Decide guest grants explicitly instead of by permission name
guest_grantable_permissions() opened any permission whose name ended
'.view' or '.read' to the guest role, on the reasoning that reading is
the safe default. That is true of a permission gating a list of asset
numbers and false of one gating bytes, and a suffix cannot tell them
apart. Twenty-four of eighty-five qualified and none had been decided:
applications.view reached the SYSTEM-context PowerShell bodies and
the installer binaries pushed to bays
backups.view returned the full payload that the separate
backups.download permission exists to protect
assets.view gated a global search that queries the staff
directory, USB history and network inventory with
no per-domain check of its own
audit.view usernames, addresses, the before/after of every
settings.view change, and every setting row - both admin
category, opened by naming alone
users.view gates nothing at all; list_users is
require_role('admin')
Every entry is now declared, by CORE_GUEST_GRANTABLE or by the plugin
that owns the permission, having read what its routes actually return.
Adding one is a code change, which is the point: it puts the decision
in a diff rather than in a suffix.
The two routes serving script bodies and installer packages move to a
new applications.download permission, which is not grantable, so a site
can still open the catalogue metadata to its floor without the bytes
going with it.
The declared set preserves the grants this site had already chosen:
applications.view, computers.view, endpoints.view, reports.view,
tools.secrets, warranty.view.
Two known gaps are recorded on the hooks that expose them rather than
silently carried: the computer serializer publishes every column plus
resolved rdp:// and vnc:// links, and the per-asset endpoint panels are
keyed on a small integer so walking ids reconstructs much of the roster
that endpoints.fleet exists to protect. Neither is widened here.
A shipped test was granting guests audit.view and passing.
Scope: product
(cherry picked from commit 347402896c)
This commit is contained in:
@@ -656,13 +656,17 @@ def upload_application_package(app_id: int):
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@applications_bp.route('/package/<path:filename>', methods=['GET'])
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@require_permission('applications.view')
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@require_permission('applications.download')
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def serve_application_package(filename):
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"""Download an uploaded installer.
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Authenticated, unlike the image: this is licensed vendor software, and an
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open URL would publish it to anything that can reach the site. Always sent
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as an attachment so a browser saves it rather than trying to render it.
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Gated on applications.download, not applications.view: a guest may be
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granted the metadata permission, and "an open URL would publish it" is just
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as true of a URL any anonymous visitor can reach.
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"""
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return send_upload(_apppackage_dir(), filename, as_attachment=True)
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@@ -196,11 +196,15 @@ def upload_script_body(script_id: int):
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@scripts_bp.route('/body/<path:filename>', methods=['GET'])
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@require_permission('applications.view')
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@require_permission('applications.download')
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def download_script_body(filename: str):
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"""Operator-facing script body download (JWT/RBAC).
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The endpoint agent uses the collector-authenticated plugin route instead;
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this one is for humans reviewing what a script does.
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Gated on applications.download, not applications.view: this serves the
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SYSTEM-context PowerShell a site pushes to its bays, and a guest may be
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granted the metadata permission.
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"""
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return send_upload(_script_dir(), filename, as_attachment=True)
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@@ -351,19 +351,20 @@ def update_role(roleid: int):
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# Update permissions
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if 'permissions' in data and role.rolename != 'admin':
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# The guest role is anyone with no account, so what it may hold is
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# bounded: reads, plus the handful of writes a plugin has explicitly
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# declared safe to do anonymously. Refused at the door rather than
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# warned about - a checkbox that quietly makes deleting an asset
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# anonymous is not a warning anybody reads twice.
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# bounded to what core or a plugin has explicitly declared grantable.
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# Refused at the door rather than warned about - a checkbox that
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# quietly makes deleting an asset anonymous is not a warning anybody
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# reads twice.
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if role.rolename == Role.GUEST:
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allowed = guest_grantable_permissions()
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refused = sorted(set(data['permissions']) - allowed)
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if refused:
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
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'The guest role cannot hold {}. A guest may be granted any '
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'view permission, and only writes a plugin has declared '
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'safe to do without an account.'.format(', '.join(refused)))
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'The guest role cannot hold {}. A guest may only be '
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'granted permissions core or the owning plugin has '
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'declared grantable, which is a code change rather than a '
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'setting.'.format(', '.join(refused)))
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old_perms = [p.name for p in role.permissions]
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perms = Permission.query.filter(Permission.name.in_(data['permissions'])).all()
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new_perms = [p.name for p in perms]
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