Act on the five-agent review of the wilm import

Findings the reviewers verified, fixed here. The larger cluster they found is
NOT fixed and is listed at the end.

Frontend. reportImageUrl is called from the template, so it ran on every render
with no in-flight guard: a report whose fetch was pending was re-requested, and
because each resolution reassigns the map the whole grid re-rendered and
re-fired the rest, costing up to N-squared requests for N thumbnails. Two blobs
resolving for one key orphaned the first object URL where revoke could not
reach it, and a failure was never recorded so a broken image retried forever.
Guarded, deduplicated, failures remembered.

Three CSS variables did not exist, so their hardcoded fallbacks always won:
--bg-alt (the "No screenshot" tile, near-black in light mode), and
--warning-text/-bg/-border (dark khaki on a dark modal). Replaced with real
tokens. The DEV badge's literal #c62828 is var(--danger).

Installer and launcher. The generated site installer ran docker compose with no
-p, so the project name defaulted to the package folder - which carries the
version. Installing the next version created a new project with new empty
volumes and the site came up looking wiped, old data stranded under the old
project. Pinned to shopdb-<channel>.

Start-ShopDBDev deleted any existing -TargetDir that lacked a .git, recursively
and without asking. For a script handed round as "save it anywhere and run it",
a mistyped -TargetDir pointed at Documents would have destroyed it. It now only
reclaims a directory that is empty or carries this launcher's own marker, and
refuses otherwise.

Dev secrets came from Get-Random, which is System.Random: a 32-bit seed, and all
four values off one stream, so recovering one recovers the rest. They sign JWTs
for a stack a pilot may point at real imported data. CSPRNG now, and the API
port binds to loopback like the DB rather than every interface.

Two of my own from earlier in this session. The operator-report size check sat
below request.form, and the first access to that parses and spools the whole
multipart - so it ran after the thing it prevents. Moved above. And the channel
remap missed build-channel-installer.ps1 entirely, where it set BOTH channels to
main: a "stable" package built from the trunk, the exact mislabel the remap was
for. stable now resolves the newest v* tag.

Also removed a zero-byte docs/ShopDB-Planner-Tasks-v2.csv that rode in.

NOT FIXED - needs a decision, and it is the biggest thing the review found.
Migrations 0006/0007 freeze the originating site's fleet convention into
product seed: a shipped policy literally named "RPCA Shopfloor App Monitors",
a hardcoded 'Shopfloor PC' type deciding who gets the shipped watch-list, and
shipped rows the API refuses to edit or deactivate - including their launch
paths. A site whose eDNC is on another drive cannot correct it and gets
permanent false drift. Those are stamped migrations, so this gets harder to
undo at every install. See the review notes before anyone upgrades a second
site through 0006-0007.

Suite 2314 passing, frontend 316, all three PowerShell files parse.

Scope: product

plugins/computers/frontend/views/ConfigurationPoliciesList.vue

@@ -310,9 +310,9 @@ async function remove(p) {
   margin: 2px 0 0;
   padding: 6px 8px;
   font-size: 0.85em;
-  color: var(--warning-text, #8a6d3b);
-  background: var(--warning-bg, rgba(240, 173, 78, 0.12));
-  border: 1px solid var(--warning-border, rgba(240, 173, 78, 0.4));
+  color: var(--warning-dark);
+  background: var(--bg);
+  border: 1px solid var(--warning);
   border-radius: 4px;
 }
 </style>

plugins/endpoints/api/routes.py

@@ -1851,6 +1851,20 @@ def upload_operator_report():
     if error is not None:
         return error
 
+    # Refuse an oversized body BEFORE anything parses it. content_length is a
+    # header, so it is readable without touching the body; request.form is not
+    # - the first access to it makes werkzeug parse the whole multipart and
+    # spool the file part to a temp file. An earlier version of this check sat
+    # below that line and so ran after the thing it exists to prevent. The
+    # value is caller-supplied, which is why this is an early out and not the
+    # enforcement; the bounded read below is.
+    declared = request.content_length or 0
+    if declared > OPERATOR_REPORT_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES + _OPERATOR_REPORT_FORM_SLACK:
+        return error_response(
+            ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
+            'screenshot exceeds the {} byte limit'.format(
+                OPERATOR_REPORT_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES))
+
     hostname = (request.form.get('hostname') or '').strip()
     if not hostname:
         return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
@@ -1869,18 +1883,6 @@ def upload_operator_report():
     imagemimetype = None
     imagebytesize = None
 
-    # Refuse an oversized body BEFORE reading it. The cap used to be checked
-    # after upload.read(), which pulls the whole thing into memory first - the
-    # check could not prevent what it was there to prevent. content_length is
-    # caller-supplied so it is a cheap early out, not the enforcement; the read
-    # below is still bounded.
-    declared = request.content_length or 0
-    if declared > OPERATOR_REPORT_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES + _OPERATOR_REPORT_FORM_SLACK:
-        return error_response(
-            ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
-            'screenshot exceeds the {} byte limit'.format(
-                OPERATOR_REPORT_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES))
-
     upload = request.files.get('screenshot')
     if upload is not None and upload.filename:
         # Read one byte past the cap: enough to know it was exceeded, without