The product shipped one Configuration Policy carrying every shopfloor app
monitor, wrapped in a shipped Site Policy that applied it to every endpoint.
That bundled two decisions a site cannot separate: which monitors exist, and
which endpoints get them. A site that wanted eDNC on one PC type and MTConnect
on another had to delete the shipped policy and rebuild both halves.
Ship one Configuration Policy per monitor with no PC type attribution, and stop
shipping a Site Policy at all. Composition is a site decision; the product now
supplies parts, not an assembled opinion.
Shipped Configuration Policies become editable and deletable. Provenance stays
a source tag rather than a lock, which is safe because seeding is insert-if-
absent and no reconciling seeder exists, so a site edit is never stomped. The
stale comments claiming shipped rows were read-only and reconciled described
behavior the code never had.
Ticking "Required on all PCs" now generates a configuration policy that
installs the application on every non-server endpoint it matches, rather
than only flagging a software-compliance report row.
Because that save is a fleet-wide deployment, it requires explicit
acknowledgement. The gate is enforced in the API, not only in the form:
a confirmation dialog that can be sidestepped by POSTing directly is
decoration, not a safeguard. It fires only on the transition INTO the
required state, since re-saving an already-required application deploys
nothing new.
Generated policies carry a new 'autoapp' source. They stay editable, and
hand-editing one transfers ownership to 'local' so it survives a later
uncheck; 'shipped' remains read-only. Existing required applications are
not migrated retroactively - policies are only created on save.
Also adds the monitorable fields that the shipped-policy breakup will
build on, and repairs a mangled non-ASCII byte in copilot-instructions.md
that was failing the style gate.
Adds PolicyActionHold so an admin can suspend specific actions on a computer without editing the policy itself, covering the break-glass case where a machine must be quiesced immediately. Holds cover multiple actions in one atomic submission rather than one row per action, so a partial failure cannot leave a half-applied hold. Duration is free-form with 0 meaning indefinite (migration 0006 makes expiresat nullable); the prior fixed ceiling was removed because an admin quiescing a misbehaving machine does not know in advance how long it needs, and a hold silently expiring is worse than one that must be cleared deliberately. The What This Does explainer reflects indefinite holds.
collect_now exemption: refreshing status was denied on any endpoint with a non-empty effective policy even when the caller held the matching grant, because policy intersection silently removed the action. collect_now is a read-only status refresh with no side effects, so it now sits in POLICY_EXEMPT_ACTIONS alongside the other routine actions. Verified against a synthetic non-empty policy: operators can refresh status again while every write action stays gated.
Configuration policies need a way to attach process/service monitors so drift can be evaluated against a machine's desired state. This wires the policy resolver and routes to the shared monitor catalog and adds an action picker UI that can create process monitors with an optional launch path.
Applied on top of af13337 so nothing already on wilm is rewritten.
AUTHORIZATION. The six new policy GETs were @jwt_required(optional=True) with
no permission at all, so an anonymous caller could list configuration and
business policies - gated only by a feature flag that 404s while off. They now
require computers.view. The six policy write routes stacked @jwt_required()
above @require_permission, the same pattern removed from nine endpoints routes
in this very push: the outer decorator answers an anonymous request 401 before
require_permission can consult the guest role, so a grant to guests silently
does nothing. Removed, and the now-unused import with them.
tests/test_core/test_public_read_surface.py failed at af13337 with seven ungated
GETs. It passes now. The seventh, endpoints.claim_next_command, is genuinely
agent-facing - authenticated in the handler by the endpoints collector key,
because a bay has no user session - so it joins PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS with its reason
written down, exactly as report_command_result already does in test_authz.py.
Note which half is public: claiming a queued command is the agent's business,
while ENQUEUEING one is the real authority and stays gated on endpoints.command.
INSTALLER. -BaseUrl and -CollectorKey are now mandatory with no defaults, and
https is enforced unless -AllowInsecureHttp is passed for a local test box. The
defaults were a real hostname (ADR-015) and a live collector key: a key in
source is a key in git history, and that key is also the command channel's kill
switch. Removing it here does not undo the disclosure - it must be rotated on
the server, and purged from af13337 - but it stops the next clone carrying it.
IMPORT. A committed import wrote thousands of rows and left no audit trail; it
now writes one AuditLog row inside the same transaction, so it cannot survive a
rollback or go missing from a commit. The computer-type dropdown asked for
per_page: 200, which the API ignores in favour of perpage and clamps to 100
anyway - it uses a new computersApi.types.listAll(), the pattern already applied
to the other selectors. And the comment claiming the template example rows are
"emitted as commented rows the engine skips" was the opposite of the truth: they
import as live data, the emitted instructions say so, and a test depends on it.
Not fixed here, deliberately: rotating the leaked key, purging it from history,
and the endpoint agent's own hardening (per-host credentials, a protected
process denylist so stop cannot kill security tooling, signing before the
PowerShell runner is enabled, registry ACLs, and the 25-second long poll that
will pin a worker thread per bay).
Default fuzzy reconcile threshold to 0 and refuse merges when digit runs differ so numbered labels like Bay 311 never bind to Bay 310. Keep edit forms from clearing saved model fields when category filtering hides untyped rows. Includes in-progress computers policy and endpoints command feature work.
