A sweep of the URL map found 165 GET routes that answered anybody, with no
token at all: the whole asset inventory, every machine, PC, printer and network
device, the USB checkout history and who is holding which drive, the staff
directory with its photographs, every core report. Guest access had been argued
about one feature-flag at a time while the front door stood open.
Each of those now carries the read permission it belongs to. That also makes
the guest role mean something: a site can open exactly the reads it chooses,
and nothing follows by accident.
Thirty-three endpoints stay public, and each is named with its reason rather
than left to be inferred: the app shell and its bootstrap, the settings
allowlist (the handler already filters an anonymous caller down to branding and
a few keys), images fetched by <img src> which carries no Authorization header,
what a display kiosk renders before anybody signs in, the parts and USB kiosks,
the client scripts that run as SYSTEM before a user session exists, and a
secure-send link whose unguessable token IS the authorisation.
tests/test_core/test_public_read_surface.py is the standing gate, the companion
to the mutating-route sweep that has guarded writes for months. A new public
read fails CI until somebody adds it to that list in front of a reviewer. Four
further reads need a login but no permission, because the handler decides from
who you are - your own user record, your own API tokens, the role catalogue the
grid renders - and the same test proves each still refuses an anonymous caller.
Verified not vacuous by ungating one route and watching the sweep name it.
The employees plugin gained employees.view; the directory is names, SSOs,
photographs and reporting lines, and it had no permission of any kind.
Around ninety tests asserted payload shapes against endpoints that answered
anybody. They are about what the answer says, not about who may ask, so they
are signed in now rather than the gate being loosened. The ones that assert an
anonymous caller is refused were left exactly as they were.
Support teams gain a webhookurl (migration 7d29 + API + settings-page field), so
a team is a notification target. send_webhook(url=) lets a caller override the
site default with a team's webhook. Printedparts gains a 'alert support team'
setting (printedparts_alert_supportteamid) + selector on its settings page;
low-stock alerts post to that team's webhook, falling back to the site
alert_webhook_url. Email leg unchanged. Same pattern extends to other alerting
plugins (printers low-toner next).
Label switches from CODE128 to a QR encoding 'TAG|rev' (gage lab tag + latest
print-file revision), so a physical part carries which revision it was printed
from - short payload stays low-version + reliable at 0.5in (margin quiet zone,
EC M, no logo). Item exposes latestrevision; kiosk strips the |rev to resolve
and records the scanned revision on the take (migration 0004 adds
printeditemtransactions.revision) for traceability of which rev was consumed.
Manual entry records a null revision.
The gage lab assigns real WJRP asset numbers, so identity splits: the
internal itemcode stays auto-minted and a new optional unique
gagelabtag (migration 0003) carries the lab's number - settable on
create/edit, searchable, and resolved by the kiosk for scans and bare
keypad digits against the numeric tail of either identifier
(unique-match only). The print-files table becomes stacked revision
cards - filename with rev/current badges, one meta line, delete pinned
right - ending the horizontal scroll in that column.
Browsing the catalog (item list, detail, file listings) now requires
authentication plus the view permission, and the /printedparts pages
and the label print page require login. Still deliberately open: the
kiosk endpoints per the decision record, the image serve and file
download (img tags and anchor downloads cannot carry a JWT), and the
reports (product-wide jwt-optional convention). Grant
printedparts.view to the roles that should see the catalog.
printeditemfiles lands as the plugin's first incremental migration
(0002 on the plugin chain - the ADR-008 payoff). Revisions are
append-only per item: upload assigns the next number, records the
uploader from the JWT, enforces an extension allowlist and a 100 MB
cap; download serves the original filename; a permission-gated delete
covers wrong-file mistakes. The detail page gains the revision table
with a current badge. Unique storedfilename is sized 191 so the index
fits MySQL's 767-byte prefix - the per-plugin chain does not apply the
core env's ROW_FORMAT hook.
Alert recipients gain roles: Role joins the 0.13.0 surface, a role
picker on the settings page, and every active member of the selected
roles is folded into the deduped recipient list.
Retire button with confirmation on the detail page (item leaves the
storefront and the kiosk rejects its code; ledger history and label
survive), Restore on retired items, and an Include-retired list toggle
with a badge. Restore is its own permission-gated POST - the generic
update still cannot flip isactive. New codes mint as WJRP0042 style
without the dash; existing codes are immutable bin labels and keep
their form.
Contract 0.13.0 puts the User model on the plugin surface. The
settings page gains a checkbox picker over the user list; selected
users receive low-stock alerts at their account email, merged and
deduped with the free-text address list, inactive accounts skipped,
site alert_recipients still the fallback when both are empty.
Contract 0.12.0: send_email/send_alert join the plugin surface (the
mailer was core-only), PLUGIN-HOOKS and status docs updated, manifest
pins the new floor. The alert fires inside _ledger_write only when a
decrement CROSSES the item's threshold - one alert per depletion,
rearmed by restocking above - and is best-effort after the commit so
mail trouble can never fail a take. Recipients come from
printedparts_alert_email, falling back to the site alert_recipients.
on_enable re-seeds settings idempotently so existing installs pick up
new keys. Crossing/rearm semantics proven by test.
Two open endpoints: an item lookup by scanned code and the take POST -
the product's first unauthenticated write, held to the decision
record's bar (decrement-only, badge-attributed server-side, bounded,
physically rate-limited; justification in the plugin README). The
/parts-kiosk route is a full-screen no-auth view beside /shopfloor: a
hidden always-focused input consumes keyboard-wedge scans for
whichever step is active, TouchKeypad (net-new 3x4 grid) takes the
quantity, and a success screen resets after a few seconds. Manual
type-in fallbacks cover damaged labels. Kiosk test proves open access,
the over-take guard, the badge policy, and cache==ledger afterward.
get_permissions declares view/create/edit/delete/restock (seeded on
install/enable and by flask seed permissions); every write route adds
require_permission on top of jwt_required. New test proves
authentication alone is not authorization: a role-less member gets
403 where an admin succeeds.
Badge resolver copied from the USB contract (SSO digits, 0<digits>BZ
PayNo wrap) with names from the employees directory and the
unknown-badge policy setting; deliberately copied rather than
cross-imported so the contract test stays green. Restock and adjust
write the ledger row and move the cached quantity in one commit -
the single-commit invariant every write path must use. Adjust
requires a reason and refuses to drive stock below zero. Detail page
gains Restock/Adjust modals. Seven tests cover minting, the
cache==ledger invariant, badge shapes, policy toggle, and auth.
