75ee3b7c1cc4680039f23b4a364f63f33d79fbbb
5 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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cproudlock
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a46058a4dd |
Close the last three restore-gate gaps, and make the gate test the real gate
Three defects that all shared a shape: the restore path looked checked and was not. An unreadable data revision was treated as a legacy set. backup.sh discards the mysql error when reading alembic_version, so a set could be written with an empty datarev; the compatibility check then fell through to the code-to-code head comparison - the very check datarev was introduced to replace - and badged the set restorable on no evidence at all. A manifest that CARRIES the key and left it empty is now refused, while one with no key at all is still the genuine legacy case and keeps the fallback. backup.sh records the failure in run history rather than passing it over in a log line, since the set it just wrote cannot be restored. Dumps were bound to the schema they came from. mysqldump --databases bakes CREATE DATABASE and USE <name> into the file, so restoring onto a site whose MYSQL_DATABASE differs loaded every row into the dump's schema, left the live database untouched, and reported success. New sets are dumped without it and load into the schema named at restore time. Existing sets are still bound, so the gate reads which schema they name and refuses a mismatch instead of restoring beside the live data. Also dropped --no-tablespaces into the main dump: it needs the PROCESS privilege the app user does not have on MySQL 8. The gate's own test carried a copy of the gate. test-restore-datarev.sh re-implemented the predicate in its own shell functions, so it would have stayed green through any drift in restore.sh - including the plugin-chain hole fixed in the previous commit, which it could never have caught. restore.sh now takes RESTORE_CHECK_ONLY, which stops it immediately after the gates having touched nothing, plus overridable paths for the migration and plugin trees. The test drives the shipped script and asserts on its exit code, so the verdict under test IS the verdict that ships. Confirmed non-vacuous by planting a violation: disabling the plugin revision check turns the suite red. Nine cases now, up from five, covering both plugin-chain directions, a plugin the build does not have, and the schema binding. Moving the schema check earlier was prompted by that test: it had been placed after the safety copy, so it needed a live database to reach a verdict it can reach for free. It sits with the other gates now and stops before anything is written. Round-tripped against a real stack after the dump format change: backup, mutate, restore, data back to backup-time state, and the new dumps confirmed to carry no schema name. Suite 2607 passed / 9 skipped. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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e2705d732a |
Gate a restore on every schema chain, not just the core one
The compatibility gate read alembic_version and nothing else, but plugin schemas move independently of core. Roll the code back to an older plugin revision and the core head can be identical, so a dump carrying plugin tables the code has never heard of passed the gate, loaded - destroying what was there - and only then failed in 'flask plugin upgrade-all' with "Can't locate revision". A failed restore that has already replaced what it was restoring over is the worst outcome this feature can produce, and it was reachable from an ordinary rollback. Backups now stamp the applied revision of every alembic_version_<plugin> table alongside the core one, read from the dumped database the same way. restore.sh checks each against that plugin's own versions directory and refuses before touching anything, naming the plugin and the revision to deploy past. A plugin in the dump that this build does not have at all is refused for the same reason. The list endpoint's compatibility badge asks the same question, so the UI cannot offer a set the restore will reject. Sets taken before the stamp existed carry no dataplugins and keep their old core-only verdict. Their plugin revisions are unknowable, and making every existing set unrestorable to close this would be a worse trade than the gap. Proven against a real stack, reproducing the exact case: core head identical, endpoints data stamped at a revision the build does not have. The restore refused, the live row was still there afterwards, and it stopped early enough that the pre-restore safety copy was never needed. The same set with its true revision restored normally. Suite 2605 passed / 9 skipped, with the gate covered both ways plus the legacy fallback. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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fa6b99bf91 |
Finish a restore without a browser, from the set that was asked for
Closes the three defects in the imported restore path, at Ben's request. Each was proven against a real stack before and after: two backup sets with different data and different instance files, then a restore of the OLDER one, which is the case that was broken. A restore no longer depends on a tab staying open. The backup sidecar has no Flask, so it loads the dump and leaves a sentinel for the api container to run the migrations. The only thing that ever acted on that sentinel was the poll loop of the modal that queued the restore, so closing the tab - or letting a token expire - during the minutes a load takes left the data at the old revision under new code, every query on a newer column failing, and nothing retrying. A watcher in the api container now claims and runs it. The endpoint no longer runs the upgrade at all; it only makes sure something is pending, which is also how a failed upgrade is retried. That takes Alembic out of the request path, where it could outrun the gunicorn worker timeout and be killed mid-chain, leaving a half-applied revision the next attempt trips over. The claim is a rename, because rename(2) is atomic: several workers and a browser poll can race the same sentinel and exactly one wins. A failed upgrade parks itself as .upgrade-failed rather than re-arming, since putting it back would rerun the same broken chain on every poll forever. Instance files come from the set being restored. The restic call asked for 'latest' regardless of which set was named, so restoring anything but the newest paired that set's DATABASE with the NEWEST snapshot's uploads and plugins.json - a mismatch nothing downstream could detect. Now scoped by the set's own tag, which backup.sh has always written. The tree is replaced rather than restored over, so files created after the snapshot are gone afterwards: a restore has to put the site back to the snapshot, not merge into it. Done as a staged swap rather than 'restic restore --delete --target /', because that aims a delete pass at the container root and the cost of getting its filter wrong is the whole filesystem. Nothing destructive happens before a copy is taken. The dump carries DROP TABLE per table with no transaction around it, and the instance tree is replaced wholesale, so a wrong set or a failure part-way through left nothing to go back to. restore.sh now writes a pre-restore-<stamp>/ set - dump, instance tarball and a README saying what it is and how to load it - and refuses to touch anything if that copy cannot be written. Two more found while proving the above, both of which stopped the overlay working at all: * Every script under scripts/backup/ was committed non-executable, while every other .sh in the repo is 755. The compose entrypoints are /opt/backup/watch.sh and backup.sh from a read-only bind mount, so the backup and watcher containers could not start from a clean checkout on any machine, and nothing could fix it at runtime. * Dockerfile.backup could not build without the corporate CA staged. A plain COPY of the gitignored cert fails outright; the trailing-glob form does too, because BuildKit fails a COPY whose pattern matches nothing - which is exactly the case being handled. Copying the directory and testing for the file inside it is the form that works both ways. Verified by building the image with no cert present. Suite 2600 passed / 9 skipped. The finalizer has unit tests covering the atomic claim, the parked failure and the endpoint no longer running the upgrade. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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83190422c9 |
Act on the review of the wilm import
Six findings from a four-agent review of the imported work, plus the contract bump the import owed. Nothing here changes what the imported features do. The contract version was not bumped for a change that widens what a plugin may declare. The asset-panel vocabulary gained two tab groups (serviceprocess, reports), a datetime column format, a map.body key and a tabs section that renders as a table. 0.29.0 bumped for exactly this class of change when the optional group was added, so this is 0.31.0 with a ledger row. All four are optional and resolve server-side when absent, so a plugin declaring none of them is unaffected. Site Backups now answers honestly where it has nothing behind it. The overlay is a compose profile: a separate container writes sets onto a shared volume and the api container only reads them. A Windows/IIS install runs no such container and the default root resolves to a drive-letter path nothing creates, so Back Up Now either failed on PermissionError or reported a run queued that would never happen, under a banner reading "No verified backup yet" - which describes a backup that failed, not a feature that was never installed. The three write routes refuse with the same 404 shape the configuration-policy routes use for a disabled feature, the list and status routes report whether a store exists, and the page says so instead of offering buttons. Two listAll callers still read a response that is not there. listAll resolves to a plain array through fetchAllPages, so response.data.data throws: PC Types settings rendered empty, and in Configuration Policies the throw happened inside the shared try, so PC types, applications, the action catalog and monitors were all left unassigned by one bad read. The agent package upload cannot succeed on IIS as shipped. MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH went to 256 MB to admit the ~69 MB tray binary, but IIS request filtering caps a body at 30,000,000 bytes and answers 413 before waitress sees the request, so web.config needs the matching requestLimits. The backup image could not be built by anyone outside a TLS-intercepting network. Dockerfile.backup did a plain COPY of a gitignored corporate root CA, and a COPY of a missing file fails the build. The trailing glob makes it a no-op when the cert is absent. endpointstates.domain was the one new string column written without a clamp. Under STRICT_TRANS_TABLES an over-long value raises Data too long and aborts the whole check-in, so a single malformed report would stop a machine reporting telemetry and events entirely. Not fixed here, and left with upstream: the restore path finalizes its schema upgrade only from a browser poll loop, so closing the tab mid-restore leaves the data behind the code; it restores instance files from the newest snapshot rather than the set that was asked for; and it takes no safety dump before the destructive load. All three are in the Docker-only overlay, which this site does not run, and none can be validated here. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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6e36df841e |
Import the wilm endpoint telemetry, PC Detail rework and backup overlay
Ports 37 of Benjamin Baker's commits from the wilm branch, mirrored from the
corporate GitHub at
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