ge-aerospace/shopdb-flask
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
839 Commits 6 Branches 28 Tags
dev
Commit Graph

17 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
cproudlock
6e36df841e Import the wilm endpoint telemetry, PC Detail rework and backup overlay 
Ports 37 of Benjamin Baker's commits from the wilm branch, mirrored from the
corporate GitHub at 7905917c. wilm rides the publication lineage and shares no
ancestor with wj, so this is a filtered tree patch rather than a merge:
94 files, and every path the publication export strips (docs/, tools/, mcp/,
CLAUDE.md, start-*.sh, .gitea/, the three excluded tests) is held back, because
a raw diff would delete each of them from this tree.

What comes across:

* Endpoint telemetry, phase 2. Physical disk health from two sources, NIC link
  state, boot type, Defender health, processor/memory/chassis inventory, the
  listening TCP set, mapped network drives and Windows Update history. Five
  additive migrations, 0012 through 0016, off the 0011 head.
* Mapped drives are collected by a probe running in the interactive user's
  session, because they do not exist in the agent's session 0. Two Windows
  sources can disagree about one drive and the worse status wins, so a
  half-broken share is never rendered as healthy.
* Windows events are reported once each, keyed on the channel's own record id,
  instead of being re-sent whenever a report overlapped the last one.
* PC Detail rework: Details cards flow, the hand-written Network card gives way
  to a full address history, Storage and disk health merge into one card with
  two sections, Operator Reports and Corporate Tools get their own tabs.
* An opt-in restic backup overlay with a third container, restore gated on the
  dump's own data revision rather than the code head, and backup/restore history.
* The agent's version is read from the binary's PE version rather than trusted
  from the csproj, and the Fleet view gains an Agent Version column.
* The enqueue route now asks caller_holds instead of the owner's permissions,
  which closes the scoped-token elevation on run_script, update_app and
  system_restart.

Held back deliberately:

* agent/installer/install-shopdbagent.ps1 stays deleted, as upstream deleted it.
  The installer that reaches a bay is generated by _install_script() in
  plugins/endpoints/api/siteagent.py; the standalone script had stopped being
  shipped and was collecting fixes no endpoint ever ran.
* The .gitignore hunk adding docs/*.md. Correct on the publication lineage,
  where docs/ becomes the wiki and its absence is how the gates detect a
  published checkout. Here it would silently ignore every new doc.
* Their deletions of docs/DEV-BUILD-TEST.md and docs/PLUGIN-HOOKS.md. Upstream
  those were stubs; here PLUGIN-HOOKS.md is the 31KB document CLAUDE.md points
  readers at.
* Five zero-byte files committed by an accidental `git add -A`, a run log from
  the author's own machine, and docs/notes/, which is working scratch that says
  so in its own header and belongs in devnotes/ on this side.

Carried with the import so it lands green: the 17 new routes are described in
docs/api-inventory.json with the spec and project map regenerated, and two new
frontend specs read fixtures through fileURLToPath(URL) which node rejects under
jsdom's own URL global.

Suite 2591 passed / 9 skipped; frontend 391 passed; naming, style and doc gates
clean.

Scope: product
 2026-09-06 16:47:24 -04:00
cproudlock
12392a361e Refuse a value the database cannot store, instead of quietly changing it 
Wave 2 of the remediation plan. Eight findings from the feature test run were
the same defect twice: a write that reports success while storing something
other than what was sent.

The first half is a date parser that swallowed its own error. Two plugins
carried an identical private _parse_date returning None on ValueError, so an
unparseable date and a deliberately cleared one produced the same write.
PUT /api/warranty/<id> with enddate '30-06-2027' answered 200 "Warranty
updated" and stored NULL, dropping the record out of every expiry surface on
the strength of a typo; the measuring-tool calibration date did the same and
flipped the tool to 'unknown', out of the calibration report and the map
overlay. shopdb/utils/datevalues.py now holds one strict parser on the contract
surface: an explicitly empty value clears the field, anything that is not a
date is refused with a 400 naming the field, and those are different intents
with different answers. The vendor-lookup paths keep a lenient wrapper on
purpose - a provider changing its date shape must not fail the refresh of an
otherwise good record, and no person typed that value.

The second half is why the truncation findings were possible at all. MySQL was
running non-strict: sql_mode on the 5.6 server is NO_ENGINE_SUBSTITUTION with
no STRICT_TRANS_TABLES, so it accepted writes it could not store and adjusted
them. A 257-character username became its first 100 characters (and the next
distinct one then collided with it); an over-long asset number was cut at 50; a
malformed releasedate became '0000-00-00' and permanently broke every read of
that application. All with a 201. The mode is now set on the CONNECTION rather
than left to the server, so a site whose my.cnf disagrees still gets it.

That trades silent corruption for a DataError, which uncaught is a 500 - and a
500 says the server is broken when the truth is that the value does not fit. An
error handler maps it to a 400 naming the column where MySQL names one.
Verified by hand against MySQL 5.6: POST /api/users with a 257-character
username now answers 400 "That value is too long for username." and stores
nothing, where it previously stored a truncated row and answered 201.

Twelve tests. The date guard is verified by planting: restore the swallowing
parser and four of them fail. The DataError tests raise the error directly
because the suite runs on SQLite, which does not enforce VARCHAR length at all -
there is no value that would trigger it there, which is precisely why this went
unnoticed.

Scope: product
 2026-09-03 13:58:41 -04:00
cproudlock
405a2ef919 Cap request bodies, close a hole in the gate, fix to_dict and two settings pages 
Six fixes that were ours regardless of what the sister site does. Four came out
of our own reviews; two you reported from the settings pages.

MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH was set nowhere. Every upload route caps its own payload, but
each of those checks runs after the body has arrived: the first touch of
request.form or request.files makes Werkzeug parse the whole multipart and spool
the file to a temp file, so a route can reject the content and still have paid
for the transfer and the disk. Three separate reviews found that shape in three
different routes, which makes it a property of the app rather than of any
handler. 128 MB, clearing the 64 MB agent binary with room for the envelope.

The naming gate excluded devnotes with --exclude-dir, which matches a directory
of that NAME at any depth - so a force-added plugins/<plugin>/devnotes/ was
invisible to every check in the file, ADR-015 included. Replaced with a path
anchored post-filter. Verified by planting the same site literal in root
devnotes/ AND in plugins/endpoints/devnotes/: the gate now reports exactly one,
the nested one. Before, it reported none.

BaseModel.to_dict walked __table__.columns and published every one, so a model
without an override published whatever it carried - including columns added
later by someone not thinking about this method. User has no override, so
User.to_dict() returned its bcrypt hash. Nothing calls it in a response path
today, which is luck rather than design. A blanket allowlist would empty the
output of all 34 models relying on the default, so this pins a floor instead:
named secret-bearing columns are never emitted, and a model may extend the set.
Eight tests, including a sweep over every mapped model.

ActionPicker's Esc handlers had .prevent but not .stop, so the event bubbled to
the wrapper and closed the whole picker instead of returning to the monitor list.

The branding page reported "error loading image" on the site and badge logos.
Two bugs stacked. The load failure was real: the preview used the stored value
as a raw src, and that value is root-relative, so under /shopdb or /ops it
resolved against the SERVER root and 404d - siteSettings.js wraps every logo in
withBase() and this page was the one place that did not. With that fixed two of
three were still invisible, because the shipped GE mark is fill="white" for the
dark sidebar and was rendering white-on-white. The preview tile now sits on a
mid-tone checker so artwork of any colour reads against it.

The floor-map levels table ran off the right with its cells crushed - nine
columns of inputs, no scroll wrapper, and .data-table is styled nowhere. My
first attempt reached for the global .table-container and made it WORSE: that
class also sets white-space: nowrap, and a full sentence of hint text lives in
one of the cells, so nowrap forced the table wider still. It now scrolls in a
local wrapper, the hint wraps, and the name input has a width instead of
collapsing to one character.

Suite 2377, frontend 324, gate green.

Scope: product
 2026-09-03 08:38:47 -04:00
cproudlock
af42ba3589 Register the endpoints list without a trailing slash, and stop hiding its errors
All checks were successful
CI / naming (push) Successful in 3s
Details
CI / frontend (push) Successful in 13s
Details
CI / migrations-mysql (push) Successful in 40s
Details
CI / backend (push) Successful in 4m7s
Details 
An endpoint reported telemetry correctly for hours while the Fleet page showed
"No endpoints found". The PC detail page displayed its panels the whole time, so
ingest was plainly working; only the list was empty.

The list route was the one route in 331 paths registered with a trailing slash:

    @endpoints_bp.route('/', methods=['GET'])      ->  /api/endpoints/

The browser client calls it without one, so Flask answered a 308 redirect to an
ABSOLUTE url. On dev that resolves and nobody notices. Behind the IIS subpath it
cannot: with no ProxyFix, Werkzeug builds that Location from the scheme and host
it believes it has, so it emitted http:// and dropped the /shopdb prefix. A
browser will not follow an https page to http, the request failed, and the
page's catch block rendered the empty state.

Every other route in the plugin worked throughout, because none of them carries
a trailing slash - the detail panels call /endpoints/asset/<id>/status and were
never redirected. Detail works, list empty is the signature of this bug.

Registered as '' now, so the rule is /api/endpoints. That is what
CONTRIBUTING.md's API section spells and what every other list route in the
product already did. The inventory and the generated spec are updated to match.

Also here:

  - tests/test_core/test_no_redirecting_routes.py fails the build if any /api
    rule is registered with a trailing slash and strict slashes. Verified by
    planting the violation: it named the offending route, then passed once
    reverted. It takes the shared app fixture rather than building its own
    application - doing that rebinds SQLAlchemy and leaves the NEXT module
    without tables, which showed up as three unrelated "no such table: settings"
    failures visible only in a full run.

  - The Fleet page now renders "Could not load endpoints (HTTP nnn). This is a
    failed request, not an empty fleet." A list that reports a 403 and an empty
    fleet identically is what made this take as long as it did.

  - TRUSTED_PROXY_COUNT (default 0) applies ProxyFix when set. Off by default on
    purpose: it makes X-Forwarded-* trusted, and a client can send those itself,
    while the login rate limit and account lockout are keyed on the client
    address. Set it to 1 on an instance behind IIS.

Full suite 2124 passed, vitest 260 passed, naming and docs gates green.
 2026-08-28 17:48:06 -04:00
cproudlock
784964c907 Bring the wilm branch into main: endpoints plugin, agent, policies, CSV import 
Ports the corporate-GitHub wilm branch onto main, keeping the two branches
separate. Thirteen upstream commits arrive with their authorship intact; the
review fixes and the portability work below are on top.

What arrives:

  endpoints plugin  - a ShopDB agent reporting endpoint state, telemetry,
                      services and interfaces, with a command channel the agent
                      long-polls. Ingest stays on the generic collector route
                      (ADR-006); the agent key is a UI-managed single-scope
                      token whose revocation is an instant kill switch.
  computers policies - Configuration and Business Policies (RMM-style), scope
                      trees validated at write time, actions checked against
                      the endpoints command allowlist. Feature-gated: every
                      route 404s while the setting is off, so enabling it can
                      never half-expose the surface.
  asset CSV import  - templates, a collector script carrying the site path, and
                      a validate-then-commit import. A plugin can own a virtual
                      column plus a post-write row hook, which is how a PC's
                      machine number becomes a controls link without a
                      hand-built relationships sheet.
  agent/            - the Windows agent and its installer.

Contract 0.21.0 -> 0.24.0, additive throughout: register_import_hook (0.22),
mint/list/revoke_service_token (0.23), collector_authorized (0.24). The stability
table had no rows for any of them and now does.

MySQL 5.6 portability. The branch stored three policy columns as sa.JSON, the
only JSON columns in the product, and 5.6 has no JSON type: the migration failed
with a bare syntax error near the word JSON. They are TEXT now, through a
JSONText type decorator, so all seventeen call sites still read and write dicts.
The convention elsewhere is already TEXT (guides.blocksjson,
geenforce.manifestjson).

Review fixes carried on top:

  - six policy GETs were jwt_required(optional=True), which authenticates a
    caller without checking anything; they require computers.view now, and six
    redundant jwt_required decorators are gone
  - the agent installer took a default BaseUrl and CollectorKey, so a mistyped
    run silently pointed an endpoint at the wrong instance; both are mandatory
    and a non-https BaseUrl throws unless -AllowInsecureHttp is passed
  - a committing CSV import wrote no audit row

Documentation: the 34 new routes are described in docs/api-inventory.json, which
is hand-maintained on purpose, and the generated spec now covers 331 paths and
477 operations across 22 surfaces. DEVELOPMENT-SETUP's 1071 troubleshooting row
said "use MySQL 8 for dev" and now gives the actual fix, including the trap that
5.6 downgrades ROW_FORMAT=DYNAMIC to Compact with a warning instead of an error.

Full suite 2123 passed, vitest 260 passed, all seventeen plugin chains migrate
clean on MySQL 5.6 and the naming, docs, parity and read-surface gates are green.
 2026-08-28 16:17:17 -04:00
cproudlock
5b19f3b554 ADR-013 Phase 2: enforcement + signed shelf + adopt 
Completes the marketplace security model. Verification stops being advisory:
a plugin only loads or migrates when its tree matches a trusted signature, and
plugins are pulled from a signed shelf with anti-rollback and revocation.

Enforcement (default OFF - existing deploys unchanged):
- verification.py PluginVerifier, shared by the loader (verify-at-load, before
  plugin.py is imported) and the migration manager (verify-at-migrate, before
  any DDL). Fail-closed: an unsigned/tampered/wrong-key plugin does not run.
- Gated by PLUGIN_REQUIRE_SIGNED. PLUGIN_DEV_TRUST_DIRS exempts named dirs but
  only under DEBUG/TESTING; production ignores it.
- flask plugin stamp-bundled writes provenance into in-tree plugins so
  verify-at-load applies to bundled plugins too (image build step).
- tier:core manifest guard: uninstall/disable refuse a core-tier plugin.

Shelf (shelf.py):
- Signed shelf-index.json (+ .sig): monotonic serial (a site refuses an older
  index - anti-rollback), revoked list carried across builds, per-entry
  version/tier/core_version for browse. Index is a browse layer only; adopt
  reads security-bearing fields from the verified artifact.
- flask plugin shelf-build / shelf-list / adopt / audit. adopt verifies index +
  artifact (signature + every file hash), unpacks to staging, re-verifies, then
  atomically moves into place and installs+enables the closure. Refuses a
  downgrade without --force-downgrade. Anti-rollback serial stored in
  instance/shelf-state.json.
- config PLUGIN_SHELF_DIR; the app only reads the folder, never speaks a
  network. .env.example + docs/PLUGIN-SIGNING.md document the flow.

22 tests: verifier policy (off / no-keys / signed / tampered / wrong-key /
dev-exempt), verify-at-load + verify-at-migrate integration, tier guard, index
sign/verify + tamper/wrong-key, serial state, revocation, version resolution,
verified atomic unpack + tamper refusal. Live-smoked keygen->pack->shelf-build
->list->adopt->audit + serial guard. 1050 pass, naming green.
 2026-07-18 20:44:54 -04:00
cproudlock
86f5f1be68 ADR-013 Phase 1: signed plugin artifacts (pack/validate/keygen) 
Packaging + provenance for the plugin marketplace. No runtime behavior change
yet - verification is available on demand; enforcing it at plugin load/migrate
and pulling from a shelf are Phase 2.

- signing.py: ed25519 key pairs + provenance. Provenance is a sorted per-file
  SHA-256 map plus metadata; the detached signature covers the exact
  serialized provenance bytes, so verifying is re-hash files, re-serialize,
  check signature. verify() accepts any of several trusted keys (rotation).
  Uses cryptography (already a dependency).
- packaging.py: pack() builds a signed <name>-<version>.shopdbplugin (zip +
  PROVENANCE.json + PROVENANCE.sig). verify_artifact()/verify_dir() re-hash
  and check the signature, and flag a tampered file, an unexpected file, a
  wrong/absent key - all fail closed.
- CLI: `flask plugin keygen` (publisher key pair), `flask plugin pack <name>
  --key` (validates then signs), and `flask plugin validate` extended to a
  signed artifact by path (--pubkey, else PLUGIN_TRUSTED_KEYS).
- config PLUGIN_TRUSTED_KEYS: os.pathsep-separated public-key PEM paths,
  delivered with the site config, never read from the shelf. .env.example
  documents it.
- docs/PLUGIN-SIGNING.md: curator flow (keygen offline, review, pack, publish,
  pin keys, rotate).

The signature proves an artifact is exactly what a curator signed, not that the
code is safe - human review before signing is the control. 11 tests: sign/verify
round trip, wrong key, provenance excludes noise, serialize determinism, pack +
verify, tamper -> hash mismatch, extra file, no-key fail-closed, verify_dir.
1028 pass, naming green.
 2026-07-18 20:21:57 -04:00
cproudlock
b8c22244a1 Multi-site distribution readiness: settings-driven site config, security closeout, release engineering, v0.5.0
Some checks failed
CI / backend (push) Failing after 2s
Details
CI / naming (push) Successful in 1s
Details
CI / frontend (push) Successful in 7s
Details 
Make the app distributable to other GE Aerospace sites (one self-hosted
instance per site, ADR-004). GE values remain the shipped defaults; every
site-specific behavior is now a Setting an admin can change in the UI.

Settings-driven site config:
- Branding: site/QR/badge logos, favicon, primary color (upload endpoints
  mirror the map-blueprint pattern; new Settings > Branding section).
- ServiceNow: search/incident/change URL templates ({ticket}), ticket
  prefixes, enable toggle. Defaults point at the current
  geaerospaceqa.service-now.com global search. Disabled = plain-text tickets.
- Employee-id regex (employeeid_pattern), printer hostname template,
  QR label targets (qr_target_printer / qr_target_usb, blank = asset page,
  else URL template with placeholders), usb_label_style (barcode|qr).
- West Jefferson floor-plan PNGs removed from the tree; generic placeholder
  ships as the map default and sites upload their own blueprint.

Security closeout:
- dashboarddefaults writes now require admin.
- Collector: generic error messages (no str(exc) leak); API key accepted
  via X-API-Key header only (BREAKING: querystring api_key removed).
- IP-based login rate limiting (AUTH_RATELIMIT_* knobs) atop account lockout.
- Setting.set() creation race fixed (IntegrityError retry).

Release engineering and docs:
- __version__ 0.5.0 (distinct from __contract_version__, ADR-007),
  CHANGELOG.md, Gitea Actions CI config, frontend version aligned.
- One wizard-first install story across README/DEPLOY; new CONFIG.md,
  UPGRADE.md, BACKUP-RESTORE.md; CLAUDE.md and ROADMAP de-staled.
- Dockerfile multi-stage build now bundles the frontend; compose binds
  MySQL to 127.0.0.1; stale database/schema.sql and one-off SQL removed.

Debt and fixes:
- .query.get() -> db.session.get() sweep; datetime.utcnow() removed
  (naive-UTC via timezone-aware now); users.py on authz decorators.
- Fixed 4 stale tests (slides feed shape, shopfloor splitperemployee,
  plugin contract purity) and the USB label page field mapping (both usb
  modes emit the cmmc shape: device_id/device_desc).
- Health endpoint reports the real version.

248 tests pass; naming/style check green; frontend builds; fresh-DB
flask db upgrade + seeds verified; QR targets verified by decoding
rendered codes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-07-10 15:02:07 -04:00
cproudlock
78a0ee8d83 Add custom fields + warranty plugin, rework settings into two-pane shell 
Feature work from the 2026-07 session:

Settings IA
- Replace the flat 27-card settings hub with a persistent two-pane shell
  (SettingsLayout.vue): grouped, searchable left rail + content pane.
- Nest all settings/* routes under the shell via router post-processing;
  shared nav catalog in settingsNav.js. Group by asset class (PCs, Printers,
  Equipment, Network) so per-type settings stop scattering.

Custom fields (core)
- customfields + customfieldvalues tables (migration 7d14), CRUD API at
  /api/customfields, per-asset value get/save.
- Settings management page + reusable CustomFieldsSection (detail) and
  CustomFieldsInputs (form) wired into all four asset types.

Warranty (new plugin)
- plugins/warranty: warranties + warrantyassets (migration 7d15), derived
  coverage status, provider abstraction (manual now; Dell/Lenovo/HP stubs).
- API CRUD + per-asset panel + report buckets; WarrantyPanel on all four
  detail pages; Warranties management page; Warranty report + Reports card.
- Seed warranty.* permissions.

Printer drivers
- printerdrivers table (migration 7d13) linked to printer models; drivers now
  surface on the matching printer's detail page.

Other
- PCDetail rebalanced (Network + Status + Warranty + custom fields on the right).
- Rename PCs list "Features" column to "Remote Access"; fix badge hover underline.
- Drop equipment islocationonly field.
- Centralize asset-type label/route maps into utils/assetTypes.js.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-07-09 15:37:21 -04:00
cproudlock
5fa5160420 Apply skill-driven review fixes: security, hook isolation, tests, docs 
Addresses findings from a 6-lens review against the project skills
(defining-asset-contract, enforcing-plugin-contract, hardening-flask-config,
integrating-plugin-hooks, pinning-flask-behavior, simplifying-python).

Security (hardening-flask-config):
- Load per-plugin COLLECTOR_API_KEY_<PLUGIN> from env in create_app. from_object
  only copies class attributes, so per-plugin keys (ADR-006) were dead in real
  deploys and silently fell back to the shared key.
- EMPLOYEE_DB_USER/PASSWORD no longer default to root/rootpassword (no safe
  default for a secret; unset fails loud). Documented in .env.example + DEPLOY.md.
- COLLECTOR_API_KEY + per-plugin + EMPLOYEE_DB_* added to .env.example/DEPLOY.md.

Hook isolation (integrating-plugin-hooks):
- collector _collector_plugins and dashboard get_navigation now re-raise in
  dev/test and log+isolate in prod, instead of silently swallowing a broken
  plugin hook.

Plugin loader (enforcing-plugin-contract):
- enable_plugin/install_plugin read dependencies+version from the manifest
  instead of instantiating the plugin class.
- _register_plugin_components rejects a second plugin claiming an already-used
  api_prefix (reset per app in init_app).

Tests (pinning-flask-behavior):
- test_identifiers.py: gauge/maintenance round-trip on computer/printer/network
  create+update; per-type seed yields the 12 identifier keys.
- contract tests for apply_collector_payload presence + schema-declarers-implement.
- security tests for per-plugin key env loading + no employee-db password default.

Docs/contract sync (defining-asset-contract):
- PLUGIN-HOOKS.md documents apply_collector_payload; stale 0.2.0 -> 0.3.0.
- ADR-006 documents apply_collector_payload + single-dispatch rationale.
- ADR-001 enumerates the expanded shopdb.api import surface.

Simplify (simplifying-python):
- De-duplicate the 21-entry settings defaults: shared build_default_settings()
  used by both the /settings/seed route and the CLI (were drifting copies).
- Remove dead AssetStatus import + redundant AssetType local import in computers
  plugin; comment the statusid=1 collector default.

153 tests pass (was 145), naming/style green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-06-26 19:25:52 -04:00
cproudlock
e1948a4774 Migrate PC form + collector off legacy Machine onto the asset/computer model 
- PCForm saves/loads via computersApi (asset core + computer extension +
  primary IP in one call); PC Type now uses the dedicated computertypes table
  instead of MachineType, fixing the cross-table id mismatch.
- Collector (/api/collector/*) writes the Computer model: lookup by hostname
  or asset number, update loggedinuser/lastreporteddate/lastboottime + asset
  serial, installed apps via ComputerInstalledApp.
- Add computers.vendorid + modelnumberid (PCs carry make/model) and
  computerinstalledapps.installedversion; computer GET now includes
  communications. Wire COLLECTOR_API_KEY into config.

Retires the last write paths to the Machine model for PCs (ADR-001).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-06-26 09:16:09 -04:00
cproudlock
b516b9b771 Security: mask settings secrets, remove hardcoded employee-DB creds 
- GET /settings now masks password/token values (were returned in plaintext
  to anonymous callers); sending the mask back on update is a no-op so the
  real secret is never clobbered.
- Move the employee-directory DB credentials out of source into env-backed
  config (shopdb.utils.employee_db); employees + notification recognition use
  the shared helper. Employee lookups stop leaking exception strings.
- Fix low-supplies report using loc.location instead of loc.locationname.

Employee/notification read endpoints stay unauthenticated by design (public
shopfloor kiosk displays consume them).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-06-26 08:42:16 -04:00
cproudlock
0436e8b0af Asset-side printer save, status CRUD, real printer types, network fix 
- Printers save through the asset blueprint (PUT /printers) instead of the
  legacy machines API; restrict supply-model picker to printer models.
- Asset statuses get full CRUD (PUT/DELETE with in-use guard); canonical set.
- Printer types reseeded to a real classification set + list filter.
- Equipment accepts gauge/maintenance references.
- Fix network list emitting network_device instead of networkdevice (View 404).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-06-26 08:35:32 -04:00
cproudlock
c70bc37642 Phase 1: pytest baseline, production hardening, pinned requirements 
Establishes the safety net required before any structural refactor.

Tests (tests/):
- conftest.py rewritten for Flask-SQLAlchemy 3.x (drop-recreate per
  test, StaticPool-shared in-memory SQLite, admin_user + auth_headers
  fixtures). Removes deprecated db.create_scoped_session pattern.
- test_smoke.py: 8 baseline tests (app boot, JWT login valid+invalid,
  protected routes, paginated response shape, plugin auto-discovery).
- test_security_config.py: 7 tests pinning ProductionConfig.validate
  failure modes (missing/dev SECRET_KEY, missing JWT_SECRET_KEY,
  missing DATABASE_URL, wildcard CORS, empty CORS) and one happy-path.

Production hardening (shopdb/config.py, shopdb/__init__.py):
- ProductionConfig.validate() raises ConfigError on missing or
  insecure SECRET_KEY, JWT_SECRET_KEY, DATABASE_URL, CORS_ORIGINS.
  No silent fallback to dev defaults in production.
- create_app invokes validate() when config_name == 'production'.
- CORS_ORIGINS default no longer wildcard; defaults to localhost
  Vite dev origin.
- Drop os.path.exists probe in serve_frontend (path-traversal risk
  surface). send_from_directory handles safe-join + 404 itself.
- Replace User.query.get with db.session.get (SQLAlchemy 2.0 API).

TestingConfig (shopdb/config.py):
- Add StaticPool + check_same_thread connect_args so SQLite in-memory
  is shared across the test session.

Index dedup (plugins/printers/models/printer_extension.py):
- Rename idx_printer_windowsname -> idx_printerdata_windowsname.
  Two model classes (Printer, PrinterData) declared the same index
  name; SQLite enforces global index uniqueness even across tables.
  Per CONTRIBUTING.md naming convention, indexes follow
  idx_<table>_<column>.

Dependency pinning (requirements.in, requirements.txt):
- requirements.in holds the loose source pins (the human-edited file).
- requirements.txt is now a uv-compiled lockfile (every transitive
  dep pinned to an exact version). Reproducible builds. Run
  `uv pip compile requirements.in -o requirements.txt` to refresh.

Test count: 0 -> 15 passing. All naming/style checks still green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-08 14:48:19 -04:00
cproudlock
2c36c0c873 Add system settings, audit logging, user management, and dark mode fixes 
System Settings:
- Add SystemSettings.vue with Zabbix integration, SMTP/email config, SAML SSO settings
- Add Setting model with key-value storage and typed values
- Add settings API with caching

Audit Logging:
- Add AuditLog model tracking user, IP, action, entity changes
- Add comprehensive audit logging to all CRUD operations:
  - Machines, Computers, Equipment, Network devices, VLANs, Subnets
  - Printers, USB devices (including checkout/checkin)
  - Applications, Settings, Users/Roles
- Track old/new values for all field changes
- Mask sensitive values (passwords, tokens) in logs

User Management:
- Add UsersList.vue with full user CRUD
- Add Role management with granular permissions
- Add 41 predefined permissions across 10 categories
- Add users API with roles and permissions endpoints

Reports:
- Add TonerReport.vue for printer supply monitoring

Dark Mode Fixes:
- Fix map position section in PCForm, PrinterForm
- Fix alert-warning in KnowledgeBaseDetail
- All components now use CSS variables for theming

CLI Commands:
- Add flask seed permissions
- Add flask seed settings

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-02-04 22:16:56 -05:00
cproudlock
180e6a0915 Migrate frontend to plugin-based asset architecture 
- Add equipmentApi and computersApi to replace legacy machinesApi
- Add controller vendor/model fields to Equipment model and forms
- Fix map marker navigation to use plugin-specific IDs (equipmentid,
  computerid, printerid, networkdeviceid) instead of assetid
- Fix search to use unified Asset table with correct plugin IDs
- Remove legacy printer search that used non-existent field names
- Enable optional JWT auth for detail endpoints (public read access)
- Clean up USB plugin models (remove unused checkout model)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-01-29 16:07:41 -05:00
cproudlock
30dd65674d Initial commit: Shop Database Flask Application 
Flask backend with Vue 3 frontend for shop floor machine management.
Includes database schema export for MySQL shopdb_flask database.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-01-13 16:07:34 -05:00