A sweep of the URL map found 165 GET routes that answered anybody, with no
token at all: the whole asset inventory, every machine, PC, printer and network
device, the USB checkout history and who is holding which drive, the staff
directory with its photographs, every core report. Guest access had been argued
about one feature-flag at a time while the front door stood open.
Each of those now carries the read permission it belongs to. That also makes
the guest role mean something: a site can open exactly the reads it chooses,
and nothing follows by accident.
Thirty-three endpoints stay public, and each is named with its reason rather
than left to be inferred: the app shell and its bootstrap, the settings
allowlist (the handler already filters an anonymous caller down to branding and
a few keys), images fetched by <img src> which carries no Authorization header,
what a display kiosk renders before anybody signs in, the parts and USB kiosks,
the client scripts that run as SYSTEM before a user session exists, and a
secure-send link whose unguessable token IS the authorisation.
tests/test_core/test_public_read_surface.py is the standing gate, the companion
to the mutating-route sweep that has guarded writes for months. A new public
read fails CI until somebody adds it to that list in front of a reviewer. Four
further reads need a login but no permission, because the handler decides from
who you are - your own user record, your own API tokens, the role catalogue the
grid renders - and the same test proves each still refuses an anonymous caller.
Verified not vacuous by ungating one route and watching the sweep name it.
The employees plugin gained employees.view; the directory is names, SSOs,
photographs and reporting lines, and it had no permission of any kind.
Around ninety tests asserted payload shapes against endpoints that answered
anybody. They are about what the answer says, not about who may ask, so they
are signed in now rather than the gate being loosened. The ones that assert an
anonymous caller is refused were left exactly as they were.
Every asset list shows a Type column (and printers a Model, machines and
network a Vendor), but the search filters only looked at the asset number,
name, serial and hostname. Searching a type returned zero rows: 'Part Washer'
on machines, 'Standard' on PCs, 'Thermal' on printers.
Extend the search on machines, computers, printers, network devices,
measuring tools and the unified asset list to cover the type name plus the
vendor/model where the list shows them. Joins are outer joins so an asset
missing a type or vendor still matches on its own fields; the core list uses
a correlated EXISTS instead, since its type-name filter already joins
AssetType.
