Fleet health showed dncMain.exe red on endpoints that never ran eDNC. Three
layers each re-added the monitor, so fixing any one of them in isolation left
the others to put it back.
The installer baked a watch list into appsettings.json on every package, and
appsettings.json is never rewritten on the box, so an entry outlived whatever
policy justified it. The server auto-attached shipped monitors by PC type name.
The agent then UNIONED the server's resolved list with its local one, so an
entry could never be removed from the server side at all.
Now: the installer seeds nothing, auto-attach by PC type is gone, and
MonitorConfig.Merge replaces the local list with the server's. Null and empty
stay distinct - null means the fetch failed so keep what we have, empty means
watch nothing. Collapsing those blanks monitoring fleet-wide on one failed HTTP
call, or makes detaching the last monitor silently do nothing forever.
Ingest filters reported services against the resolved monitors as well. The
agent config sits on the endpoint, so it is not a trustworthy account of what
that endpoint should be reporting.
Launch paths move the same way, which exposed an older bug. MTConnect installs
to ProgramData and starts through run.bat, but LaunchPathPolicy approved only
the Program Files roots, so the launchpath on its shipped monitor row - seeded
in 0006, present from the start - was rejected every time as outside every
approved root. That was invisible because a local launchpaths entry wins in
ResolveLaunchPath and never reaches validation; remote start worked only
through the bypass. The same precedence meant editing an eDNC, UDC or MTConnect
path in the WebUI could never reach an existing endpoint.
So ProgramData is approved and the local launch map ships empty. ProgramData is
world-writable and the agent launches as SYSTEM, which is why it was excluded
originally; it is deliberately too broad for now and carries a REVISIT comment.
The remaining gates still hold - admin-configured monitor row, exists,
launchable extension, re-checked after symlink resolution. Narrowing it to
ProgramData\udc needs the fleet's non-Program-Files install locations
confirmed first.
Also seeds the Office ProPlus LTSC monitor templates, x64 and x86 as separate
rows since they differ only by path, and adds an agent test project. It links
the platform-pure sources rather than referencing the net8.0-windows assembly
so the semantics run on the Linux CI runners. Writing those tests caught a
merge bug where only the dedupe key was trimmed and the stored name was not.
Note for the wj merge: plugins/usb/frontend/views/usbSettings.spec.js fails on
this branch and is untouched here. Commit da91a29 added four kiosk settings the
save assertion does not expect. The spec looks like the stale side, but that is
the usb author's call - flagging rather than guessing.
The generated install.ps1 wrote the collector key to HKLM\SOFTWARE\GE\ShopDB and
left it at the DACL the key inherits, which grants BUILTIN\Users read. Any
operator logged on to any bay could read the fleet key, and that key still
authenticates an un-enrolled PC: it claims queued commands and downloads script
bodies and installer packages. The per-PC credential work exists to retire that
key, but it stays until every consumer is off it, so meanwhile what matters is
who can read it.
Protect-HklmShopdbKey breaks inheritance, DROPS the inherited entries rather
than copying them - copying is what silently preserves the Users read - and
states SYSTEM and Administrators by SID in both registry views. By SID, so a
localised Windows still matches.
Everything that legitimately reads this key is SYSTEM (the service, the
GE-Enforce reporters) or an administrator (the adoption tool,
Set-ShopDBServerPins.ps1). The tray reads no registry at all - it talks to the
service over the named pipe - so nothing loses access.
It runs for the key-less package too, because ServerPins live in the same key
and the registry is authoritative for pinning: a standard user must not be able
to rewrite the pins either.
A bay that cannot take the ACL still installs. It says so, loudly, rather than
failing the install or staying quiet, because an agent that is not installed is
a worse outcome than a key that is still readable on that one machine.
Note what this does NOT fix: bays that already carry the key keep their
inherited DACL until they are reinstalled or upgraded through a package built
after this change.
Found in the Windows VM re-test.
- A CA-flagged server certificate (common with a plain openssl self-signed
cert) produced an installer package with no pin at all, so agent 1.20
refused the server. The package now always carries the SPKI pin of the
certificate PCs receive; the CA flag only skips the trusted-root import.
When an uploaded CA-flagged certificate differs from the server's own, both
pins are included. The build response carries X-ShopDB-Build-Warning and the
installer logs what older agents need.
- Pins written into appsettings.json by the installer were merged with the
registry, so removing a pin from HKLM never took effect. When the ServerPins
value exists in the registry it is now authoritative, even when empty;
appsettings pins apply only when it is absent. Set-ShopDBServerPins.ps1
-Clear deletes the value; new -None writes an empty value (no pins).
- A script or package download sent with a credential revoked moments earlier
got 401 CREDENTIAL_INVALID and failed the command. The agent now retries that
download once with the shared key and records the fallback in the result.
Found in an end-to-end test on a Windows 11 VM against a self-signed server.
- Rollback: a 1.20 agent re-enrolls within a second of an un-enroll, so an
older agent pushed afterwards arrived on an enrolled PC and was refused.
Revoke now takes {"blockreenroll": true, "reason": ...}; a blocked PC is
never issued a credential and keeps working on the shared key until
POST .../assets/<assetid>/allow-reenroll. The Enrollment page offers the
block when un-enrolling and shows blocked PCs with an allow button.
- First upgrade of old agents: agents before 1.20 check the server
certificate when downloading the upgrade, so a store wave failed on PCs that
do not trust a self-signed server while the Migration tab said ready. A
failed download now marks the PC blocked with "server certificate not
trusted by this PC". New Install-ShopDBServerCertificate.ps1 (GE-Enforce,
SYSTEM) adds a non-CA server certificate to the trusted roots after checking
its thumbprint; the server certificate page offers a .cer download and the
SHA-1 thumbprint.
- The generated installer writes ServerPins (with an optional next pin for a
planned rotation), can leave the shared key out so the PC waits for
approval, never touches an existing credential, and skips the trusted-root
import for a CA certificate.
- The agent re-reads server pins about every 60 seconds and recycles pooled
connections within 2 minutes, so a pin change needs no restart.
- An alert can only be acknowledged by a PC it targets.
- A wave no longer counts a PC as failed after a later wave upgraded it.
- The scripts report a pin mismatch only when the pin really is missing, and
otherwise log the real error.
- Runbook: trust step before the first wave, rollback order, pin re-read,
verifying the pin against the live URL; agent contract updated.
Corporate Tools tab on PC Details, gated by endpoints.deploy and liveness.
Starts already-registered scheduled tasks; the agent's ScheduledTaskPolicy
allowlist remains the authority on what may actually run.
Dell Command | Update split into two actions (Scan, Apply Updates) because
they have very different consequences. Apply Updates carries a persistent
breakglass warning in the card naming Tanium as the primary update utility,
rendered between the row title and description so it is visible at all times
rather than only in the confirm dialog. Destructive actions keep the typed
RUN confirmation.
Fix scheduledtask_run being stripped by Configuration Policy: the
intersection in ALLOWED_ACTIONS_FOR dropped it on any endpoint whose
effective policy was non-empty, so every Corporate Tools click failed with
"not permitted by policy" regardless of the caller's role. Corporate tools
are role-gated only, via POLICY_EXEMPT_ACTIONS; policy keeps authority over
monitors and service/process primitives.
Fix blank PC Details page: watch(detailtabs) evaluates its source during
setup and read canDeploy before its const declaration, throwing a TDZ
ReferenceError that aborted setup with no API request made.
Mapped-drive refresh moves to the tray. SYSTEM cannot probe user-scoped
drives, so the service requests a re-probe over a named event and waits for
the spool collectedat stamp to advance before collecting. The probe task is
registered as a ShopFloor user principal; the Users-group principal remains
only as a degraded fallback since a group member cannot start it.
