The rollup took the highest fix version across a component's advisories, which
is wrong whenever an advisory is patched on more than one release branch. nanoid
is fixed on both 3.3.x and 5.x, and it is transitive under a postcss range of
^3.3.11 that no 5.x release can satisfy - so the recommendation was unreachable
rather than merely large.
Per advisory the target is now the lowest fix above the version in use; per
component, the highest of those. Fixes on older branches are skipped rather than
offered as a downgrade.
scripts/scan_sbom.py checks the generated SBOM against OSV.dev by purl. The SBOM
shipped to every server and nothing read it, so 'are we exposed to this advisory'
was still a person going and looking.
Shipped and build-only findings are both reported, but only shipped components
can fail a build - the highest-severity match in the tree today is against the
test runner, and a gate that fails a release over that gets bypassed and then
catches nothing. Severity is taken from the advisory rather than derived from a
CVSS vector, and an advisory with no recorded word is reported UNKNOWN and never
gates.
scripts/vulnerability-allowlist.json records reviewed advisories with the reason,
the accepter, the date, and what would invalidate the reasoning.
Documented in docs/DEPENDENCY-SECURITY.md.
