2c415a1712b4351e183d79a09193bdb6b9155bd4
5 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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cproudlock
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2c415a1712 |
fix(installer): correct a false security claim, and clear the should-fix list
CLIENT IP / SPOOFABILITY. docs/geenforce-api-cutover.md claimed that removing the IIS rewrite rule made the allowlist fail closed and that it does NOT become spoofable. The opposite is true. IIS never sets X-Forwarded-For on its own; the rule is the only thing that does. Remove it and IIS still forwards whatever X-Forwarded-For the CALLER sent, waitress trusts it because it arrives from 127.0.0.1, and remote_addr becomes attacker-controlled - so a token-less caller can fetch manifests from anywhere on the network. The document and the _trusted_client_ip docstring now say so, waitress runs with --trusted-proxy-count=1, and stage 5 checks the rule is actually live rather than assuming it. The wizard question is rephrased to something an operator can verify with their network team instead of guessing at. NON-ASCII. The style gate only ever checked .py/.vue/.js/.ts, so documentation accumulated em-dashes, arrows and box-drawing characters against this repo's own convention - including in files added this week. Cleaned, and the gate now uses INCLUDES_ALL so Markdown, JSON and YAML are covered. PLUGIN DEFAULTS. The wizard pre-ticked measuringtools and printedparts, both of which ship default_enabled=false, so every site taking the defaults installed and enabled them against their manifests. Inno has no JSON parser so the list must be hardcoded, but tests/test_installer_defaults.py now fails when it drifts. UPGRADES. The payload copy merges, so a plugin dropped from a site's profile kept its code forever - which defeats a lean build and leaves core's optional-import guards succeeding for a plugin the site no longer has. Stale plugin directories are now deregistered and removed before the copy. add-plugin used 'plugin install', which for the five default_enabled=false plugins left them installed but DISABLED - and printed a green success line anyway. It now goes through apply-profile, and the success line is gated on the exit code. Invoke-Flask records its own exit status, because $LASTEXITCODE keeps a stale value when flask.exe is missing and no native command runs. CHARSET. The utf8mb4 compiler hook lived inline in migrations/env.py, so it covered the CORE chain only: plugin baselines inherited the server default, which on a latin1 server means two charsets in one database. It is now shopdb/utils/mysql_charset.py, imported by both, and preflight reports the database's default charset. BACKUP HONESTY. The dump was described as 'all of your asset data'. Uploaded branding and floor-map images live in instance\ on disk, not in the database, so a restore from the .sql alone comes back with no map. backup now archives instance\ alongside it and says both are needed. VERSIONING. AppVersion was hardcoded at 0.9.0 while the product, the frontend and the newest tag said 0.7.0 - and 0.9.0 collides with a retired contract version. Both builders now generate version.iss from shopdb/__init__.py. Smaller: rollback overwrites .env before deleting it, as uninstall already did; appcmd unlocks are scoped to this site's location rather than server-wide, with the wide unlock as a fallback; DEVELOPMENT-SETUP says Python 3.14; the README plugin list gains printedparts; prune-schema --force is documented as first-provisioning-only; HTTPS is documented as not-the-default with the steps to add it; the DBA SQL is on the wizard's database page; the features page says unticking does not remove an installed feature; and the installer README states that bundle-lock cannot vouch for the exe itself - that needs signing or an out-of-band hash, neither of which is wired up. |
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cproudlock
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3606d8d696 |
feat(sbom): ship a CycloneDX bill of materials with every build
An air-gapped site cannot be scanned from anywhere else, so when a CVE lands the only way to answer 'is that component here, and at what version' was to RDP in and go looking. The frontend was the real blind spot: nothing recorded which version of leaflet, dompurify, jspdf or html2canvas ends up inside the compiled SPA. scripts/generate_sbom.py emits CycloneDX 1.6 covering both ecosystems - every pin in requirements.txt with the sha256 the installer enforces, and every package in package-lock.json. Build-only npm packages are marked scope 'excluded' rather than dropped, so 'not here' stays distinguishable from 'not looked for'. Dependency edges are real: uv's '# via' comments give the Python graph and package-lock gives the npm one. Hand-rolled rather than cyclonedx-py plus cyclonedx-npm because both inputs are already pinned and committed - this is a format translation, not a scan - and because the build box may be a work PC with nothing but Python and Node. It is deterministic by construction: same inputs, byte-identical output, so regenerating does not churn. Staged into the application tree by both builders, so it installs onto the server with the app. shopdb-admin.ps1 verify reports it and searches it by component name, which is the question actually being asked. Packages appearing at several depths in package-lock (node_modules/vite and node_modules/vitest/node_modules/vite) are merged, and a copy reachable outside the dev tree makes the component count as shipped. Emitting both produced duplicate bom-refs, which CycloneDX forbids and scanners reject; getting the dev merge backwards would have hidden a shipped package from a CVE search. Not covered by bundle-lock.json on purpose: its provenance is git, not the third-party payload. |
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cproudlock
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1bf3cb2e1c |
feat(installer): refuse to damage an installation it did not create
Two guards for a server deployed by hand, which the West Jefferson production box is. An existing venv is reused, which is right for a repair or an upgrade of an install this made, and wrong when the venv belongs to a different Python. The wheelhouse is tagged for one minor version, so pip finds no candidate for the compiled packages and dies partway through - after Python has been installed and the application tree replaced. The two versions are now compared up front and the run stops with both numbers and what to do about it. Switching deployment method removes the other method's IIS artifact. That is correct when this installer owns both and dangerous when it does not: a wrong -MountAlias would call Remove-WebApplication on a live mount with no prompt and no error, and the first sign would be the site returning 404. It now refuses unless a version stamp shows this installer made the install, or -AdoptExisting is passed, and the refusal lists exactly what it would have removed. |
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cproudlock
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88af7fd9ce |
feat(installer): lock the third-party payload, and build on Windows without Bash
The bundle carries ~40 wheels, a Python installer and two MSIs. All of them run as SYSTEM on the target server, and nothing verified any of them. A missing wheelhouse printed MISSING and the script still exited 0, so an empty bundle compiled into a shippable installer and the failure surfaced on an air-gapped server with no way to fix it. bundle-lock.json now records that payload exactly - sha256 and byte size per file - and verification is set equality: a missing file, an unexpected extra file, or changed content all fail. Both builders check it and refuse to produce an unverified bundle; the lock ships inside the bundle and shopdb-install.ps1 re-checks it on the server before running any of it. This is deliberately a layer above requirements.txt hashes. pip lists every artifact of a pinned version (cffi 2.1.0 alone has 100 hashes), so it proves a wheel is genuine, not that it is the wheel this bundle was built and tested with; it ignores extra files in the wheelhouse; and it covers none of the executables. refresh-bundle-lock.ps1 regenerates the lock but refuses to overwrite one until the operator has seen the diff, because the commit is the review - it is the only place a change to what runs as SYSTEM becomes visible to a human. build-installer.ps1 is the whole build natively on Windows, so a work PC needs no Bash. It shares the plugin closure resolver with build-site.sh. Both builders now copy the installer scripts from the repository. They were copied from a downloads folder, so the logic that shipped was not the logic that was committed and the build worked on exactly one machine. Two verifiers exist because PowerShell is the only thing guaranteed present on the target server, while the Linux builder should not need pwsh. tests/test_bundle_lock.py runs both against the same fixtures and fails if they disagree. |
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| 0fa5f1e910 |
feat(deploy): add the air-gapped Windows installer
Roughly 2500 lines of tested installer had been living in ~/Downloads and an untracked folder - nothing was under version control. It goes here rather than in a repo of its own because it depends on application internals: the `flask plugin` verbs, site-profile.json, MOUNT_PATH, and the plugin registry. Versioned separately it would drift out of step with the thing it installs. Contents: the read-only preflight, the staged installer (bundled MySQL, runtime, schema, IIS, verify, uninstall), the operator console, the Inno Setup wizard, the bundle builder and the artwork generator. bundle/ and Output/ are ignored - regenerable, and ~220MB. plugins.iss is ignored because build-installer.sh generates it from the staged payload. The artwork IS committed so a Windows build box does not need Python and cairosvg. Verified end to end on Windows Server 2025 against a bundled MySQL 8.0 and an existing MySQL 5.6: fresh install, upgrade with backup and rollback, re-run idempotency, uninstall, and both deployment methods including switching between them. Not yet verified: a hypervisor-level air-gapped run, and any load from a real browser (every HTTP check so far used curl, which sends no Origin header). |
