Write down the tool that was built, not the one that was tabled
Secure Send shipped on 21 August and nothing outside the code caught up. The roadmap still listed it under Deferred as "tabled", and gave as the reason that the tools plugin is browser-only by design with get_blueprint and get_models both empty - which stopped being true in the same day's commits that gave it a blueprint, a table, a migration chain, a permission and a setting. A reader following the roadmap would have concluded the feature does not exist. The generated API docs were fine: api-inventory.json and openapi.json both carry /api/tools/secrets, so the contract gates did their job. What was missing was every word written for a person, and that is the half where the security properties live. docs/SECURE-SEND.md is the new page. The parts worth having in prose rather than inferring from the code: that a lost secret is lost to everybody including an administrator, which is the same property as "a compromised database yields nothing" seen from the other side; that the 4096-character limit is the entire server-side enforcement, because a server that cannot read what it holds cannot have an opinion about content, so raising it turns a password tool into an unaudited file transfer; that redeeming is a POST because preview prefetch in chat and mail clients would otherwise spend a one-view secret before the recipient ever sees it; and that somebody should send a link to themselves through their own mail or chat client and confirm the key survives after the # before a real credential goes through it, because a product that rewrites links can strip the fragment and nothing on this side can help. securesend_allow_guests was in the database, on a settings page, and in no document. It is now in CONFIG.md with what it actually does - an unauthenticated write endpoint, rate limited per address, failing closed - rather than only its one-line description. Also corrected along the way: site_base_url was documented as scheme + host while the code deliberately tolerates a subpath in it, and the bundled plugin table in PLUGINS.md had no row for tools at all. Still missing after this: PLUGINS.md has no row for backups either.
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@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ read back through the API.
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| `setup_complete` | `false` | Set true once the first-run wizard finishes; gates the `/setup` route. |
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| `employee_directory_mode` | `selfhosted` | `selfhosted` (tables in this app) or `external` (a separate HR database, see `EMPLOYEE_DB_*`). |
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| `usb_directory_mode` | `selfhosted` | `selfhosted` or `external` (a separate `cmmc_usb` database, see `CMMC_USB_DB_*`). |
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| `site_base_url` | (empty) | Public base URL (scheme + host) for QR codes and absolute links. Blank = use the browsing origin. |
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| `site_base_url` | (empty) | Public base URL for QR codes and absolute links. Scheme + host, optionally including the subpath a site is served under (`https://host/shopdb`). Blank = use the browsing origin. |
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| `facility_name` | (empty) | Facility name in the dashboard header. Blank = frontend falls back to `ShopDB`. |
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| `pc_access_domain` | `device.geaerospace.net` | Domain appended to a PC hostname for remote-access links. Blank = hostname as-is. |
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| `employeeid_pattern` | `^\d{9}$` | Regex a search term must match to be treated as an employee id. Invalid regex falls back to the default and never 500s. |
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@@ -322,6 +322,21 @@ intersected with the owner's live permissions at use time, and suspends the
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admin bypass, so it is denied on role-gated (admin-only) endpoints and on import
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mode. Use an unscoped token for admin-only work and imports.
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### tools
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| Key | Default | Notes |
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|-----|---------|-------|
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| `securesend_allow_guests` | `false` | Let people with no account create Secure Send links. Public (readable before login) so the create page can show a guest the form instead of a sign-in wall. Off by default: a guest secret has no creator, so the audit trail can say when and from where but never who. Receiving a secret never needs an account either way. |
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Turning this on makes creation an unauthenticated write, bounded at 10 links per
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address per 10 minutes. A signed-in user still needs the `tools.secrets`
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permission, so a member without it cannot create one while a guest can - opening
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the door to guests is a decision about the door, not about revoking what a role
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holds. The setting fails closed if it cannot be read.
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See [SECURE-SEND.md](SECURE-SEND.md) for the whole feature, including why the
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server cannot recover a secret and what the size limit is doing.
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### identifiers (dynamic)
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One boolean key per asset identifier per asset type, keyed
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