cbdfcbabb774a1d84aff97bc0c3f62d2622e05fb
6 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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cproudlock
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13e992d863 |
Ask what the caller may do, not what its owner may do
Wave 4, first half. A personal API token scoped to endpoints.command alone could queue system_restart, run_script and update_app against a shop-floor PC. require_permission has always suspended the admin bypass for a scoped token, and tests pin that. What nothing covered was a route checking a SECOND permission by hand: the endpoints command route asked current_user.haspermission(elevated), which reads the token's OWNER. An admin minting a narrow token for a script therefore handed out remote restart, script execution and app deployment - the exact bypass require_permission exists to prevent, reintroduced one hand-rolled check at a time. caller_holds is now scope-aware, so the answer is about the caller rather than the person behind it: the owner must hold the permission AND, when the request carries a scoped token, the scope list must name it. An unscoped token is the person and is unchanged; a session is unchanged; guests still answer from the guest role. Both hand-rolled checks in the tree now use it - the endpoints elevated gate and the secure-send tools.secrets check, which had the same shape and the same consequence at a smaller scale. Two tests, one proving the refusal and one proving an unscoped token still passes (a fix that quietly broke every service token would be worse than the bug). Verified by planting the owner-based check back: the first fails. Reported by the fleet-agent lane of the 2026-09-03 test run and confirmed by an independent verifier that minted its own token and queued its own commands. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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54f0857e13 |
Split the fleet roster from per-endpoint reads, and stop offering controls nobody can use
Twelve endpoints routes shared one permission, which made a reasonable policy impossible to express. A site that wants signed-out visitors to see live status on a PC page had to hand them the entire fleet - including every logged-in username on the floor - because the per-asset panels and the fleet-wide list were gated on the same string. endpoints.fleet now gates the list and the three dashboard routes. endpoints.view keeps the per-asset reads: status, services, processes, interfaces, events, command history. The name is load-bearing. guest_grantable_permissions() opens any '.view' or '.read' permission to the guest role, so calling this one 'endpoints.fleet' rather than 'endpoints.fleetview' is what keeps the roster off the public surface while per-asset telemetry stays grantable. Verified both ways. Also: the services panel emitted Start/Stop row actions to every reader, because row_actions_for() never consulted the caller. Clicking was always refused server-side, so nothing was exploitable, but showing a read-only viewer controls over a shop-floor PC is the wrong signal - and it stops being cosmetic the moment a site grants that panel to guests. That needed a contract addition rather than a local check: caller_holds() on shopdb.api answers whether THIS caller holds a permission without refusing the request, which is the complement to require_permission for a surface that serves everyone but should only offer what the caller can act on. Guests are included, since a signed-out visitor holds whatever the guest role was granted. Reaching into shopdb.utils.authz instead would repeat the ADR-002 violation the contract gate caught earlier in this branch. Contract 0.24.0 -> 0.25.0. DEPLOYMENT: endpoints.fleet is a new permission. Run 'flask seed permissions' and grant it to the roles that should keep seeing the Fleet page. Until then that page is admin-only, since admins bypass every check - a safe direction, but not an automatic one. Full suite 2124 passed, naming and contract gates green, map and spec regenerated. |
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cproudlock
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afce24379c |
Reading anything needs a permission
A sweep of the URL map found 165 GET routes that answered anybody, with no token at all: the whole asset inventory, every machine, PC, printer and network device, the USB checkout history and who is holding which drive, the staff directory with its photographs, every core report. Guest access had been argued about one feature-flag at a time while the front door stood open. Each of those now carries the read permission it belongs to. That also makes the guest role mean something: a site can open exactly the reads it chooses, and nothing follows by accident. Thirty-three endpoints stay public, and each is named with its reason rather than left to be inferred: the app shell and its bootstrap, the settings allowlist (the handler already filters an anonymous caller down to branding and a few keys), images fetched by <img src> which carries no Authorization header, what a display kiosk renders before anybody signs in, the parts and USB kiosks, the client scripts that run as SYSTEM before a user session exists, and a secure-send link whose unguessable token IS the authorisation. tests/test_core/test_public_read_surface.py is the standing gate, the companion to the mutating-route sweep that has guarded writes for months. A new public read fails CI until somebody adds it to that list in front of a reviewer. Four further reads need a login but no permission, because the handler decides from who you are - your own user record, your own API tokens, the role catalogue the grid renders - and the same test proves each still refuses an anonymous caller. Verified not vacuous by ungating one route and watching the sweep name it. The employees plugin gained employees.view; the directory is names, SSOs, photographs and reporting lines, and it had no permission of any kind. Around ninety tests asserted payload shapes against endpoints that answered anybody. They are about what the answer says, not about who may ask, so they are signed in now rather than the gate being loosened. The ones that assert an anonymous caller is refused were left exactly as they were. |
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cproudlock
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151d7c4f44 |
Anyone not signed in holds the guest role
Whether somebody with no account may see something was being answered one feature at a time: a securesend_allow_guests setting, an enable flag per kiosk, and very nearly a third for guides - each with its own settings page, its own vocabulary and its own hand-written branch inside a route. Every one of them answered a permissions question, and this app already administers permissions per role. So a caller with no token is not nobody: they hold the seeded `guest` role. require_permission consults it when there is no identity, which is the entire mechanism. The role is seeded holding NOTHING, so an upgrade opens no door; a site opens one by ticking a box in the same grid it uses for every other role, and closes it the same way. Revocation is read on every request rather than cached, because taking guest access away is what somebody does the moment they realise what they opened, and it has to bite immediately. The redundant @jwt_required() above require_permission is gone from 184 routes. It was belt-and-braces before; now it is actively wrong, because it refuses a request with no token before the permission check can have an opinion, so a grant would appear to do nothing. What a guest may hold is bounded. Any .view or .read permission is grantable. A WRITE has to be blessed by whoever owns it, through the new get_guest_grantable_permissions hook (contract 0.21.0), and Secure Send is the only case that exists: sending a password to a vendor is the one write this product means to offer somebody who never signs in. Everything else is refused by the API and greyed out in the grid rather than warned about - a checkbox that quietly makes deleting an asset anonymous is not a warning anybody reads twice. A guest write records no creator: the trail says when and from where, never who, and that is the reason for the bar. GE-Enforce and Slides gained read permissions so they can be opened to guests without handing out the manage right. Their read routes accept either through require_any_permission, so nothing an existing manager could reach has moved. The navigation endpoint now returns only what the caller can actually reach. Without that a signed-out visitor gets a sidebar of the whole app where every link bounces off the login page, which reads as a broken site rather than as a closed door. A nav item may name several permissions; holding any one is enough, which is what GE-Enforce and Slides need now that a viewer and a manager hold different strings. Two things this found on the way: current_user is a LocalProxy, so `current_user is None` is False for a request with nobody behind it - harmless under a required JWT, an AttributeError the moment verification became optional. And an image pasted into a guide before its first save was never attached to it, so it was visible to editors and invisible to every reader; saving now attaches it, and `flask guides fix-images` repairs what is stored. The guides guest setting written earlier today is gone. Granting guides.view to the guest role replaces it, which is the point. |
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cproudlock
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848a8fb34f |
Add optional permission scopes to API tokens
A token may carry a scopes list: it then grants only those permissions, intersected with what the owner holds at use time, with the admin role bypass suspended and role-gated routes denied - a scoped token from an admin account is genuinely limited. Scope ceiling enforced at create/update too (only permissions the owner holds; 400 lists violations) and the picker only offers what you hold. Token management itself now requires the new apitokens.create permission (admin by default, grantable via roles). Unscoped tokens keep the exact prior act-as-owner behavior; imports need an unscoped admin token. Migration 7d22. 756 tests pass; live-verified scoped 201/403 matrix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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cproudlock
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78a0ee8d83 |
Add custom fields + warranty plugin, rework settings into two-pane shell
Feature work from the 2026-07 session: Settings IA - Replace the flat 27-card settings hub with a persistent two-pane shell (SettingsLayout.vue): grouped, searchable left rail + content pane. - Nest all settings/* routes under the shell via router post-processing; shared nav catalog in settingsNav.js. Group by asset class (PCs, Printers, Equipment, Network) so per-type settings stop scattering. Custom fields (core) - customfields + customfieldvalues tables (migration 7d14), CRUD API at /api/customfields, per-asset value get/save. - Settings management page + reusable CustomFieldsSection (detail) and CustomFieldsInputs (form) wired into all four asset types. Warranty (new plugin) - plugins/warranty: warranties + warrantyassets (migration 7d15), derived coverage status, provider abstraction (manual now; Dell/Lenovo/HP stubs). - API CRUD + per-asset panel + report buckets; WarrantyPanel on all four detail pages; Warranties management page; Warranty report + Reports card. - Seed warranty.* permissions. Printer drivers - printerdrivers table (migration 7d13) linked to printer models; drivers now surface on the matching printer's detail page. Other - PCDetail rebalanced (Network + Status + Warranty + custom fields on the right). - Rename PCs list "Features" column to "Remote Access"; fix badge hover underline. - Drop equipment islocationonly field. - Centralize asset-type label/route maps into utils/assetTypes.js. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |