Running `python scripts/export_catalog.py` on a deployed site died with
1045 "Access denied for user 'root'@'localhost'", naming a user that site
does not have.
Nothing loads .env for a plain script run. wsgi.py calls load_dotenv() for the
served app and the flask CLI loads .env for itself, so both reach the real
database; a bare `python scripts/...` gets neither. DATABASE_URL then stays
unset, FLASK_ENV defaults to development, and config.py falls back to a
hardcoded root@localhost URL.
The read-only failure above is the harmless version. Six of these seven
scripts WRITE - backfill, reclassify, retype, collapse, refile, import - and
on any box where those fallback root credentials happen to resolve, they would
have silently rewritten the wrong database with no error at all. That is also
why this survived: the dev .env points at root, so the fallback matched what
the developer expected and nothing ever looked wrong here.
All seven now load .env from the repo root, resolved from __file__ rather than
the working directory, since these are run by hand during a deployment and
rarely from the repo root.
tests/test_maintenance_scripts.py pins it for any future script: every script
that calls create_app must call load_dotenv, before create_app rather than
after it, and with an explicit path rather than a cwd-relative search.
Dedup compared a posted config against the latest revision for the ASSET,
which is only correct when a machine number means one PC. Several PCs share one
here: the part markers on 0613, 0615 and WJPRT are separate devices, differing
by COM port, filed under one machine number. Each marker's post therefore
differed from whichever marker had posted last, nothing ever deduped, and the
table grew by one row per PC per collection cycle.
A chain is now (asset, kind, source hostname). An unchanged config is a no-op
again, and each PC keeps its own history against the machine. NULL sources -
rows written before the column was populated, and hand-loaded ones - form their
own chain via IS NULL; `column == None` never matches in SQL, so without that
those rows would have re-posted forever.
Two consumers assumed the old key and are fixed with it. Retention pruned per
asset, so a busy marker's revisions could evict a quiet marker's only backup;
it now prunes each chain separately, protecting the newest and oldest of each.
The revision diff compared against the previous revision on the machine, which
across two markers reported one device's COM port as a change on the other; it
now compares within the source's own chain.
scripts/collapse_duplicate_backup_revisions.py cleans up what the old rule
wrote. It removes only a revision whose hash repeats the one before it in the
same chain - rows the fixed code would never have written - and keeps every
genuine change, every chain's newest and oldest, and every source. Dry run by
default. Its --report mode explains what grew each chain, which separates a
legitimately shared machine number from two PCs wrongly carrying the same one,
and from a value inside the config that changes on its own.
