Security closeout: settings public allowlist, audit.view gating, test-user guard

Settings exposure (review medium): GET /api/settings and /api/settings/<key>
now return the full table only to an authenticated principal. Unauthenticated
callers (kiosk dashboards, print pages, login screen, setup router) get just a
public allowlist - categories branding + map plus a named set (site_base_url,
facility_name, printer_hostname_template, contact_email_domain,
servicenow_enabled, setup_complete). A non-public single-key GET returns 404 so
existence is not confirmed. Secrets stay masked in both cases. Closes the
unauthenticated enumeration of smtp_host / employee_db_host / zabbix_url /
servicenow URLs. Allowlist mirrors the keys siteSettings.js + mapConfig.js +
setupState.js read before login.

audit.view (review low): the three audit-read routes (list, entity-history,
stats) were jwt_required only despite a defined-but-unwired audit.view
permission; now gated by it (seeded to admin), so a role-less member or unscoped
PAT can no longer read the cross-user audit trail.

flask seed test-user (review low): refuses outside DEBUG/TESTING - it creates
the well-known admin/admin123; production sites use `flask seed admin`.

Tests: unauthenticated allowlist + authed-full-masked + private-key-404, and
member-403 / admin-200 on audit routes. 336 authz tests pass; naming green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

shopdb/core/api/auditlogs.py

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required
 
 from shopdb.core.models import AuditLog
 from shopdb.utils.responses import success_response
+from shopdb.utils.authz import require_permission
 
 auditlogs_bp = Blueprint('auditlogs', __name__)
 
@@ -51,6 +52,7 @@ def _resolve_full_names(ssos):
 
 @auditlogs_bp.route('', methods=['GET'])
 @jwt_required()
+@require_permission('audit.view')
 def list_auditlogs():
     """
     List audit logs with filtering and pagination.
@@ -134,6 +136,7 @@ def list_auditlogs():
 
 @auditlogs_bp.route('/entity/<entitytype>/<int:entityid>', methods=['GET'])
 @jwt_required()
+@require_permission('audit.view')
 def get_entity_history(entitytype: str, entityid: int):
     """Get audit history for a specific entity."""
     logs = AuditLog.query.filter_by(
@@ -146,6 +149,7 @@ def get_entity_history(entitytype: str, entityid: int):
 
 @auditlogs_bp.route('/stats', methods=['GET'])
 @jwt_required()
+@require_permission('audit.view')
 def get_stats():
     """Get audit log statistics."""
     from sqlalchemy import func

shopdb/core/api/settings.py

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 import os
 
 from flask import Blueprint, request, current_app, send_from_directory
-from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required
+from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required, get_jwt_identity
 from werkzeug.utils import secure_filename
 
 from shopdb.extensions import db, cache
@@ -45,6 +45,24 @@ SETTINGS_CACHE_TTL = 300  # 5 minutes
 # exposed in plaintext. Sending it back on update is treated as "unchanged".
 SECRET_MASK = '********'
 
+# Public-settings allowlist. An UNAUTHENTICATED caller (kiosk dashboards, print
+# pages, the login screen, the setup router) may read only these; everything
+# else (smtp_host, employee_db_host, zabbix_url, servicenow URLs, ...) needs a
+# valid token. Secrets stay masked in both cases. Keep in sync with the keys
+# frontend/src/utils/siteSettings.js + mapConfig.js + setupState.js read before
+# login. Whole categories that are purely presentation are allowed wholesale;
+# the rest are named keys so a new integration key does not leak by default.
+PUBLIC_SETTING_CATEGORIES = {'branding', 'map'}
+PUBLIC_SETTING_KEYS = {
+    'site_base_url', 'facility_name', 'printer_hostname_template',
+    'contact_email_domain', 'servicenow_enabled', 'setup_complete',
+}
+
+
+def _is_public_setting(setting) -> bool:
+    return (setting.category in PUBLIC_SETTING_CATEGORIES
+            or setting.key in PUBLIC_SETTING_KEYS)
+
 # Optional asset identifiers and the asset types they can be toggled on.
 # Drives per-type seed keys and the Settings matrix UI. The asset type names
 # match the AssetType.assettype values seeded by each plugin.
@@ -200,6 +218,10 @@ def list_settings():
         query = query.filter_by(category=category)
 
     settings = query.order_by(Setting.category, Setting.key).all()
+    # Unauthenticated callers see only the public allowlist (branding + a few
+    # bootstrap keys); an authed principal sees everything (secrets masked).
+    if get_jwt_identity() is None:
+        settings = [s for s in settings if _is_public_setting(s)]
     return success_response([_serialize_setting(s) for s in settings])
 
 
@@ -212,6 +234,11 @@ def get_setting(key: str):
     if not setting:
         return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, f'Setting {key} not found', http_code=404)
 
+    # A non-public key is invisible to an unauthenticated caller (404, not 403,
+    # so its existence is not confirmed either).
+    if get_jwt_identity() is None and not _is_public_setting(setting):
+        return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, f'Setting {key} not found', http_code=404)
+
     return success_response(_serialize_setting(setting))