62c5454f00eba0d724f94dea8bf18b39beb689af
8 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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cproudlock
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5f350179b1 |
fix(installer): undo a fix applied twice, and load the checker at script scope
A review of the installer for Windows-only defect classes found seven live issues. These two would have stopped the next attempt on any server. DOUBLE-APPLIED GUARD. Yesterday's $null.Count fix was applied at BOTH ends: Test-BundleLock returns ,$problems, and the call site also wrapped it in @(). The comma already hands the array back intact, so the extra @() nests it and .Count becomes 1 regardless of how many problems there are. Every install would have failed with "the bundle does not match bundle-lock.json (1 problem(s))" on a byte-perfect payload. Applying the same guard at both ends was worse than applying it at neither. Verified in a Windows VM against a real bundle: clean 0, tampered 1, restored 0. DOT-SOURCE SCOPE. bundle-lock.ps1 was dot-sourced INSIDE Assert-BundleIntegrity, which loads it into that function's scope - every helper it defines disappears when the function returns. Assert-BundleIntegrity itself worked; the next caller, Get-WheelhousePythonTag, died with "The term 'Get-JsonProperty' is not recognized". It only fires where a venv already exists, so greenfield was fine and every retry after a part-completed install was not. Now loaded once at script scope, guarded so the stages that run without a bundle still work. Both were confirmed by running them rather than by reading: the nesting with a three-case pwsh test, the scoping with a minimal repro. |
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cproudlock
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14fedcee4c |
fix(installer): a clean payload crashed stage 2
Reported from Server 2019: "The property 'Count' cannot be found on this object" immediately into stage 2. Test-BundleLock returns an array of problems, and an EMPTY array means the payload is exactly right. PowerShell unrolls a zero-element return into $null, and under Set-StrictMode 2.0 $null.Count throws - so the branch that runs when everything is correct was the one that could not run. Every failing bundle got past it fine, which is why nothing caught it until the 8.3 path fix made verification succeed for the first time on a real server. Fixed at both ends: the call site wraps in @(), and Test-BundleLock returns ,$problems so no caller can be handed $null or a bare string depending on how many problems there happen to be. The other .Count uses in this file were already @()-wrapped and are unaffected. |
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cproudlock
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263ae8e3b4 |
fix(installer): install the Visual C++ runtime before MySQL, and log the MSI
Second failure from the Server 2019 test. The previous fix worked - msiexec went from exit 1639 (ERROR_INVALID_COMMAND_LINE, which is why it printed its usage dialog) to exit 1603 (ERROR_INSTALL_FAILURE), so the command line parses now and the MSI itself is failing. It failed in 1.1 seconds. An MSI that dies that fast has not begun installing; it has failed a launch condition. MySQL 8.4 requires the Visual C++ redistributable and a bare Windows Server does not ship it - the same runtime mysql.exe and mysqldump.exe import, which was visible when their DLL dependencies were trimmed and went unnoticed. Stage 0 now installs VC_redist.x64.exe from the bundle before touching MySQL, skipping it when vcruntime140.dll is already present, and fails with a sentence naming the requirement if the redistributable is absent from the bundle altogether. vcredist\ is an optional locked payload. msiexec also gets /l*v now. A bare 1603 names neither the failing action nor the reason, and it is the most common MySQL install failure - diagnosing this one took a launch-condition inference rather than a log. The MSI log lands beside the installer's own in ProgramData, so the next failure is readable instead of guessed at. |
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cproudlock
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f72813ed9c |
feat(installer): bundle the database - MySQL 8.4 LTS, not 8.0
The bundled-database option could not actually be built. Stage 0 looks for mysql\mysql-8.0.x-winx64.msi, and Oracle no longer publishes a standalone server MSI for 8.0 - every 8.0.x returns 404. What remains for 8.0 is the MySQL Installer bundle, which is an installer-manager: 'msiexec /i INSTALLDIR=' would install THAT rather than a database, and stage 0 would then fail on a missing mysqld.exe. MySQL 8.0 also reached end of life in April 2026, so bundling it would have put an unsupported database on every new site. 8.4 LTS still ships the standalone MSI (129MB, which is what the '125MB' note in stage 0 was written against) and is supported into 2032. Defaults follow it: install root MySQL Server 8.4, service MySQL84. The operator console still looks for an 8.0 install path as a fallback, for sites already running one. Also bundles mysqlclient\ - mysql.exe and mysqldump.exe with the two OpenSSL DLLs they actually import, 20MB rather than the 51MB of debug and auth-plugin libraries the archive ships. Stage 2 stages it onto the server, so a site whose database is on ANOTHER host can still take the pre-upgrade backup that every upgrade depends on. That was the gap the preflight had started warning about. Bundle is now 221MB. |
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cproudlock
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2c415a1712 |
fix(installer): correct a false security claim, and clear the should-fix list
CLIENT IP / SPOOFABILITY. docs/geenforce-api-cutover.md claimed that removing the IIS rewrite rule made the allowlist fail closed and that it does NOT become spoofable. The opposite is true. IIS never sets X-Forwarded-For on its own; the rule is the only thing that does. Remove it and IIS still forwards whatever X-Forwarded-For the CALLER sent, waitress trusts it because it arrives from 127.0.0.1, and remote_addr becomes attacker-controlled - so a token-less caller can fetch manifests from anywhere on the network. The document and the _trusted_client_ip docstring now say so, waitress runs with --trusted-proxy-count=1, and stage 5 checks the rule is actually live rather than assuming it. The wizard question is rephrased to something an operator can verify with their network team instead of guessing at. NON-ASCII. The style gate only ever checked .py/.vue/.js/.ts, so documentation accumulated em-dashes, arrows and box-drawing characters against this repo's own convention - including in files added this week. Cleaned, and the gate now uses INCLUDES_ALL so Markdown, JSON and YAML are covered. PLUGIN DEFAULTS. The wizard pre-ticked measuringtools and printedparts, both of which ship default_enabled=false, so every site taking the defaults installed and enabled them against their manifests. Inno has no JSON parser so the list must be hardcoded, but tests/test_installer_defaults.py now fails when it drifts. UPGRADES. The payload copy merges, so a plugin dropped from a site's profile kept its code forever - which defeats a lean build and leaves core's optional-import guards succeeding for a plugin the site no longer has. Stale plugin directories are now deregistered and removed before the copy. add-plugin used 'plugin install', which for the five default_enabled=false plugins left them installed but DISABLED - and printed a green success line anyway. It now goes through apply-profile, and the success line is gated on the exit code. Invoke-Flask records its own exit status, because $LASTEXITCODE keeps a stale value when flask.exe is missing and no native command runs. CHARSET. The utf8mb4 compiler hook lived inline in migrations/env.py, so it covered the CORE chain only: plugin baselines inherited the server default, which on a latin1 server means two charsets in one database. It is now shopdb/utils/mysql_charset.py, imported by both, and preflight reports the database's default charset. BACKUP HONESTY. The dump was described as 'all of your asset data'. Uploaded branding and floor-map images live in instance\ on disk, not in the database, so a restore from the .sql alone comes back with no map. backup now archives instance\ alongside it and says both are needed. VERSIONING. AppVersion was hardcoded at 0.9.0 while the product, the frontend and the newest tag said 0.7.0 - and 0.9.0 collides with a retired contract version. Both builders now generate version.iss from shopdb/__init__.py. Smaller: rollback overwrites .env before deleting it, as uninstall already did; appcmd unlocks are scoped to this site's location rather than server-wide, with the wide unlock as a fallback; DEVELOPMENT-SETUP says Python 3.14; the README plugin list gains printedparts; prune-schema --force is documented as first-provisioning-only; HTTPS is documented as not-the-default with the steps to add it; the DBA SQL is on the wizard's database page; the features page says unticking does not remove an installed feature; and the installer README states that bundle-lock cannot vouch for the exe itself - that needs signing or an out-of-band hash, neither of which is wired up. |
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cproudlock
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aea2905de0 |
fix(installer): stop it lying, stop it leaking, and make it findable
Nine fixes from a review of the installer against its actual audience: DT leads at sister sites who are not Windows, IIS or Python specialists and who will lean on an AI assistant to get through it. TRUTHFULNESS. The preflight was advisory - an operator read 'IIS is not installed', pressed Next, answered five more pages and the install died partway through with Python already on the box. The results page now blocks while anything is failing, repaints on every run instead of latching after the first, and offers 'Check again' so a fixed problem does not mean starting over. On failure the wizard said 'Nothing was left running', which is false in every path because the stages run with -OnFailure never: it now says the server is part-configured, that re-running is safe, and how to remove it. The final page no longer reads 'ShopDB-Flask is ready' after a failed install. SECRETS. The generated MySQL root password went to Write-Host in a process the wizard runs hidden - so nobody saw it - and stdout is forwarded into the setup log operators are told to send to support, so it was permanently recorded for everyone who did not need it. It now goes to an ACL'd file. Database dumps, which contain every user password hash, landed in a ProgramData directory readable by every user on the box; the directory is now locked at creation. UPGRADES ON REMOTE-DATABASE SITES. mysqldump was looked for only under local MySQL install paths, so a site whose database is on another host silently skipped every pre-upgrade backup - after stage 2 had already stopped the pool and replaced the tree. Find-MysqlTool now prefers a client shipped in the bundle, stage 2 stages it onto the server, preflight reports when it is missing, and mysqlclient\ is an optional locked payload. UNINSTALL. A subpath install is an IIS Application, not a site; removing only the site left the application pointing at a deleted directory, so the parent site - at West Jefferson, the live classic ASP - served 503 on that path forever while Add/Remove Programs reported success. Uninstall now reads MOUNT_PATH and removes the application. The firewall rule was created as "$SiteName $SitePort" and removed as the literal 'ShopDB-Flask 8090', which matches nothing. DAY-2 TOOLING. Every shortcut now passes -AppRoot and -SitePort, and the console forwards them through its own elevation and 32-bit relaunches instead of discarding them - a non-default directory or port made it report a healthy site as broken, from a shortcut the installer wrote. 'Open ShopDB-Flask' resolved to a hardcoded localhost:8090 that was wrong for every subpath install; it now asks the console, which reads the address the installer recorded, and no longer demands administrator to open a browser. SMOKE TEST. The parent-site port lookup filtered for an http binding and defaulted to 80, so an https-only parent site failed a working install with a red dialog. DOCS AND /api/docs. The installer was invisible: nothing in docs/, README.md or CLAUDE.md mentioned it, so a DT lead or their assistant landed on the manual IIS runbook and hand-built the very server the installer then refuses to upgrade. docs/INSTALL-WINDOWS.md and docs/OPERATE-WINDOWS.md are now the canonical route, the two manual runbooks are bannered as reference-only, README and CLAUDE.md route by target, and llms.txt tells an assistant which document to follow and to ask for 'check -Json' before diagnosing. Both ship on the server, along with openapi.json and llms.txt - without those the self-hosted /api/docs was broken on every installed box, which matters most to the sites least able to debug it. Stage 5 now checks it actually serves. shopdb-admin.ps1 gains 'check -Json': one structured, secret-free block covering version, publishing method, IIS state, HTTP reachability, database, Python version, plugins and errors. That is the cheapest useful answer to 'the operator will ask an LLM' - it works with no infrastructure, which a install-time MCP server could not. |
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cproudlock
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3606d8d696 |
feat(sbom): ship a CycloneDX bill of materials with every build
An air-gapped site cannot be scanned from anywhere else, so when a CVE lands the only way to answer 'is that component here, and at what version' was to RDP in and go looking. The frontend was the real blind spot: nothing recorded which version of leaflet, dompurify, jspdf or html2canvas ends up inside the compiled SPA. scripts/generate_sbom.py emits CycloneDX 1.6 covering both ecosystems - every pin in requirements.txt with the sha256 the installer enforces, and every package in package-lock.json. Build-only npm packages are marked scope 'excluded' rather than dropped, so 'not here' stays distinguishable from 'not looked for'. Dependency edges are real: uv's '# via' comments give the Python graph and package-lock gives the npm one. Hand-rolled rather than cyclonedx-py plus cyclonedx-npm because both inputs are already pinned and committed - this is a format translation, not a scan - and because the build box may be a work PC with nothing but Python and Node. It is deterministic by construction: same inputs, byte-identical output, so regenerating does not churn. Staged into the application tree by both builders, so it installs onto the server with the app. shopdb-admin.ps1 verify reports it and searches it by component name, which is the question actually being asked. Packages appearing at several depths in package-lock (node_modules/vite and node_modules/vitest/node_modules/vite) are merged, and a copy reachable outside the dev tree makes the component count as shipped. Emitting both produced duplicate bom-refs, which CycloneDX forbids and scanners reject; getting the dev merge backwards would have hidden a shipped package from a CVE search. Not covered by bundle-lock.json on purpose: its provenance is git, not the third-party payload. |
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cproudlock
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88af7fd9ce |
feat(installer): lock the third-party payload, and build on Windows without Bash
The bundle carries ~40 wheels, a Python installer and two MSIs. All of them run as SYSTEM on the target server, and nothing verified any of them. A missing wheelhouse printed MISSING and the script still exited 0, so an empty bundle compiled into a shippable installer and the failure surfaced on an air-gapped server with no way to fix it. bundle-lock.json now records that payload exactly - sha256 and byte size per file - and verification is set equality: a missing file, an unexpected extra file, or changed content all fail. Both builders check it and refuse to produce an unverified bundle; the lock ships inside the bundle and shopdb-install.ps1 re-checks it on the server before running any of it. This is deliberately a layer above requirements.txt hashes. pip lists every artifact of a pinned version (cffi 2.1.0 alone has 100 hashes), so it proves a wheel is genuine, not that it is the wheel this bundle was built and tested with; it ignores extra files in the wheelhouse; and it covers none of the executables. refresh-bundle-lock.ps1 regenerates the lock but refuses to overwrite one until the operator has seen the diff, because the commit is the review - it is the only place a change to what runs as SYSTEM becomes visible to a human. build-installer.ps1 is the whole build natively on Windows, so a work PC needs no Bash. It shares the plugin closure resolver with build-site.sh. Both builders now copy the installer scripts from the repository. They were copied from a downloads folder, so the logic that shipped was not the logic that was committed and the build worked on exactly one machine. Two verifiers exist because PowerShell is the only thing guaranteed present on the target server, while the Linux builder should not need pwsh. tests/test_bundle_lock.py runs both against the same fixtures and fails if they disagree. |