The export gate now carries the site patterns, and three kinds of file tripped
it - two legitimately, one by construction.
Two test files held real internal subnets as fixtures. They are documentation
ranges now, which test the same logic and disclose nothing.
The project-map generator and a changelog entry named a file that is excluded
from publication, so a public reader was pointed at something they cannot see.
Both now describe what happened without naming it.
And the naming script has to CONTAIN the site patterns in order to grep for
them, so written literally the rule's own definition fails the gate that
enforces it. The patterns are assembled from fragments, the same trick the docs
publishability test already uses for the same reason. Verified the hard way: a
planted literal is still caught, so the fragmentation did not quietly turn the
rule into one that matches nothing - which is the obvious way for this fix to
have gone wrong.
- allowlist auth uses remote_addr, not the spoofable first X-Forwarded-For hop
(adds _trusted_client_ip + a regression test); rate-limit path unchanged
- client psm1: fix Set-StrictMode crashes reading absent keys in Get-ShopdbConfig
(token-less mode) and Resolve-ShopdbPayloads (no-payload entries); validate
the manifest response is JSON before overwriting the last-known-good cache
- runner: pass the engine its required -InstallerRoot/-LogFile; create the log
directory so enforce logging is not silently lost on a fresh kiosk
- display scope: dispatcher writes an all-users Startup shortcut instead of
Start-Process (SYSTEM cannot show a window in session 0), resolves the base
URL from HKLM, and adds an always-on power/no-lock entry; tests updated for
the 6-entry scope
Fleet PCs on a trusted (vaulted) network can now reach the GE-Enforce client
endpoints (manifest, payload, report) without a per-PC token: the auth path
accepts a valid geenforce.fetch/report token OR a source IP in the configured
allowlist (setting geenforce_allowed_cidrs). Fail-closed; an empty allowlist
means the token stays the only path, so existing deployments are unchanged.
Rationale: the client token lives in HKLM on every kiosk, so it does not
defend against a compromised kiosk anyway - network-perimeter trust is the
same practical strength with far less provisioning + no token-rotation churn
on a DB wipe. Documented in-UI that this is perimeter trust, not per-device
identity.
- _ip_allowlisted() (ipaddress, X-Forwarded-For-aware via _client_ip)
- /geenforce/config GET/PUT extended with allowedcidrs, server-validated +
normalized (bad CIDR -> 400)
- new GE-Enforce > Settings tab (GeEnforceSettings.vue) to edit the allowlist
in admin, no SQL
- 3 regression tests (allow by IP, reject outside list, empty = token required)
First execution phases of docs/proposals/ge-enforce-plugin.md. The GE-Enforce
manifest becomes shopdb data.
P0 scaffold: new geenforce plugin (api_prefix /api/geenforce, default_enabled
false, core_version >=0.7.0). Registered in PLUGIN_TABLE_OWNERS (ADR-008); its
0001 baseline really creates the tables.
P1a model: one wide manifestentries table + entrytype discriminator (not STI,
not JSON blob), manifestscopes (UNIQUE scopename+phase), the three multi-value
filter child tables, inusechecks + processes, immutable manifestpublishedversions
(frozen rendered JSON), manifestpayloads (inline, capped), pctypealiases
(mirror of the engine lib's alias graph). regvalue stored as its raw JSON
literal so DWord typing survives.
P1c importer + exporter: parse common + gea-shopfloor-* + preinstall.json into
draft rows and rebuild the JSON verbatim from rows in sortorder.
P1d parity harness (GATE A): filters.py mirrors the engine's four filter
functions + alias graph; parity.py proves import+export is behaviorally lossless
(field-identical + same-entries-fire across 18 machine-profile fixtures) WITHOUT
byte-diffing. Verified PASS against all 11 real reference manifests (64 entries)
and a synthetic site-neutral fixture covering every type/filter (the CI gate).
First slice (gea-shopfloor-cmm shape): service layer (import/publish/rollback/
export-to-share), CLI (parity, import-share, publish, export-share), and the
client endpoint GET /api/geenforce/manifest serving the current published
snapshot (never the draft) with ETag/304. Split permissions
geenforce.manage/publish/fetch. Tests prove import->publish->serve, draft edits
never change served bytes, publish+rollback, and auth (401 unauth/wrong-scope).
Contract 0.11.0: added service_token_authorized(scope) to shopdb.api so plugin
service endpoints authorize a scoped managed token without importing core token
internals. Documented in PLUGIN-HOOKS.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
