A sweep of the URL map found 165 GET routes that answered anybody, with no
token at all: the whole asset inventory, every machine, PC, printer and network
device, the USB checkout history and who is holding which drive, the staff
directory with its photographs, every core report. Guest access had been argued
about one feature-flag at a time while the front door stood open.
Each of those now carries the read permission it belongs to. That also makes
the guest role mean something: a site can open exactly the reads it chooses,
and nothing follows by accident.
Thirty-three endpoints stay public, and each is named with its reason rather
than left to be inferred: the app shell and its bootstrap, the settings
allowlist (the handler already filters an anonymous caller down to branding and
a few keys), images fetched by <img src> which carries no Authorization header,
what a display kiosk renders before anybody signs in, the parts and USB kiosks,
the client scripts that run as SYSTEM before a user session exists, and a
secure-send link whose unguessable token IS the authorisation.
tests/test_core/test_public_read_surface.py is the standing gate, the companion
to the mutating-route sweep that has guarded writes for months. A new public
read fails CI until somebody adds it to that list in front of a reviewer. Four
further reads need a login but no permission, because the handler decides from
who you are - your own user record, your own API tokens, the role catalogue the
grid renders - and the same test proves each still refuses an anonymous caller.
Verified not vacuous by ungating one route and watching the sweep name it.
The employees plugin gained employees.view; the directory is names, SSOs,
photographs and reporting lines, and it had no permission of any kind.
Around ninety tests asserted payload shapes against endpoints that answered
anybody. They are about what the answer says, not about who may ask, so they
are signed in now rather than the gate being loosened. The ones that assert an
anonymous caller is refused were left exactly as they were.
Whether somebody with no account may see something was being answered one
feature at a time: a securesend_allow_guests setting, an enable flag per kiosk,
and very nearly a third for guides - each with its own settings page, its own
vocabulary and its own hand-written branch inside a route. Every one of them
answered a permissions question, and this app already administers permissions
per role.
So a caller with no token is not nobody: they hold the seeded `guest` role.
require_permission consults it when there is no identity, which is the entire
mechanism. The role is seeded holding NOTHING, so an upgrade opens no door; a
site opens one by ticking a box in the same grid it uses for every other role,
and closes it the same way. Revocation is read on every request rather than
cached, because taking guest access away is what somebody does the moment they
realise what they opened, and it has to bite immediately.
The redundant @jwt_required() above require_permission is gone from 184 routes.
It was belt-and-braces before; now it is actively wrong, because it refuses a
request with no token before the permission check can have an opinion, so a
grant would appear to do nothing.
What a guest may hold is bounded. Any .view or .read permission is grantable.
A WRITE has to be blessed by whoever owns it, through the new
get_guest_grantable_permissions hook (contract 0.21.0), and Secure Send is the
only case that exists: sending a password to a vendor is the one write this
product means to offer somebody who never signs in. Everything else is refused
by the API and greyed out in the grid rather than warned about - a checkbox
that quietly makes deleting an asset anonymous is not a warning anybody reads
twice. A guest write records no creator: the trail says when and from where,
never who, and that is the reason for the bar.
GE-Enforce and Slides gained read permissions so they can be opened to guests
without handing out the manage right. Their read routes accept either through
require_any_permission, so nothing an existing manager could reach has moved.
The navigation endpoint now returns only what the caller can actually reach.
Without that a signed-out visitor gets a sidebar of the whole app where every
link bounces off the login page, which reads as a broken site rather than as a
closed door. A nav item may name several permissions; holding any one is
enough, which is what GE-Enforce and Slides need now that a viewer and a
manager hold different strings.
Two things this found on the way: current_user is a LocalProxy, so
`current_user is None` is False for a request with nobody behind it - harmless
under a required JWT, an AttributeError the moment verification became
optional. And an image pasted into a guide before its first save was never
attached to it, so it was visible to editors and invisible to every reader;
saving now attaches it, and `flask guides fix-images` repairs what is stored.
The guides guest setting written earlier today is gone. Granting guides.view to
the guest role replaces it, which is the point.
An SVG is an XML document that may carry a script, and it is an accepted image
type because floor-plan maps and branding genuinely want vector. Loaded through
an img tag that script never runs, so the tiles and maps were never the risk.
Opening the file's own URL is - and the application image route is public, so
that URL needs no session.
Every route that serves an upload now goes through one helper that sends
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox, and nosniff. Seven routes
across core and five plugins, so a new one added later starts from the same
place rather than repeating the reasoning. Banning the format instead would
have cost the maps their only sensible one.
The app also sent no security headers at all. It now sets nosniff,
frame-ancestors self (as X-Frame-Options too, for the display bays' browsers)
and a referrer policy. Deliberately NOT a page-wide CSP: this serves an SPA with
inline styles, so a real script-src policy is a change worth making with the
frontend in front of you, and a permissive header claiming one would be worse
than having none.
Contract 0.19.0. send_upload is on the shopdb.api surface, because a plugin
serving user-supplied bytes should not have to remember these headers. The same
bump records that get_dashboard_widgets has taken data and shape rather than a
component name since the dashboard was rebuilt - that shipped without a bump,
while BasePlugin and PLUGIN-HOOKS.md both still documented the shape nothing
renders, which is how five plugins came to declare widgets pointing at
components nobody had written.
Adding an application meant typing an image FILENAME and trusting someone had
dropped the file into the frontend's own directory by hand, and typing an
install path from memory. Both are uploads now, following the model-image trio
that models and part photos already use.
The two differ deliberately. The image is public, because application tiles
render before anything is authenticated. The installer is not: it is licensed
vendor software, an open URL would publish it to anything that can reach the
site, and it is always sent as an attachment rather than rendered.
Installers are capped at 500MB and the size is measured by seeking the stream
rather than trusting Content-Length, which a chunked upload does not send and a
client can understate. Anything larger belongs on the share, and the error says
so rather than just refusing.
Files are chosen before a new application exists, so they are held and uploaded
once there is an id to attach them to. A failed upload leaves the saved record
alone and reports, rather than losing what saved fine.
Removing an installer only clears installpath when it pointed at the upload - a
share path was typed by a person and is not ours to wipe. The detail page reads
both shapes, since entries from the classic site hold a bare filename that is
still served from /images/applications/.
Classic ShopDB listed an application's related KB articles on its page; the flask
app detail didn't, even though KB articles carry an appid FK. get_application now
returns a knowledgebase list (KB rows linked by appid; lazy + plugin-guarded so
core stays decoupled), and ApplicationDetail.vue renders a Knowledge Base section
linking each article.
Verified: an app returns its linked KB (e.g. 77 articles) and the section renders.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /api/applications/{id}/versions now calls apply_import_timestamps so an
imported version's original dateadded/releasedate survives (was skipped, unlike
the app + install endpoints). No-op outside import mode.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces the legacy supportteams/appowners pair: supportteams
(teamname unique, teamurl ServiceNow link) + supportteamcontacts
(multiple named contacts with SSO per team, the people you reach out
to), applications.supportteamid intact. Migration 7d18 migrates each
legacy team owner into a contact, drops appowners, and has a validated
downgrade. New /api/supportteams CRUD (admin writes, import-mode
timestamps, teamname lookup), Support card on application detail,
contacts column on the list, and a settings management page.
IMPORT-API.md mapping updated to the concrete endpoints.
658 tests pass; live dev migration applied (24 teams / 24 contacts);
fresh-install and downgrade round-trips verified on scratch DBs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Goal: an LLM or script can migrate an entire legacy database using only
the HTTP API - original history preserved, safely re-runnable.
- X-Import-Mode header (admin only): create/update endpoints across 15
timestamped entity types accept original createddate/modifieddate;
helper exposed via shopdb.api (contract 0.7.0 -> 0.8.0).
- Exact-match natural-key lookup filters on 13 list endpoints for the
lookup-then-upsert recipe.
- Selfhosted USB checkout/checkin accept backdated event times in
import mode.
- docs/IMPORT-API.md: operator manual grounded in the real legacy
schema - order of operations, full table-by-table mapping including
the machines fan-out, idempotent Python importer with dry-run, parity
checks, and decided dispositions for unmigrated tables (DNC config
stays live-fed via the collector; supportteams/appowners map to the
upcoming supportteams model).
635 tests pass; naming green; frontend untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Make the app distributable to other GE Aerospace sites (one self-hosted
instance per site, ADR-004). GE values remain the shipped defaults; every
site-specific behavior is now a Setting an admin can change in the UI.
Settings-driven site config:
- Branding: site/QR/badge logos, favicon, primary color (upload endpoints
mirror the map-blueprint pattern; new Settings > Branding section).
- ServiceNow: search/incident/change URL templates ({ticket}), ticket
prefixes, enable toggle. Defaults point at the current
geaerospaceqa.service-now.com global search. Disabled = plain-text tickets.
- Employee-id regex (employeeid_pattern), printer hostname template,
QR label targets (qr_target_printer / qr_target_usb, blank = asset page,
else URL template with placeholders), usb_label_style (barcode|qr).
- West Jefferson floor-plan PNGs removed from the tree; generic placeholder
ships as the map default and sites upload their own blueprint.
Security closeout:
- dashboarddefaults writes now require admin.
- Collector: generic error messages (no str(exc) leak); API key accepted
via X-API-Key header only (BREAKING: querystring api_key removed).
- IP-based login rate limiting (AUTH_RATELIMIT_* knobs) atop account lockout.
- Setting.set() creation race fixed (IntegrityError retry).
Release engineering and docs:
- __version__ 0.5.0 (distinct from __contract_version__, ADR-007),
CHANGELOG.md, Gitea Actions CI config, frontend version aligned.
- One wizard-first install story across README/DEPLOY; new CONFIG.md,
UPGRADE.md, BACKUP-RESTORE.md; CLAUDE.md and ROADMAP de-staled.
- Dockerfile multi-stage build now bundles the frontend; compose binds
MySQL to 127.0.0.1; stale database/schema.sql and one-off SQL removed.
Debt and fixes:
- .query.get() -> db.session.get() sweep; datetime.utcnow() removed
(naive-UTC via timezone-aware now); users.py on authz decorators.
- Fixed 4 stale tests (slides feed shape, shopfloor splitperemployee,
plugin contract purity) and the USB label page field mapping (both usb
modes emit the cmmc shape: device_id/device_desc).
- Health endpoint reports the real version.
248 tests pass; naming/style check green; frontend builds; fresh-DB
flask db upgrade + seeds verified; QR targets verified by decoding
rendered codes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Feature work from the 2026-07 session:
Settings IA
- Replace the flat 27-card settings hub with a persistent two-pane shell
(SettingsLayout.vue): grouped, searchable left rail + content pane.
- Nest all settings/* routes under the shell via router post-processing;
shared nav catalog in settingsNav.js. Group by asset class (PCs, Printers,
Equipment, Network) so per-type settings stop scattering.
Custom fields (core)
- customfields + customfieldvalues tables (migration 7d14), CRUD API at
/api/customfields, per-asset value get/save.
- Settings management page + reusable CustomFieldsSection (detail) and
CustomFieldsInputs (form) wired into all four asset types.
Warranty (new plugin)
- plugins/warranty: warranties + warrantyassets (migration 7d15), derived
coverage status, provider abstraction (manual now; Dell/Lenovo/HP stubs).
- API CRUD + per-asset panel + report buckets; WarrantyPanel on all four
detail pages; Warranties management page; Warranty report + Reports card.
- Seed warranty.* permissions.
Printer drivers
- printerdrivers table (migration 7d13) linked to printer models; drivers now
surface on the matching printer's detail page.
Other
- PCDetail rebalanced (Network + Status + Warranty + custom fields on the right).
- Rename PCs list "Features" column to "Remote Access"; fix badge hover underline.
- Drop equipment islocationonly field.
- Centralize asset-type label/route maps into utils/assetTypes.js.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Verification audit (re-run of the 6 skill lenses) confirmed the prior fixes hold
and surfaced a few misses:
Security (HIGH):
- search.py _check_smart_redirect still opened a raw pymysql connection with
root/rootpassword (reachable on any 9-digit SSO query). Now uses the shared
env-backed employee_connection helper.
- Deleted dead shopdb/core/services/employee_service.py (zero importers; carried
another root/rootpassword literal). No hardcoded credentials remain in app
logic; config.py dev defaults stay gated by ProductionConfig.validate.
Dead hook:
- get_services was implemented by the printers plugin but had no consumer (docs
claimed otherwise). Added PluginManager.get_service(name) that resolves a
service from enabled plugins; updated PLUGIN-HOOKS.md.
Tests:
- search disabled-plugin exclusion (the high-value gap): enabled plugin's
hostname appears, disabled plugin's hostname drops out (searched by a hostname
distinct from assetnumber so only the gated domain can match).
- get_service consumer test (unknown name -> None).
Simplify:
- Extract the triplicated GE_LOGO_SVG + loadLogo + drawLogoOverlay into shared
frontend/src/views/print/qrLogo.js (renderQrDataUrl); both QR views use it.
- applications.py: lift the misplaced pagination import to the top; drop unused
Computer unpacking in the 3 endpoints that only touch ComputerInstalledApp.
154 tests pass, naming/style green, app boots, QR render verified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Architectural pass from the skill review ("plugin is the product" boundary).
Core no longer imports plugin models at module load (was a hard import-time
dependency that broke core if the computers plugin was absent/disabled):
- collector.py, applications.py, reports.py: lazy + guarded imports of the
computers plugin models. Endpoints that need install-tracking now return 503
when the plugin is absent instead of failing at import.
Search honors runtime enable/disable:
- search.py: _require_enabled(name) raises ImportError for a disabled plugin,
so each plugin-scoped block skips it (a disabled plugin's rows leave search).
- Replace hardcoded root/rootpassword employee-DB connection in _search_employees
with the shared env-backed employee_connection helper.
Plugin hooks (integrating-plugin-hooks: every hook needs a consumer):
- get_dashboard_widgets: add the consumer GET /api/dashboard/widgets (5 plugins
already implemented the hook; it had none). Skips disabled, isolates in prod.
- get_searchable_fields: REMOVED. Zero plugins implemented it and there was no
consumer; global search is a core concern over the asset model. Contract
reduction, __contract_version__ 0.3.0 -> 0.4.0.
Docs/contract: PLUGIN-HOOKS.md (widgets consumer note, searchable-fields removal,
0.4.0), PLUGIN-QUICKSTART.md, ADR-001 hook list. Tests: widgets endpoint
aggregate + disabled-skip; contract tests for the removed/added hooks.
151 tests pass, naming/style green, app boots all 6 plugins.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add applications.isrequired (model + migration 7c02 + create/update + form
checkbox). The software-compliance report compared required apps against
installs but no such flag existed, so it 500'd; now it works.
- Repair relationshiptypes rows with 0000-00-00 createddate/modifieddate
(partof/connectedto) to real timestamps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The asset/computer model is now the single source of truth. Remove the Machine
instance layer end to end:
- Delete models Machine, MachineStatus, PCType, MachineRelationship,
InstalledApp, PrinterData; keep MachineType (models.machinetypeid still
references it).
- Delete the /api/machines, /api/statuses, /api/pctypes blueprints and the
legacy /api/printers/legacy (PrinterData) blueprint.
- Drop the deprecated communications.machineid column and its FK.
- Migration 7c01 drops tables machines, machinestatuses, pctypes,
machinerelationships, installedapps, printerdata (idempotent).
- Fix remaining readers (applications install counts) to ComputerInstalledApp.
- Frontend: remove dead machinesApi/statusesApi/pctypesApi wrappers; repoint
the PC Types settings page at computer types.
143 tests pass; all asset/computer/dashboard/report/collector endpoints 200.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- applications.py installed-on + per-computer install/uninstall/update endpoints
now use Computer / ComputerInstalledApp instead of Machine / InstalledApp.
- ApplicationDetail "Installed On" list reads the computer shape.
- Drop the unused Machine/MachineType import from the assets map endpoint.
No active core endpoint uses the Machine model anymore (only the legacy
/api/machines blueprint and reference-data seeder remain).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
System Settings:
- Add SystemSettings.vue with Zabbix integration, SMTP/email config, SAML SSO settings
- Add Setting model with key-value storage and typed values
- Add settings API with caching
Audit Logging:
- Add AuditLog model tracking user, IP, action, entity changes
- Add comprehensive audit logging to all CRUD operations:
- Machines, Computers, Equipment, Network devices, VLANs, Subnets
- Printers, USB devices (including checkout/checkin)
- Applications, Settings, Users/Roles
- Track old/new values for all field changes
- Mask sensitive values (passwords, tokens) in logs
User Management:
- Add UsersList.vue with full user CRUD
- Add Role management with granular permissions
- Add 41 predefined permissions across 10 categories
- Add users API with roles and permissions endpoints
Reports:
- Add TonerReport.vue for printer supply monitoring
Dark Mode Fixes:
- Fix map position section in PCForm, PrinterForm
- Fix alert-warning in KnowledgeBaseDetail
- All components now use CSS variables for theming
CLI Commands:
- Add flask seed permissions
- Add flask seed settings
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Flask backend with Vue 3 frontend for shop floor machine management.
Includes database schema export for MySQL shopdb_flask database.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
