Both kiosks admit a check-in or check-out with no login when the caller sits in
a configured network. The subtraction that makes that safe was missing.
A reverse proxy normally sits ON the plant network a site enters in the
allowlist. When the proxy forwards nothing - misconfigured, or something
bypassed it - the request arrives wearing the proxy's own address, which matches
the allowlist, while carrying no evidence whatever about who sent it. That is
the one case that has to refuse, and it was being admitted. The previous
fail-closed test only looked closed because the proxy in it happened to sit
outside the range.
Addresses that belong to the path are now subtracted before the allowlist is
consulted: loopback always, since no site's kiosk is the server itself, plus
whatever the site declares as its proxies. USB and printedparts get the same
treatment - they had diverged for no reason anybody chose.
Three more, same surface:
A range that admits everybody can no longer be saved by accident. 0.0.0.0/0 and
::/0 are refused outright, anything wider than a site plausibly needs is refused
unless an explicit override is set, and the refusal says why.
The kiosk token no longer travels in a URL. The provisioning link carries a
single-use setup code redeemed on first open, so the token stays out of browser
history, referrers and proxy logs. The route is declared public deliberately:
the secret is the code, the way a password-reset link is the secret.
The badge-to-name lookup is bounded. It answers without a login and is now
reachable from a whole network rather than one screen, so a source that keeps
missing gets refused rather than being allowed to walk the directory. On by
default, budget and kill switch are settings.
All four new settings carry controls on their settings pages. A setting that can
stop the kiosk, or widen it, must not be reachable only by hand-editing rows.
The installer's client-IP advice is corrected: it described the opposite of what
the shipped waitress flags do, and named only GE-Enforce as the thing that
breaks when the rule is absent, when the two kiosk allowlists depend on it too.
The device token assumes a handful of fixed screens an administrator
provisions once. That is not how these kiosks are used: most people open the
page on their own PC, and there is no login, so per-browser provisioning would
mean touching every PC on the floor and losing it again on the next reimage or
cleared profile. A screen in that state did not look refused either - the USB
kiosk rendered a working page whose every call answered 404.
Both kiosks now admit a caller on either ground, the same shape the GE-Enforce
client endpoints already use: the per-device token, or a source address inside
an allowlist. Wall screens keep the token and are not confined to the
allowlist; everyone else is admitted by where they are on the network. Still
gated on the site's enable flag, so nothing opens by itself, and both
allowlists ship empty - token-only until a site enters its ranges.
- shopdb.api gains ip_in_cidrs and request_ip_allowlisted (contract 0.35.0).
On the surface because both plugins need the identical gate, and a CIDR
parser copied into two of them is where a fail-open creeps in later. They
fail closed on an empty setting, an unparseable caller address and a
malformed entry, and they read remote_addr rather than raw X-Forwarded-For -
so the IIS rewrite rule is what makes them meaningful, which the module says
at length.
- Separate settings per kiosk, usb_kiosk_allowed_cidrs and
printedparts_kiosk_allowed_cidrs. One must not grant the other, for the same
reason the tokens are separate.
- Both settings pages get a picker listing the network plugin's subnets with
their VLANs. It stores resolved CIDR strings, not subnet ids: the setting has
to work at a site that does not run that plugin and must not break when an
inventory row is deleted. Entries matching no subnet are shown rather than
hidden, since a stale one left by an inventory edit looks exactly like a
hand-typed range.
- USBKiosk says it was not admitted instead of pretending to work, which
PartsKiosk already did.
- The USB settings page keyed text-vs-boolean off the token alone. Adding a
second text setting to the boolean path would have saved it as the word
'true' - the bug that replaced the kiosk token and 404'd every provisioned
screen. Both load and save now key off a list, with a spec on it.
The trade, stated plainly in the admin UI: anyone on an allowed network can
check a drive in or out against a badge number they guess, and the record
carries that person's name. Badges are attribution, not authorization. Keeping
the ranges narrow is what bounds it; login is the alternative and was ruled out
because these users do not sign in.
Catalog with photos and append-only print-file revisions, a stock
ledger attributing every take/restock/adjust to a badge-resolved
employee, a touch kiosk (scan bin, scan badge, keypad quantity) with a
deliberately open decrement-only take endpoint, 1x0.5in CODE128 bin
labels, low-stock email alerts to selected users, roles, or addresses,
and stock/consumption/by-person reports with a cache-vs-ledger
reconcile. Ships disabled; enable per site. Contract 0.13.0 adds the
mailer and the User/Role models to the plugin surface.
