Whether somebody with no account may see something was being answered one
feature at a time: a securesend_allow_guests setting, an enable flag per kiosk,
and very nearly a third for guides - each with its own settings page, its own
vocabulary and its own hand-written branch inside a route. Every one of them
answered a permissions question, and this app already administers permissions
per role.
So a caller with no token is not nobody: they hold the seeded `guest` role.
require_permission consults it when there is no identity, which is the entire
mechanism. The role is seeded holding NOTHING, so an upgrade opens no door; a
site opens one by ticking a box in the same grid it uses for every other role,
and closes it the same way. Revocation is read on every request rather than
cached, because taking guest access away is what somebody does the moment they
realise what they opened, and it has to bite immediately.
The redundant @jwt_required() above require_permission is gone from 184 routes.
It was belt-and-braces before; now it is actively wrong, because it refuses a
request with no token before the permission check can have an opinion, so a
grant would appear to do nothing.
What a guest may hold is bounded. Any .view or .read permission is grantable.
A WRITE has to be blessed by whoever owns it, through the new
get_guest_grantable_permissions hook (contract 0.21.0), and Secure Send is the
only case that exists: sending a password to a vendor is the one write this
product means to offer somebody who never signs in. Everything else is refused
by the API and greyed out in the grid rather than warned about - a checkbox
that quietly makes deleting an asset anonymous is not a warning anybody reads
twice. A guest write records no creator: the trail says when and from where,
never who, and that is the reason for the bar.
GE-Enforce and Slides gained read permissions so they can be opened to guests
without handing out the manage right. Their read routes accept either through
require_any_permission, so nothing an existing manager could reach has moved.
The navigation endpoint now returns only what the caller can actually reach.
Without that a signed-out visitor gets a sidebar of the whole app where every
link bounces off the login page, which reads as a broken site rather than as a
closed door. A nav item may name several permissions; holding any one is
enough, which is what GE-Enforce and Slides need now that a viewer and a
manager hold different strings.
Two things this found on the way: current_user is a LocalProxy, so
`current_user is None` is False for a request with nobody behind it - harmless
under a required JWT, an AttributeError the moment verification became
optional. And an image pasted into a guide before its first save was never
attached to it, so it was visible to editors and invisible to every reader;
saving now attaches it, and `flask guides fix-images` repairs what is stored.
The guides guest setting written earlier today is gone. Granting guides.view to
the guest role replaces it, which is the point.
A geenforce.fetch token can now be pinned to specific manifest scopes so a
fleet-wide key (a display's, delivered by DSC or baked into the image) is not a
skeleton key for the whole content store. NULL binding = unrestricted, so every
existing service token keeps working.
Core:
- ApiToken.resourcescopes column + resourcescopelist property (migration
7d30_apitoken_resourcescopes; NULL = unrestricted).
- apitokens API create/update accept + persist an optional resourcescopes list
(a resource-name allowlist; not permission-catalog names).
- New contract helper authorized_service_token(scope): same check as
service_token_authorized but returns the ApiToken so a plugin can read its
binding. Contract 0.14.0 -> 0.15.0; also export SupportTeam.
GE-Enforce enforcement:
- get_manifest: a bound token requesting a scope outside its allowlist -> 403.
- get_payload: a bound token may only pull a blob its own scope(s) reference
(service.blob_referenced_by_scopes); anything else -> 404 (no hash probing).
- Decorator stashes the authorized token on g for the route to read.
Also fixes a pre-existing contract-surface violation: the printers/printedparts
alert helpers imported shopdb.core.models / shopdb.extensions directly; now
via shopdb.api (SupportTeam newly exported). Docs: GE-ENFORCE-DISPLAY.md
provisioning note, PLUGIN-HOOKS.md, CLAUDE.md.
9 new resource-binding tests; full suite 1131 passing.
A token may carry a scopes list: it then grants only those permissions,
intersected with what the owner holds at use time, with the admin role
bypass suspended and role-gated routes denied - a scoped token from an
admin account is genuinely limited. Scope ceiling enforced at
create/update too (only permissions the owner holds; 400 lists
violations) and the picker only offers what you hold. Token management
itself now requires the new apitokens.create permission (admin by
default, grantable via roles). Unscoped tokens keep the exact prior
act-as-owner behavior; imports need an unscoped admin token.
Migration 7d22.
756 tests pass; live-verified scoped 201/403 matrix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
API tokens: any user mints named, optionally-expiring tokens
(shopdb_pat_..., sha256-stored, secret shown once) at Settings > API
Tokens; a before-request shim swaps a valid PAT for a request-scoped
JWT of its owner, so the entire existing auth/authz/import-mode stack
works unchanged and revoked/expired tokens 401 cleanly. Built for
long-running scripts - the legacy import no longer dies when a login
JWT expires. Migration 7d21_apitokens; create/revoke audit-logged.
Audited integration gaps fixed: Asset.to_dict serializes measuring
tools (typedata + pluginid - relationship links to tools resolve); map
subtype filter/colors and MapEditor include them; dashboard totals
count them; warranty links use a new by-asset route; the measuringtools
ADR-010 hooks are real (corrected presentation token, implemented
map-overlay endpoint); the login avatar resolves through the
employee-photo helper.
737 tests pass; naming green; frontend builds; both features verified
live end-to-end.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
