Build GE-Enforce manifest-store plugin (P0/P1): model, importer, parity gate
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First execution phases of docs/proposals/ge-enforce-plugin.md. The GE-Enforce
manifest becomes shopdb data.

P0 scaffold: new geenforce plugin (api_prefix /api/geenforce, default_enabled
false, core_version >=0.7.0). Registered in PLUGIN_TABLE_OWNERS (ADR-008); its
0001 baseline really creates the tables.

P1a model: one wide manifestentries table + entrytype discriminator (not STI,
not JSON blob), manifestscopes (UNIQUE scopename+phase), the three multi-value
filter child tables, inusechecks + processes, immutable manifestpublishedversions
(frozen rendered JSON), manifestpayloads (inline, capped), pctypealiases
(mirror of the engine lib's alias graph). regvalue stored as its raw JSON
literal so DWord typing survives.

P1c importer + exporter: parse common + gea-shopfloor-* + preinstall.json into
draft rows and rebuild the JSON verbatim from rows in sortorder.

P1d parity harness (GATE A): filters.py mirrors the engine's four filter
functions + alias graph; parity.py proves import+export is behaviorally lossless
(field-identical + same-entries-fire across 18 machine-profile fixtures) WITHOUT
byte-diffing. Verified PASS against all 11 real reference manifests (64 entries)
and a synthetic site-neutral fixture covering every type/filter (the CI gate).

First slice (gea-shopfloor-cmm shape): service layer (import/publish/rollback/
export-to-share), CLI (parity, import-share, publish, export-share), and the
client endpoint GET /api/geenforce/manifest serving the current published
snapshot (never the draft) with ETag/304. Split permissions
geenforce.manage/publish/fetch. Tests prove import->publish->serve, draft edits
never change served bytes, publish+rollback, and auth (401 unauth/wrong-scope).

Contract 0.11.0: added service_token_authorized(scope) to shopdb.api so plugin
service endpoints authorize a scoped managed token without importing core token
internals. Documented in PLUGIN-HOOKS.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
cproudlock
2026-07-12 16:53:18 -04:00
parent cf2f9c308e
commit d85b33bd68
24 changed files with 1830 additions and 3 deletions

View File

@@ -32,7 +32,11 @@ from .plugins import plugin_manager
# catalog. Consumed by full_permission_catalog() (core + enabled plugins),
# which backs seeding, the role grid, and API-token scope validation. Additive
# optional hook, minor bump.
__contract_version__ = '0.10.0'
# 0.11.0: added service_token_authorized(scope) to shopdb.api so a plugin's
# unattended endpoints (e.g. the GE-Enforce fetch API) can authorize a scoped
# managed service token without importing core token internals. Additive name
# on the import surface, minor bump.
__contract_version__ = '0.11.0'
# Product release version (see ADR-007). The product version and the
# plugin-contract version above are distinct series with independent

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@@ -58,6 +58,11 @@ from shopdb.utils.pagination import get_pagination_params, paginate_query
# Authorization decorators for gating plugin write routes
from shopdb.utils.authz import require_permission, require_role
# Service-token authorization for unattended plugin endpoints (collector,
# GE-Enforce fetch, ...): checks a scoped managed token without exposing token
# internals.
from shopdb.utils.apitoken_auth import service_token_authorized
# Import-mode helpers: preserve legacy timestamps during a bulk data import
from shopdb.utils.import_mode import (
apply_import_timestamps,
@@ -254,6 +259,7 @@ __all__ = [
# Authorization decorators
'require_permission',
'require_role',
'service_token_authorized',
# Import-mode helpers
'apply_import_timestamps',
'import_mode_active',

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@@ -42,6 +42,11 @@ PLUGIN_TABLE_OWNERS: dict[str, Iterable[str]] = {
'computers': ('computertypes', 'computers', 'computerinstalledapps',
'accessprotocols', 'computeraccess'),
'employees': ('directoryemployees',),
'geenforce': ('manifestscopes', 'manifestentries', 'manifestentrypctypes',
'manifestentryhostnames', 'manifestentrymachinenumbers',
'manifestinusechecks', 'manifestinusecheckprocesses',
'manifestpublishedversions', 'manifestpayloads',
'pctypealiases'),
'knowledgebase': ('knowledgebase',),
'machines': ('machinetypes', 'machines'),
'measuringtools': ('measuringtooltypes', 'measuringtools'),

View File

@@ -76,6 +76,40 @@ def touch_apitoken_lastused(token):
db.session.commit()
def service_token_authorized(scope):
"""True when the current request carries a managed token scoped for `scope`
whose owner is active and holds that permission. Accepts X-API-Key or a
Bearer PAT (the before_request shim resolves Bearer into g.apitokenid).
Touches lastusedat on success.
The single contract-surface entry point for unattended SERVICE tokens
(collector.ingest, geenforce.fetch, ...), so plugins authorize a service
token without reaching into core token internals. Returns False on any
miss; the caller returns its own 401.
"""
from shopdb.core.models import User
api_key = request.headers.get('X-API-Key')
token = None
if api_key and api_key.startswith(TOKEN_SECRET_PREFIX):
resolved = resolve_api_token(api_key)
token = resolved[0] if resolved else None
else:
tokenid = getattr(g, 'apitokenid', None)
if tokenid is not None:
token = db.session.get(ApiToken, tokenid)
if token is None:
return False
scopelist = token.scopelist
if not scopelist or scope not in scopelist:
return False
user = db.session.get(User, token.userid)
if user is None or not user.isactive or not user.haspermission(scope):
return False
touch_apitoken_lastused(token)
return True
def install_apitoken_auth(app):
"""Register the before_request PAT shim on the app."""