Security: mask settings secrets, remove hardcoded employee-DB creds
- GET /settings now masks password/token values (were returned in plaintext to anonymous callers); sending the mask back on update is a no-op so the real secret is never clobbered. - Move the employee-directory DB credentials out of source into env-backed config (shopdb.utils.employee_db); employees + notification recognition use the shared helper. Employee lookups stop leaking exception strings. - Fix low-supplies report using loc.location instead of loc.locationname. Employee/notification read endpoints stay unauthenticated by design (public shopfloor kiosk displays consume them). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -13,6 +13,22 @@ settings_bp = Blueprint('settings', __name__)
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SETTINGS_CACHE_KEY = 'system_settings'
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SETTINGS_CACHE_TTL = 300 # 5 minutes
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# Placeholder returned in API responses for secret values so they are never
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# exposed in plaintext. Sending it back on update is treated as "unchanged".
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SECRET_MASK = '********'
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def _is_secret(key: str) -> bool:
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return 'password' in key or 'token' in key or 'secret' in key
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def _serialize_setting(setting):
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"""Serialize a setting, masking secret values so they never leave the API."""
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data = setting.to_dict()
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if _is_secret(setting.key):
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data['value'] = SECRET_MASK if setting.value else ''
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return data
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def get_cached_settings():
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"""Get all settings from cache or database."""
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@@ -42,7 +58,7 @@ def list_settings():
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query = query.filter_by(category=category)
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settings = query.order_by(Setting.category, Setting.key).all()
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return success_response([s.to_dict() for s in settings])
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return success_response([_serialize_setting(s) for s in settings])
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@settings_bp.route('/<key>', methods=['GET'])
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@@ -54,7 +70,7 @@ def get_setting(key: str):
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if not setting:
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return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, f'Setting {key} not found', http_code=404)
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return success_response(setting.to_dict())
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return success_response(_serialize_setting(setting))
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@settings_bp.route('/<key>', methods=['PUT'])
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@@ -74,15 +90,21 @@ def update_setting(key: str):
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# Track old value for audit
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old_value = setting.value
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# Convert value to string for storage
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value = data['value']
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# A secret submitted as the mask placeholder means "leave unchanged" - the
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# client only ever received the mask, so don't overwrite the real secret.
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if _is_secret(key) and value == SECRET_MASK:
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return success_response(_serialize_setting(setting), message='Setting unchanged')
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# Convert value to string for storage
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if isinstance(value, bool):
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setting.value = 'true' if value else 'false'
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else:
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setting.value = str(value) if value is not None else None
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# Audit log (mask sensitive values)
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is_sensitive = 'password' in key or 'token' in key or 'secret' in key
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is_sensitive = _is_secret(key)
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AuditLog.log('updated', 'Setting', entityname=key, changes={
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'value': {
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'old': '***' if is_sensitive else old_value,
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@@ -93,7 +115,7 @@ def update_setting(key: str):
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db.session.commit()
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invalidate_settings_cache()
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return success_response(setting.to_dict(), message='Setting updated')
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return success_response(_serialize_setting(setting), message='Setting updated')
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@settings_bp.route('', methods=['POST'])
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