An adversarial security review of the Phase 2 trust model found four real
bypasses (two remote-triggerable to in-process code execution). Root cause for
three: the set of bytes verification covered was smaller than the set that
determined execution. Fixes:
1. Bytecode-cache blind spot (CRITICAL). verify_dir excluded __pycache__/.pyc,
so a planted cache ran while escaping the hash map. verify_dir now flags any
bytecode as an unexpected file; the loader strips bytecode before verify and
imports under sys.dont_write_bytecode, so only verified source executes.
2. Unauthenticated verify-at-load bypass (CRITICAL). load_plugin_class imported
plugin.py with no gate, reachable via discover_available / an anonymous GET
/api/plugins. The verify+strip gate moved INTO load_plugin_class - the single
import choke point every path flows through - so an unsigned/tampered plugin
is never imported. discover_available skips a refused plugin instead of 500.
3. Ungated migration entrypoints (HIGH). downgrade_plugin and get_current_head
(ScriptDirectory imports version modules) ran plugin code with no check. All
alembic-invoking methods now pass through _verify_ok (strip + verify) first
and run under no-bytecode.
4. Revocation/content bypass (HIGH). The signed index bound a filename, not
content; adopt did not bind the delivered bytes to the resolved version, so
revoked bytes could be served under a live filename. The index now records a
per-artifact SHA-256; adopt verifies the on-disk digest and requires the
artifact's own signed manifest version to equal the resolved version.
Enforcement stays default-off; strip/no-bytecode run only under enforcement, so
the unsigned path is unchanged. 6 regression tests (planted bytecode, the
discover import path, downgrade gate, version-swap). 1054 pass, naming green.
Completes the marketplace security model. Verification stops being advisory:
a plugin only loads or migrates when its tree matches a trusted signature, and
plugins are pulled from a signed shelf with anti-rollback and revocation.
Enforcement (default OFF - existing deploys unchanged):
- verification.py PluginVerifier, shared by the loader (verify-at-load, before
plugin.py is imported) and the migration manager (verify-at-migrate, before
any DDL). Fail-closed: an unsigned/tampered/wrong-key plugin does not run.
- Gated by PLUGIN_REQUIRE_SIGNED. PLUGIN_DEV_TRUST_DIRS exempts named dirs but
only under DEBUG/TESTING; production ignores it.
- flask plugin stamp-bundled writes provenance into in-tree plugins so
verify-at-load applies to bundled plugins too (image build step).
- tier:core manifest guard: uninstall/disable refuse a core-tier plugin.
Shelf (shelf.py):
- Signed shelf-index.json (+ .sig): monotonic serial (a site refuses an older
index - anti-rollback), revoked list carried across builds, per-entry
version/tier/core_version for browse. Index is a browse layer only; adopt
reads security-bearing fields from the verified artifact.
- flask plugin shelf-build / shelf-list / adopt / audit. adopt verifies index +
artifact (signature + every file hash), unpacks to staging, re-verifies, then
atomically moves into place and installs+enables the closure. Refuses a
downgrade without --force-downgrade. Anti-rollback serial stored in
instance/shelf-state.json.
- config PLUGIN_SHELF_DIR; the app only reads the folder, never speaks a
network. .env.example + docs/PLUGIN-SIGNING.md document the flow.
22 tests: verifier policy (off / no-keys / signed / tampered / wrong-key /
dev-exempt), verify-at-load + verify-at-migrate integration, tier guard, index
sign/verify + tamper/wrong-key, serial state, revocation, version resolution,
verified atomic unpack + tamper refusal. Live-smoked keygen->pack->shelf-build
->list->adopt->audit + serial guard. 1050 pass, naming green.
Framework:
- Per-plugin Alembic migration chains (ADR-008): every bundled plugin
carries its own chain with a stamp-only anchor at the ownership cutover;
new plugin schema lands in plugins/<name>/migrations/, never the core
chain. Deploys add flask plugin upgrade-all. Fixed a latent bug in the
shared alembic template (engine URL resolution) and taught the metadata
filter to include FK-referenced core tables.
- Frontend plugin route gating (ADR-009): plugin routes carry meta.plugin;
a disabled plugin's pages redirect to the dashboard via a cached,
fail-open check against the new public GET /api/plugins/enabled.
- get_reports() plugin hook (contract 0.5.0 -> 0.6.0): plugins contribute
report cards; warranty and toner cards moved off the hardcoded list.
Reports:
- Hub grouped by category with search; inline reports render at the top,
are URL-backed (?report=id, back-button and deep links work), expose
their server-side filter params as controls, and export CSV. Warranty
and Toner pages gained CSV export.
- Deleted the dead legacy Warranty Status report (always-zero buckets
from a retired column).
Theming and fonts:
- Inter (variable) bundled locally via @fontsource, replacing the Google
Fonts Roboto import - air-gapped installs now render correctly; tables
use tabular numerals.
- Optional brand_primary_dark_color, brand_accent_color,
brand_sidebar_color settings applied to CSS vars at bootstrap.
USB frontend repair (views were reading a dead legacy shape):
- List/detail/form and the employee profile USB panels remapped to the
real API shape (device_id/device_desc/checkinoutlog); employee panels
now use /usb/checkouts endpoints; external-mode /usb/checkouts/active
honors the badge filter; dead client methods pruned.
Also: warranties list page no longer requires login (matches app
convention); collector doc rewritten with a GE-Enforce integration guide
and paste-ready PowerShell reporter; ADR index and CHANGELOG updated.
Verified: 323 tests pass, naming/style green, frontend builds, plugin
migration dry-run green on scratch MySQL.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Flask backend with Vue 3 frontend for shop floor machine management.
Includes database schema export for MySQL shopdb_flask database.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
