Give each endpoint its own credential and fix the review findings on the server
Per-PC credentials (replaces the 09-14 client-certificate attempt): - POST /api/endpoints/enroll issues a credential to a PC that matches exactly one computer by hostname and BIOS serial and has none yet. Anything else (unknown or duplicate hostname, serial mismatch, already enrolled) waits as a request an admin approves or rejects. The agent's persisted nonce binds an approved request to the PC that asked. - One auth helper serves every agent route. With X-Endpoint-Credential the asset comes from the credential and a request naming another PC gets 403 ASSET_MISMATCH. The shared key still works for PCs that have not enrolled, is refused (401 SHARED_KEY_REFUSED) for any PC that has, and can be switched off. A revoked credential gets 401 CREDENTIAL_INVALID so the agent re-enrolls. - The core collector accepts the credential for the computers, printers and endpoints collectors through two new plugin hooks exposed on shopdb.api (contract 0.33.0), and refuses the shared key for enrolled PCs. - Admin API: enrollment list, approve, reject, revoke (un-enroll), settings. Migration API: per-PC readiness with blockers, and upgrade waves that package the agent once and queue the existing agent upgrade per PC. - Migration 0023 creates endpointcredentials, endpointenrollrequests and endpointmigrationwaves, drops the certificate columns from assets where test databases have them, and renames app_fingerprint to appfingerprint. 0021 and 0022 keep their ids but no longer alter the core assets table. - Removed: client_cert.py, certificate renewal, the unauthenticated /test/client-cert route, nginx client certificate forwarding and the agent certificate script. The client-cert header could be forged on IIS, the key was readable by users, and the shared key remained a fallback. - GET /settings/server-cert returns the SPKI SHA-256 pin for GE-Enforce. Review fixes: - report_command_result used g without importing it; every result was a 500. - collect_log refuses setup answer files, appsettings, agent directories and key files at enqueue. - Fleet alerts: alerttimeout and alertfleet agree with the migration, the scope is validated and a malformed scope no longer reaches the whole fleet, and the ack race no longer raises NameError. - A refused break-glass override leaves no hold and no audit row. - Agent upgrade checks locks and permissions before repackaging, and writes the package atomically. - Server certificate upload validates the pair before replacing files; generation no longer builds an openssl config from user input; audit rows are actually written. - Health evaluation runs in a savepoint so a caught error cannot lose the check-in. - Required-app policies are found by appid, survive renames, and deleting an app deactivates policies that still name it. The UI and API now say such a policy only takes effect inside a business policy. - Backfill handles duplicate fingerprints and rolls back a failed batch. - Plugin settings routes skip a plugin whose hook raises. - The setup token is no longer printed to the log. - The naming gate checks top-level files again and handles odd file names. - Removed root scratch scripts, one of which carried a token. - Rewrote the fleet alert scheduling and app delta tests on real fixtures.
This commit is contained in:
cproudlock
157
tests/test_plugins/test_endpoints_server_certificate.py
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157
tests/test_plugins/test_endpoints_server_certificate.py
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"""Server TLS certificate upload and generate routes.
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The new pair must be parsed, and the key proven to match the certificate,
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BEFORE the existing files are backed up or replaced: a bad upload must leave
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nginx's current certificate exactly where it was. cn and san must be plain
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hostname/IP syntax; anything else (newlines, '=', brackets) is refused.
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"""
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import io
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
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import pytest
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from cryptography import x509
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, serialization
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
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from cryptography.x509.oid import NameOID
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from plugins.endpoints.api import routes as endpoint_routes
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UPLOAD_URL = '/api/endpoints/settings/server-cert/upload'
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GENERATE_URL = '/api/endpoints/settings/server-cert/generate'
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@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
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def cert_dir(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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directory = tmp_path / 'certs'
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directory.mkdir()
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monkeypatch.setattr(endpoint_routes, '_server_cert_dir', lambda: directory)
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monkeypatch.setattr(endpoint_routes, '_restart_nginx', lambda: None)
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return directory
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def _pair(cn='old.example.test'):
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key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
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name = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, cn)])
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now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
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certificate = (x509.CertificateBuilder()
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.subject_name(name).issuer_name(name)
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.public_key(key.public_key())
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.serial_number(x509.random_serial_number())
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.not_valid_before(now - timedelta(days=1))
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.not_valid_after(now + timedelta(days=30))
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.sign(key, hashes.SHA256()))
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cert_pem = certificate.public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM)
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key_pem = key.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM,
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serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8,
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serialization.NoEncryption())
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return cert_pem, key_pem
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def _seed_existing(cert_dir):
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cert_pem, key_pem = _pair('existing.example.test')
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(cert_dir / 'server.crt').write_bytes(cert_pem)
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(cert_dir / 'server.key').write_bytes(key_pem)
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return cert_pem, key_pem
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def _upload(client, headers, cert_bytes, key_bytes):
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return client.post(UPLOAD_URL, headers=headers,
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content_type='multipart/form-data',
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data={'cert': (io.BytesIO(cert_bytes), 'server.crt'),
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'key': (io.BytesIO(key_bytes), 'server.key')})
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def test_a_matching_pair_replaces_and_backs_up(client, db, auth_headers, cert_dir):
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from shopdb.api import AuditLog
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old_cert, old_key = _seed_existing(cert_dir)
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new_cert, new_key = _pair('new.example.test')
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response = _upload(client, auth_headers, new_cert, new_key)
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assert response.status_code == 200, response.get_json()
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assert (cert_dir / 'server.crt').read_bytes() == new_cert
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assert (cert_dir / 'server.key').read_bytes() == new_key
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backups = sorted(p.name for p in cert_dir.iterdir() if '.backup.' in p.name)
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assert len(backups) == 2
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assert not [p for p in cert_dir.iterdir() if p.name.endswith('.tmp')]
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assert AuditLog.query.filter_by(
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action='endpoints.server_cert.uploaded').count() == 1
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def test_a_mismatched_key_touches_nothing(client, db, auth_headers, cert_dir):
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old_cert, old_key = _seed_existing(cert_dir)
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new_cert, _new_key = _pair('new.example.test')
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_other_cert, other_key = _pair('other.example.test')
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response = _upload(client, auth_headers, new_cert, other_key)
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assert response.status_code == 400
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assert 'does not match' in response.get_json()['data']['error']['message']
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assert (cert_dir / 'server.crt').read_bytes() == old_cert
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assert (cert_dir / 'server.key').read_bytes() == old_key
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assert sorted(p.name for p in cert_dir.iterdir()) == ['server.crt', 'server.key']
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def test_garbage_certificate_touches_nothing(client, db, auth_headers, cert_dir):
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old_cert, _old_key = _seed_existing(cert_dir)
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_cert, key = _pair()
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garbage = b'-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nnope\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n'
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response = _upload(client, auth_headers, garbage, key)
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assert response.status_code == 400
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assert (cert_dir / 'server.crt').read_bytes() == old_cert
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assert len(list(cert_dir.iterdir())) == 2
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@pytest.mark.parametrize('cn', [
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'host\nprompt = yes',
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'bad host',
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'a=b',
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'[alt_names]',
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'a' * 65,
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])
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def test_generate_refuses_unsafe_cn(client, db, auth_headers, cert_dir, cn):
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_seed_existing(cert_dir)
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response = client.post(GENERATE_URL, headers=auth_headers,
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json={'cn': cn, 'days': 30})
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assert response.status_code == 400
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assert len(list(cert_dir.iterdir())) == 2
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@pytest.mark.parametrize('san', [
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'DNS:ok.example.test,DNS:bad\nname',
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'IP:999.1.1.1',
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'URI:http://x',
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'DNS:a b',
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])
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def test_generate_refuses_unsafe_san(client, db, auth_headers, cert_dir, san):
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_seed_existing(cert_dir)
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response = client.post(GENERATE_URL, headers=auth_headers,
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json={'cn': 'ok.example.test', 'san': san,
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'days': 30})
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assert response.status_code == 400
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assert len(list(cert_dir.iterdir())) == 2
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def test_generate_installs_a_valid_pair(client, db, auth_headers, cert_dir):
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from shopdb.api import AuditLog
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_seed_existing(cert_dir)
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response = client.post(GENERATE_URL, headers=auth_headers,
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json={'cn': 'shopdb.example.test',
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'san': 'DNS:shopdb.example.test,IP:10.0.0.5',
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'days': 30})
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assert response.status_code == 200, response.get_json()
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certificate = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(
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(cert_dir / 'server.crt').read_bytes())
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assert certificate.subject.get_attributes_for_oid(
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NameOID.COMMON_NAME)[0].value == 'shopdb.example.test'
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assert endpoint_routes._validate_certificate_pair(
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(cert_dir / 'server.crt').read_bytes(),
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(cert_dir / 'server.key').read_bytes()) is None
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assert AuditLog.query.filter_by(
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action='endpoints.server_cert.generated').count() == 1
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