories whose unsigned plugins are trusted - honored ONLY under
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# DEBUG/TESTING (the external-repo/symlink dev workflow). Production ignores.
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PLUGIN_DEV_TRUST_DIRS = [
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path.strip()
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for path in os.environ.get('PLUGIN_DEV_TRUST_DIRS', '').split(os.pathsep)
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if path.strip()
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]
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# Read-only folder the app pulls plugin artifacts from (a SharePoint-synced
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# or copied shelf). Empty = no shelf configured. The app never speaks any
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# network protocol; it reads this folder.
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PLUGIN_SHELF_DIR = os.environ.get('PLUGIN_SHELF_DIR', '')
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ZABBIX_ENABLED = os.environ.get('ZABBIX_ENABLED', 'false').lower() == 'true'
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ZABBIX_URL = os.environ.get('ZABBIX_URL', '')
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ZABBIX_TOKEN = os.environ.get('ZABBIX_TOKEN', '')
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