Two asks, and the first is a real security decision so it is a SETTING that
defaults to the safe answer rather than a code change somebody inherits.
securesend_allow_guests, OFF by default. With it off the model is unchanged: a
login plus tools.secrets. With it on, somebody with no account - at a shared bay
terminal, a contractor - can create a link too.
The cost is named in the setting's own description and pinned by a test: a guest
secret has NO CREATOR, so the audit trail can say when and from where but never
who. That is the whole reason it is a switch a person turns on deliberately.
IT FAILS CLOSED. A missing row, a half-migrated site, an unhappy database - the
answer is no. An error must never be the thing that opens an unauthenticated
write endpoint.
A SIGNED-IN USER STILL NEEDS THE PERMISSION even when guests are allowed, which
is surprising enough that a test pins it: opening the door to guests is a
decision about the door, not about revoking what a role holds.
Guest creation is rate limited per address, same shape as the login limiter. Not
a security boundary - a determined person has more addresses - but an open
endpoint should not be an easy place to park data or fill a disk.
VIEWS ARE NOW A NUMBER, 1 to 100, instead of a four-item dropdown. How many
people need a password is the sender's business: a shift handover is not one
colleague on a call. The floor is what matters, not the ceiling - unlimited
views would just be a password on a web page.
Also folded in, from the retention question: nothing removed a secret that
EXPIRED WITHOUT BEING OPENED. The recipient goes on holiday, the link is never
clicked, and the ciphertext sat there for good - not readable, but it made
"nothing lingers" untrue and grew the table in exactly the case where the
feature failed. Any create now sweeps expired rows and a late click tidies its
own, so it stays bounded without a scheduler an air-gapped site would never add.
Two gates caught mistakes on the way: current_user is a LocalProxy and is never
None, so `current_user is None` silently took the signed-in branch for a guest;
and cache was imported straight from shopdb.extensions when it is already on the
shopdb.api contract surface.
1836 tests green.
9845867 gave it its own plugin because Tech Tools is browser-only and this needs
storage. That was the right reading of the code and the wrong answer for the
person using it: Tech Tools is where you go for a utility, and a tool nobody can
find is a tool nobody uses.
So Tech Tools now has a blueprint, a table and a migration chain where it had
none. Its docstring and manifest say why, because "every tool here runs in the
browser" was load-bearing documentation and is no longer true.
WHAT MOVED
/api/securesend -> /api/tools/secrets
securesend.create -> tools.secrets
securesend0001baseline -> tools0001securesend
PLUGIN_TABLE_OWNERS, EXPECTED_HEAD_REVISION, EXEMPT_ENDPOINTS, the universal
profile and the api-inventory surface all follow it.
THE OLD "NO BACKEND" TEST IS NARROWED, NOT DELETED. It asserted
get_blueprint() is None, which is the sort of guard that gets removed when it
becomes inconvenient. It now asserts the blueprint serves EXACTLY the three
secret routes, with their methods - so a future tool that quietly grows an
endpoint or a table has to edit this test, and therefore make the decision on
purpose rather than by drift.
Asserting methods rather than paths also pins the detail this design turns on:
redeeming is POST-ONLY. Chat and mail clients prefetch GET urls to build
previews, and a preview that could redeem would consume a one-view secret before
its recipient opened the link. Previously that was a comment; now it fails a
test.
UNINSTALLING THE OLD PLUGIN COULD NOT BE DONE WITH THE PLUGIN TOOLING. `flask
plugin uninstall securesend` loads a plugin before uninstalling it, so a plugin
whose directory has been deleted cannot be removed by the command that manages
plugins - the registry entry had to be edited by hand. Worth fixing separately;
it is the same registry-versus-code divergence the device work hit from the
other side.
MIGRATING A CHAIN THAT HAS ALREADY RUN needs the old table and its version row
dropped first, because the relocated chain has no stamp and tries to create a
table that exists. Only relevant to anyone who installed securesend during the
hour it existed - it did reach the publication repo in 4242028 - and the fix is
DROP TABLE securesendsecrets plus DROP TABLE alembic_version_securesend before
running plugin upgrade-all.
1829 tests green. Still backend only: there are no pages yet, so nothing here is
reachable by a person.
