An endpoint reported telemetry correctly for hours while the Fleet page showed
"No endpoints found". The PC detail page displayed its panels the whole time, so
ingest was plainly working; only the list was empty.
The list route was the one route in 331 paths registered with a trailing slash:
@endpoints_bp.route('/', methods=['GET']) -> /api/endpoints/
The browser client calls it without one, so Flask answered a 308 redirect to an
ABSOLUTE url. On dev that resolves and nobody notices. Behind the IIS subpath it
cannot: with no ProxyFix, Werkzeug builds that Location from the scheme and host
it believes it has, so it emitted http:// and dropped the /shopdb prefix. A
browser will not follow an https page to http, the request failed, and the
page's catch block rendered the empty state.
Every other route in the plugin worked throughout, because none of them carries
a trailing slash - the detail panels call /endpoints/asset/<id>/status and were
never redirected. Detail works, list empty is the signature of this bug.
Registered as '' now, so the rule is /api/endpoints. That is what
CONTRIBUTING.md's API section spells and what every other list route in the
product already did. The inventory and the generated spec are updated to match.
Also here:
- tests/test_core/test_no_redirecting_routes.py fails the build if any /api
rule is registered with a trailing slash and strict slashes. Verified by
planting the violation: it named the offending route, then passed once
reverted. It takes the shared app fixture rather than building its own
application - doing that rebinds SQLAlchemy and leaves the NEXT module
without tables, which showed up as three unrelated "no such table: settings"
failures visible only in a full run.
- The Fleet page now renders "Could not load endpoints (HTTP nnn). This is a
failed request, not an empty fleet." A list that reports a 403 and an empty
fleet identically is what made this take as long as it did.
- TRUSTED_PROXY_COUNT (default 0) applies ProxyFix when set. Off by default on
purpose: it makes X-Forwarded-* trusted, and a client can send those itself,
while the login rate limit and account lockout are keyed on the client
address. Set it to 1 on an instance behind IIS.
Full suite 2124 passed, vitest 260 passed, naming and docs gates green.
Ports the corporate-GitHub wilm branch onto main, keeping the two branches
separate. Thirteen upstream commits arrive with their authorship intact; the
review fixes and the portability work below are on top.
What arrives:
endpoints plugin - a ShopDB agent reporting endpoint state, telemetry,
services and interfaces, with a command channel the agent
long-polls. Ingest stays on the generic collector route
(ADR-006); the agent key is a UI-managed single-scope
token whose revocation is an instant kill switch.
computers policies - Configuration and Business Policies (RMM-style), scope
trees validated at write time, actions checked against
the endpoints command allowlist. Feature-gated: every
route 404s while the setting is off, so enabling it can
never half-expose the surface.
asset CSV import - templates, a collector script carrying the site path, and
a validate-then-commit import. A plugin can own a virtual
column plus a post-write row hook, which is how a PC's
machine number becomes a controls link without a
hand-built relationships sheet.
agent/ - the Windows agent and its installer.
Contract 0.21.0 -> 0.24.0, additive throughout: register_import_hook (0.22),
mint/list/revoke_service_token (0.23), collector_authorized (0.24). The stability
table had no rows for any of them and now does.
MySQL 5.6 portability. The branch stored three policy columns as sa.JSON, the
only JSON columns in the product, and 5.6 has no JSON type: the migration failed
with a bare syntax error near the word JSON. They are TEXT now, through a
JSONText type decorator, so all seventeen call sites still read and write dicts.
The convention elsewhere is already TEXT (guides.blocksjson,
geenforce.manifestjson).
Review fixes carried on top:
- six policy GETs were jwt_required(optional=True), which authenticates a
caller without checking anything; they require computers.view now, and six
redundant jwt_required decorators are gone
- the agent installer took a default BaseUrl and CollectorKey, so a mistyped
run silently pointed an endpoint at the wrong instance; both are mandatory
and a non-https BaseUrl throws unless -AllowInsecureHttp is passed
- a committing CSV import wrote no audit row
Documentation: the 34 new routes are described in docs/api-inventory.json, which
is hand-maintained on purpose, and the generated spec now covers 331 paths and
477 operations across 22 surfaces. DEVELOPMENT-SETUP's 1071 troubleshooting row
said "use MySQL 8 for dev" and now gives the actual fix, including the trap that
5.6 downgrades ROW_FORMAT=DYNAMIC to Compact with a warning instead of an error.
Full suite 2123 passed, vitest 260 passed, all seventeen plugin chains migrate
clean on MySQL 5.6 and the naming, docs, parity and read-surface gates are green.
Air-gapped sites cannot pip install / npm ci / docker pull, so a build-at-site
compose (build: .) fails and reports 'service api is not running'. Add a
build-once-ship-image path:
- scripts/build-offline-bundle.ps1: on a connected box, build shopdb-flask +
pull mysql:8.0, docker save both into one gzipped tarball with a sha256.
- docker-compose.airgap.yml: runs pre-loaded images (image:, never build:),
drops the ./plugins bind mount (which would mask the image's baked-in plugins
with an empty host dir and load zero plugins at an image-only site), and adds
a one-shot migrate service (db upgrade + plugin upgrade-all + seed) that api
waits on via service_completed_successfully, so 'up -d' brings a working site.
- docs/DEPLOY-AIRGAP.md: full runbook (build, transfer+verify, load+run, admin,
verify, upgrade, troubleshooting), incl the Zscaler in-build cert caveat.
- .env.example: IMAGE_TAG for the air-gap compose to pin the loaded image tag.
Completes the marketplace security model. Verification stops being advisory:
a plugin only loads or migrates when its tree matches a trusted signature, and
plugins are pulled from a signed shelf with anti-rollback and revocation.
Enforcement (default OFF - existing deploys unchanged):
- verification.py PluginVerifier, shared by the loader (verify-at-load, before
plugin.py is imported) and the migration manager (verify-at-migrate, before
any DDL). Fail-closed: an unsigned/tampered/wrong-key plugin does not run.
- Gated by PLUGIN_REQUIRE_SIGNED. PLUGIN_DEV_TRUST_DIRS exempts named dirs but
only under DEBUG/TESTING; production ignores it.
- flask plugin stamp-bundled writes provenance into in-tree plugins so
verify-at-load applies to bundled plugins too (image build step).
- tier:core manifest guard: uninstall/disable refuse a core-tier plugin.
Shelf (shelf.py):
- Signed shelf-index.json (+ .sig): monotonic serial (a site refuses an older
index - anti-rollback), revoked list carried across builds, per-entry
version/tier/core_version for browse. Index is a browse layer only; adopt
reads security-bearing fields from the verified artifact.
- flask plugin shelf-build / shelf-list / adopt / audit. adopt verifies index +
artifact (signature + every file hash), unpacks to staging, re-verifies, then
atomically moves into place and installs+enables the closure. Refuses a
downgrade without --force-downgrade. Anti-rollback serial stored in
instance/shelf-state.json.
- config PLUGIN_SHELF_DIR; the app only reads the folder, never speaks a
network. .env.example + docs/PLUGIN-SIGNING.md document the flow.
22 tests: verifier policy (off / no-keys / signed / tampered / wrong-key /
dev-exempt), verify-at-load + verify-at-migrate integration, tier guard, index
sign/verify + tamper/wrong-key, serial state, revocation, version resolution,
verified atomic unpack + tamper refusal. Live-smoked keygen->pack->shelf-build
->list->adopt->audit + serial guard. 1050 pass, naming green.
Packaging + provenance for the plugin marketplace. No runtime behavior change
yet - verification is available on demand; enforcing it at plugin load/migrate
and pulling from a shelf are Phase 2.
- signing.py: ed25519 key pairs + provenance. Provenance is a sorted per-file
SHA-256 map plus metadata; the detached signature covers the exact
serialized provenance bytes, so verifying is re-hash files, re-serialize,
check signature. verify() accepts any of several trusted keys (rotation).
Uses cryptography (already a dependency).
- packaging.py: pack() builds a signed <name>-<version>.shopdbplugin (zip +
PROVENANCE.json + PROVENANCE.sig). verify_artifact()/verify_dir() re-hash
and check the signature, and flag a tampered file, an unexpected file, a
wrong/absent key - all fail closed.
- CLI: `flask plugin keygen` (publisher key pair), `flask plugin pack <name>
--key` (validates then signs), and `flask plugin validate` extended to a
signed artifact by path (--pubkey, else PLUGIN_TRUSTED_KEYS).
- config PLUGIN_TRUSTED_KEYS: os.pathsep-separated public-key PEM paths,
delivered with the site config, never read from the shelf. .env.example
documents it.
- docs/PLUGIN-SIGNING.md: curator flow (keygen offline, review, pack, publish,
pin keys, rotate).
The signature proves an artifact is exactly what a curator signed, not that the
code is safe - human review before signing is the control. 11 tests: sign/verify
round trip, wrong key, provenance excludes noise, serialize determinism, pack +
verify, tamper -> hash mismatch, extra file, no-key fail-closed, verify_dir.
1028 pass, naming green.
The app can run as an IIS Application under an existing site
(e.g. https://host/ops/) instead of its own site + port:
- frontend: vite base via VITE_BASE_PATH; router history, axios
baseURL, and root-absolute asset/route paths resolve through
utils/basePath.js withBase()
- backend: MOUNT_PATH (env or .env) wraps the app in a WSGI
middleware that shifts the prefix into SCRIPT_NAME, so one knob
serves API + SPA under the mount
- docs: INSTALL-WINDOWS-IIS.md section 7b runbook + troubleshooting
rows; DEPLOY-WINDOWS-IIS.md pointer; commented examples in
deploy/windows/web.config and .env.example
Root deployment unchanged (MOUNT_PATH unset, base '/'). Also folds
two stray root-absolute callers into the shared plumbing
(MachineForm relationship-types fetch, reports CSV window.open).
Feature work from the 2026-07 session:
Settings IA
- Replace the flat 27-card settings hub with a persistent two-pane shell
(SettingsLayout.vue): grouped, searchable left rail + content pane.
- Nest all settings/* routes under the shell via router post-processing;
shared nav catalog in settingsNav.js. Group by asset class (PCs, Printers,
Equipment, Network) so per-type settings stop scattering.
Custom fields (core)
- customfields + customfieldvalues tables (migration 7d14), CRUD API at
/api/customfields, per-asset value get/save.
- Settings management page + reusable CustomFieldsSection (detail) and
CustomFieldsInputs (form) wired into all four asset types.
Warranty (new plugin)
- plugins/warranty: warranties + warrantyassets (migration 7d15), derived
coverage status, provider abstraction (manual now; Dell/Lenovo/HP stubs).
- API CRUD + per-asset panel + report buckets; WarrantyPanel on all four
detail pages; Warranties management page; Warranty report + Reports card.
- Seed warranty.* permissions.
Printer drivers
- printerdrivers table (migration 7d13) linked to printer models; drivers now
surface on the matching printer's detail page.
Other
- PCDetail rebalanced (Network + Status + Warranty + custom fields on the right).
- Rename PCs list "Features" column to "Remote Access"; fix badge hover underline.
- Drop equipment islocationonly field.
- Centralize asset-type label/route maps into utils/assetTypes.js.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses findings from a 6-lens review against the project skills
(defining-asset-contract, enforcing-plugin-contract, hardening-flask-config,
integrating-plugin-hooks, pinning-flask-behavior, simplifying-python).
Security (hardening-flask-config):
- Load per-plugin COLLECTOR_API_KEY_<PLUGIN> from env in create_app. from_object
only copies class attributes, so per-plugin keys (ADR-006) were dead in real
deploys and silently fell back to the shared key.
- EMPLOYEE_DB_USER/PASSWORD no longer default to root/rootpassword (no safe
default for a secret; unset fails loud). Documented in .env.example + DEPLOY.md.
- COLLECTOR_API_KEY + per-plugin + EMPLOYEE_DB_* added to .env.example/DEPLOY.md.
Hook isolation (integrating-plugin-hooks):
- collector _collector_plugins and dashboard get_navigation now re-raise in
dev/test and log+isolate in prod, instead of silently swallowing a broken
plugin hook.
Plugin loader (enforcing-plugin-contract):
- enable_plugin/install_plugin read dependencies+version from the manifest
instead of instantiating the plugin class.
- _register_plugin_components rejects a second plugin claiming an already-used
api_prefix (reset per app in init_app).
Tests (pinning-flask-behavior):
- test_identifiers.py: gauge/maintenance round-trip on computer/printer/network
create+update; per-type seed yields the 12 identifier keys.
- contract tests for apply_collector_payload presence + schema-declarers-implement.
- security tests for per-plugin key env loading + no employee-db password default.
Docs/contract sync (defining-asset-contract):
- PLUGIN-HOOKS.md documents apply_collector_payload; stale 0.2.0 -> 0.3.0.
- ADR-006 documents apply_collector_payload + single-dispatch rationale.
- ADR-001 enumerates the expanded shopdb.api import surface.
Simplify (simplifying-python):
- De-duplicate the 21-entry settings defaults: shared build_default_settings()
used by both the /settings/seed route and the CLI (were drifting copies).
- Remove dead AssetStatus import + redundant AssetType local import in computers
plugin; comment the statusid=1 collector default.
153 tests pass (was 145), naming/style green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Migration runner ready and a sister site can deploy from a clean
checkout with one .env file.
ADRs relocated (migrations/adr/ -> docs/adr/):
- migrations/ is now Alembic territory, not docs.
- All cross-references updated: CLAUDE.md, docs/PLUGIN-HOOKS.md,
docs/PLUGIN-QUICKSTART.md.
Alembic initialized (migrations/):
- env.py, script.py.mako, alembic.ini copied from Flask-Migrate
templates so `flask db migrate` and `flask db upgrade` work without
a one-time `flask db init` (which would clash with the existing
migrations/ directory).
- Baseline migration generated via autogenerate, captures all 47
tables (core models + 6 plugins) as the upgrade target. Ready for
per-site `flask db upgrade` from an empty schema.
Deploy artifacts:
- Dockerfile: python:3.12-slim base, gunicorn server, non-root user,
healthcheck against /api/auth/login. Single image bundles all six
plugins; sites enable via `flask plugin install <name>`.
- docker-compose.yml: MySQL 8 + API container, healthcheck-gated
startup, env-driven secrets that fail loud on missing values
(`${SECRET_KEY:?}` form).
- .env.example: full env-var inventory with comments. Calls out
required vs optional. Matches what ProductionConfig.validate
enforces.
docs/DEPLOY.md:
- Step-by-step per-site runbook: clone, configure .env, bring up
stack, run migrations, seed reference data, install plugins,
create admin, front with TLS, backups, updates.
- Common-issues table.
- Cross-links to ADR-004 (per-site rationale), ADR-003 (plugin
distribution), and the config source.
Skills:
- migrating-asset-schema: Alembic + one-shot data migration policy.
Rules: additive first, renames are three steps, destructive ops
need rollback, equipment migration filter per ADR-001 + ADR-005.
- hardening-flask-config: production validation, CORS allowlist
policy, JWT cookie hardening, per-site deploy isolation per ADR-004.
CLAUDE.md updated to reflect the post-Phase-5 state. No tests added
this commit; the Alembic baseline is exercised by the existing
db.create_all-based test suite (tests do not touch the migration
runner; that's by design until per-plugin migrations land).
Test count unchanged: 101 passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
System Settings:
- Add SystemSettings.vue with Zabbix integration, SMTP/email config, SAML SSO settings
- Add Setting model with key-value storage and typed values
- Add settings API with caching
Audit Logging:
- Add AuditLog model tracking user, IP, action, entity changes
- Add comprehensive audit logging to all CRUD operations:
- Machines, Computers, Equipment, Network devices, VLANs, Subnets
- Printers, USB devices (including checkout/checkin)
- Applications, Settings, Users/Roles
- Track old/new values for all field changes
- Mask sensitive values (passwords, tokens) in logs
User Management:
- Add UsersList.vue with full user CRUD
- Add Role management with granular permissions
- Add 41 predefined permissions across 10 categories
- Add users API with roles and permissions endpoints
Reports:
- Add TonerReport.vue for printer supply monitoring
Dark Mode Fixes:
- Fix map position section in PCForm, PrinterForm
- Fix alert-warning in KnowledgeBaseDetail
- All components now use CSS variables for theming
CLI Commands:
- Add flask seed permissions
- Add flask seed settings
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Flask backend with Vue 3 frontend for shop floor machine management.
Includes database schema export for MySQL shopdb_flask database.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
