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Document the upload, proof and forecast endpoints
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Ten routes shipped over the last few commits without reaching the inventory,
which is the file everything else is generated from - openapi.json, the /api/docs
browser, and the per-site build. An endpoint absent from it is invisible to
anyone integrating against the API even though it answers requests.

The auth notes matter more than the paths. API-REFERENCE tells a deployment
reviewer that essentially every GET is optional-auth; two of these are not, and
an exception buried in a table of 372 operations is one nobody reads. The
installer download and the warranty proof are called out with why: one is
licensed vendor software, the other carries pricing and a service tag. The
application image is listed with the fully public endpoints, since tiles render
before login.
This commit is contained in:
cproudlock
2026-08-12 12:06:25 -04:00
parent ea35a134fe
commit a64796f060
4 changed files with 302 additions and 1 deletions
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13
docs/API-REFERENCE.md
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@@ -96,6 +96,18 @@ Two auth patterns dominate the reads:
Every mutating endpoint (POST / PUT / PATCH / DELETE) requires a JWT and is
gated by `require_role` or `require_permission`; none are public.
Two GETs deliberately break the optional-auth convention and require a
permission, because what they return is not asset metadata but a file that
carries value or liability of its own:
| Endpoint | Requires | Why |
|---|---|---|
| `GET /api/applications/package/<filename>` | `applications.view` | Licensed vendor installers. An anonymous URL is a redistribution channel. |
| `GET /api/warranty/proof/<filename>` | `warranty.view` | Invoices and certificates carry pricing and a service tag. |
Their sibling upload/delete routes are `applications.edit` / `warranty.edit`
like any other mutation.
### Fully public endpoints (auth = none)
| Endpoint | Purpose |
@@ -107,6 +119,7 @@ gated by `require_role` or `require_permission`; none are public.
| `GET /api/settings/branding/<filename>` | Serve site branding assets (logo, etc.). |
| `GET /api/settings` and `GET /api/settings/<key>` | Read-only, and only the public allowlist: the `branding` and `map` categories, a few named site keys, plus any key a plugin declares `public` in `get_settings_defaults` (e.g. `printedparts_label_prefix`, which the logged-out parts kiosk renders). Every other key answers 404 to an anonymous caller. |
| `GET /api/models/image/<filename>` | Serve a model image. |
| `GET /api/applications/image/<filename>` | Serve an application image (tiles render before login). |
| `GET /api/dashboard/navigation` | Public navigation tree. |
| `GET /api/dashboard/health` | Liveness / health probe. |
| `GET /api/plugins/enabled` | List enabled plugins (no claims used). |