The USB kiosk had a feature flag and nothing else. A flag is a decision, not a
credential: with the kiosk on, anyone who could reach the app could move a drive
between checked-out and checked-in and sign it with a badge they guessed. Same
reasoning that closed the parts kiosk, smaller blast radius - which is why
Darkwing did not raise it and why it was worth asking about anyway.
Both kiosks now share one mechanism. The device token moved out of the
printedparts api wrapper into a request interceptor that attaches X-Kiosk-Token
by URL prefix, with one localStorage key per kiosk - they are separate screens
in separate rooms, and a shared token would mean provisioning one grants the
other. claimKioskToken() is shared too, so both views take the token from a
?token= URL once and strip it from the address bar identically.
Then the part that matters more than either fix. I told you to set the new
settings in the UI, and that was impossible: every plugin settings page carries
a hardcoded key list, and nothing had added them. printedparts_kiosk_enabled,
printedparts_kiosk_token and usb_kiosk_token were declared, seeded and read
correctly, and rendered by no page - changeable only by writing SQL.
tests/test_plugin_settings_reachable.py now fails when any declared setting
appears nowhere in its plugin's frontend. It found seven MORE that were already
in that state, all pre-existing:
collector_corporate_ranges computers_configpolicies_enabled
computers_machinelink_alerts computers_quietreporthours
geenforce_reportstaleminutes printers_dashboardpercent
warranty_expiringdays
All seven now have fields. I first parked them in a KNOWN_GAPS ratchet, then
fixed them and deleted the ratchet - a backlog list in a new check is a way of
agreeing the check does not apply yet. There is no backlog; the check is
absolute.
Two of my own mistakes on the way, both caught by tests rather than by reading:
the blanket rename of the USB guard also rewrote the call inside _kiosk_open, so
it called itself until the stack ran out; and the first version of the reachable
check skipped all 17 plugins because it looked for get_settings() when the
method is get_settings_defaults() - it passed by testing nothing, which is the
exact shape it exists to catch.
Suite 2336, frontend 316, build clean.
Scope: product
The scanner has been reporting the same count for weeks, which is what a rule
that only prints becomes. It now FAILS the build, and it looks where the leaks
actually were: PowerShell, the installer, the seeds, generated JSON, the
frontend - case-insensitively, across plugins, shopdb, scripts, deploy, tools.
A line that is deliberate declares itself with an ADR-015-OK marker and a
reason, so the claim is visible in review instead of tolerated in silence.
What it found, fixed here:
- The shadow client wrote one site's ShopDB URL into HKLM whenever the registry
disagreed. At the site it was written for that reads as healing drift;
anywhere else it overwrites the site's own address on every enforce cycle,
and the site cannot win because the cycle repeats. The bay's value now wins,
an explicit -BaseUrl seeds it, and with neither there is nothing honest to
write, so it says so and skips.
- The kiosk dispatcher fell back to one plant's host when HKLM was unset, so a
kiosk elsewhere quietly opened a server it has no business reaching. The
fallback is now this site's site_base_url, baked in at seed time, and the
dispatcher refuses rather than guessing when neither is set. Its legacy
shortcut matcher derives the host from that URL instead of naming one.
- The OpenAPI generator hardcoded a production hostname into every spec it
generated, which then published to a public wiki. The relative mount is the
only server it can honestly name; a site passes its own by environment.
- Placeholders and examples in the UI and the client help offered real internal
subnets and a real production URL. They now use documentation ranges.
Both publication gates - the export scrub and the docs publishability test -
carry the site patterns, which neither did. One plant's hostname, FQDN and
internal networks are out of the documentation and the generated specs.
Comments naming the reference site are reworded rather than deleted: the
reasoning is worth keeping, the plant name is not what makes it true.
Fleet PCs on a trusted (vaulted) network can now reach the GE-Enforce client
endpoints (manifest, payload, report) without a per-PC token: the auth path
accepts a valid geenforce.fetch/report token OR a source IP in the configured
allowlist (setting geenforce_allowed_cidrs). Fail-closed; an empty allowlist
means the token stays the only path, so existing deployments are unchanged.
Rationale: the client token lives in HKLM on every kiosk, so it does not
defend against a compromised kiosk anyway - network-perimeter trust is the
same practical strength with far less provisioning + no token-rotation churn
on a DB wipe. Documented in-UI that this is perimeter trust, not per-device
identity.
- _ip_allowlisted() (ipaddress, X-Forwarded-For-aware via _client_ip)
- /geenforce/config GET/PUT extended with allowedcidrs, server-validated +
normalized (bad CIDR -> 400)
- new GE-Enforce > Settings tab (GeEnforceSettings.vue) to edit the allowlist
in admin, no SQL
- 3 regression tests (allow by IP, reject outside list, empty = token required)
