Let a site open secure send to guests, and choose how many times a link opens
Two asks, and the first is a real security decision so it is a SETTING that defaults to the safe answer rather than a code change somebody inherits. securesend_allow_guests, OFF by default. With it off the model is unchanged: a login plus tools.secrets. With it on, somebody with no account - at a shared bay terminal, a contractor - can create a link too. The cost is named in the setting's own description and pinned by a test: a guest secret has NO CREATOR, so the audit trail can say when and from where but never who. That is the whole reason it is a switch a person turns on deliberately. IT FAILS CLOSED. A missing row, a half-migrated site, an unhappy database - the answer is no. An error must never be the thing that opens an unauthenticated write endpoint. A SIGNED-IN USER STILL NEEDS THE PERMISSION even when guests are allowed, which is surprising enough that a test pins it: opening the door to guests is a decision about the door, not about revoking what a role holds. Guest creation is rate limited per address, same shape as the login limiter. Not a security boundary - a determined person has more addresses - but an open endpoint should not be an easy place to park data or fill a disk. VIEWS ARE NOW A NUMBER, 1 to 100, instead of a four-item dropdown. How many people need a password is the sender's business: a shift handover is not one colleague on a call. The floor is what matters, not the ceiling - unlimited views would just be a password on a web page. Also folded in, from the retention question: nothing removed a secret that EXPIRED WITHOUT BEING OPENED. The recipient goes on holiday, the link is never clicked, and the ciphertext sat there for good - not readable, but it made "nothing lingers" untrue and grew the table in exactly the case where the feature failed. Any create now sweeps expired rows and a late click tidies its own, so it stays bounded without a scheduler an air-gapped site would never add. Two gates caught mistakes on the way: current_user is a LocalProxy and is never None, so `current_user is None` silently took the signed-in branch for a guest; and cache was imported straight from shopdb.extensions when it is already on the shopdb.api contract surface. 1836 tests green.
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@@ -159,3 +159,86 @@ def test_an_unknown_token_answers_the_same_as_a_spent_one(client, auth_headers):
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assert spent.status_code == never.status_code == 404
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assert (spent.get_json()['data']['error']['message']
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== never.get_json()['data']['error']['message'])
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# ------------------------------------------------- guests, when a site allows
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def _allow_guests(db, allowed=True):
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from shopdb.core.models import Setting
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row = Setting.query.filter_by(key='securesend_allow_guests').first()
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if row is None:
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row = Setting(key='securesend_allow_guests', valuetype='boolean',
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category='tools')
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db.session.add(row)
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row.value = 'true' if allowed else 'false'
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db.session.commit()
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def test_a_guest_is_refused_by_default(client, db):
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"""Default OFF. An unauthenticated write endpoint is not something to get
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by accident."""
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_allow_guests(db, False)
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resp = client.post('/api/tools/secrets', json={'ciphertext': CIPHER, 'iv': IV})
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assert resp.status_code in (401, 403, 422)
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def test_a_guest_can_create_once_a_site_allows_it(client, db):
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_allow_guests(db, True)
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resp = client.post('/api/tools/secrets', json={'ciphertext': CIPHER, 'iv': IV})
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assert resp.status_code in (200, 201), resp.get_data(as_text=True)[:300]
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assert resp.get_json()['data']['token']
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def test_a_guest_secret_has_no_creator(client, db):
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"""The cost of the setting, pinned: the audit trail can say when and from
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where, but never who."""
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_allow_guests(db, True)
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token = client.post('/api/tools/secrets',
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json={'ciphertext': CIPHER, 'iv': IV}
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).get_json()['data']['token']
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secret = SecureSecret.query.filter_by(token=token).first()
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assert secret.createdbyuserid is None
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def test_guest_creation_is_rate_limited(client, db):
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"""An open endpoint must not be an easy place to park data."""
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from plugins.tools.api.routes import GUEST_CREATE_MAX
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_allow_guests(db, True)
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codes = [client.post('/api/tools/secrets',
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json={'ciphertext': CIPHER, 'iv': IV}).status_code
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for _ in range(GUEST_CREATE_MAX + 2)]
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assert 429 in codes, codes
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def test_a_signed_in_user_still_needs_the_permission(client, db, member_headers):
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"""Opening the door to guests is a decision about the DOOR, not about
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revoking what a role holds."""
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_allow_guests(db, True)
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resp = client.post('/api/tools/secrets',
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json={'ciphertext': CIPHER, 'iv': IV},
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headers=member_headers)
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assert resp.status_code == 403
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------- retention
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def test_an_expired_secret_nobody_opened_is_swept(client, db, auth_headers):
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"""Nothing removed a secret that was never clicked: the recipient goes on
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holiday and the ciphertext sits there for good."""
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
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token = _create(client, auth_headers).get_json()['data']['token']
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secret = SecureSecret.query.filter_by(token=token).first()
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secret.expiresat = (datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(tzinfo=None)
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- timedelta(hours=1))
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db.session.commit()
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# Any later create sweeps it, without a scheduler existing anywhere.
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_create(client, auth_headers)
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assert SecureSecret.query.filter_by(token=token).first() is None
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def test_a_custom_view_count_is_allowed(client, auth_headers):
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from plugins.tools.api.routes import MAX_VIEWS
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assert _create(client, auth_headers, views=25).status_code in (200, 201)
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assert _create(client, auth_headers, views=MAX_VIEWS).status_code in (200, 201)
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assert _create(client, auth_headers, views=MAX_VIEWS + 1).status_code == 400
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