Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
cproudlock
7480e4fe3a Give each endpoint its own credential and fix the review findings on the server
Per-PC credentials (replaces the 09-14 client-certificate attempt):
- POST /api/endpoints/enroll issues a credential to a PC that matches exactly
  one computer by hostname and BIOS serial and has none yet. Anything else
  (unknown or duplicate hostname, serial mismatch, already enrolled) waits as
  a request an admin approves or rejects. The agent's persisted nonce binds an
  approved request to the PC that asked.
- One auth helper serves every agent route. With X-Endpoint-Credential the
  asset comes from the credential and a request naming another PC gets 403
  ASSET_MISMATCH. The shared key still works for PCs that have not enrolled,
  is refused (401 SHARED_KEY_REFUSED) for any PC that has, and can be switched
  off. A revoked credential gets 401 CREDENTIAL_INVALID so the agent
  re-enrolls.
- The core collector accepts the credential for the computers, printers and
  endpoints collectors through two new plugin hooks exposed on shopdb.api
  (contract 0.33.0), and refuses the shared key for enrolled PCs.
- Admin API: enrollment list, approve, reject, revoke (un-enroll), settings.
  Migration API: per-PC readiness with blockers, and upgrade waves that
  package the agent once and queue the existing agent upgrade per PC.
- Migration 0023 creates endpointcredentials, endpointenrollrequests and
  endpointmigrationwaves, drops the certificate columns from assets where
  test databases have them, and renames app_fingerprint to appfingerprint.
  0021 and 0022 keep their ids but no longer alter the core assets table.
- Removed: client_cert.py, certificate renewal, the unauthenticated
  /test/client-cert route, nginx client certificate forwarding and the agent
  certificate script. The client-cert header could be forged on IIS, the key
  was readable by users, and the shared key remained a fallback.
- GET /settings/server-cert returns the SPKI SHA-256 pin for GE-Enforce.

Review fixes:
- report_command_result used g without importing it; every result was a 500.
- collect_log refuses setup answer files, appsettings, agent directories and
  key files at enqueue.
- Fleet alerts: alerttimeout and alertfleet agree with the migration, the
  scope is validated and a malformed scope no longer reaches the whole fleet,
  and the ack race no longer raises NameError.
- A refused break-glass override leaves no hold and no audit row.
- Agent upgrade checks locks and permissions before repackaging, and writes
  the package atomically.
- Server certificate upload validates the pair before replacing files;
  generation no longer builds an openssl config from user input; audit rows
  are actually written.
- Health evaluation runs in a savepoint so a caught error cannot lose the
  check-in.
- Required-app policies are found by appid, survive renames, and deleting an
  app deactivates policies that still name it. The UI and API now say such a
  policy only takes effect inside a business policy.
- Backfill handles duplicate fingerprints and rolls back a failed batch.
- Plugin settings routes skip a plugin whose hook raises.
- The setup token is no longer printed to the log.
- The naming gate checks top-level files again and handles odd file names.
- Removed root scratch scripts, one of which carried a token.
- Rewrote the fleet alert scheduling and app delta tests on real fixtures.
2026-09-15 16:07:06 -04:00
Proudlock
18e5fdc000 Fix critical security vulnerabilities in client certificate authentication
CRITICAL FIXES:
- Enforce cert authentication on collector telemetry endpoint
- Add authorization check in report_command_result (prefer cert over hostname)
- Implement server certificate pinning in C# agents (optional)
- Add constant-time fingerprint comparison to prevent timing attacks
- Validate fingerprint format (40 or 64 hex chars only)

AUTHENTICATION:
- Created shopdb/core/auth/client_cert.py with authenticate_by_client_cert()
- Extracts fingerprint from nginx header (SHA1), IIS environ, or ARR header
- Validates against assets.client_cert_fingerprint in database
- Checks certificate expiration (cert_expires_at column)
- Falls back to API key when cert not present (dual-auth during rollout)

AUTHORIZATION:
- shopdb/core/api/collector.py: Added cert auth to generic_collect() before
  API key check. Sets g.cert_authenticated_asset_id when cert validates.
- plugins/endpoints/plugin.py: apply_collector_payload() compares
  g.cert_authenticated_asset_id with payload's resolved assetid. Raises
  PermissionError if mismatch (prevents agent A from submitting data for
  asset B by changing hostname field).
- plugins/endpoints/api/routes.py: report_command_result() prefers
  g.cert_authenticated_asset_id over hostname parameter. Requires either
  cert or hostname for authorization.

AGENT CHANGES:
- AgentConfig.cs: Added ServerCertThumbprint config for certificate pinning
- CollectorClient.cs: Validates server cert thumbprint when configured
- CommandClient.cs: Validates server cert on WebSocket TLS
- FleetAlertClient.cs: Validates server cert on WebSocket TLS
- When ServerCertThumbprint is empty, accepts all certs (rollout compat)

REVOCATION SUPPORT:
- Added cert_revoked_at and cert_revocation_reason columns to assets table
- Migration 0022_client_cert_revocation.py adds columns
- Revocation check uses hasattr() for backward compatibility
- Revocation requires manual database UPDATE (instant kill switch)

SECURITY HARDENING:
- Constant-time fingerprint comparison via hmac.compare_digest()
- Format validation: must be 40 (SHA1) or 64 (SHA256) hex chars
- SHA1 documented as nginx limitation, acceptable for air-gapped self-signed
- Audit logging for failed authentication attempts (AuditLog.log)

DEPLOYMENT:
- Dual-auth during rollout: cert OR API key both work
- Agents without certs continue using API key (backward compatible)
- No impact on existing fleet until certs provisioned
- Rollout: server first, pilot certs, fleet rollout, retire API key

Addresses Fable security review findings: 1 critical + 5 high vulnerabilities
related to authentication bypass, authorization flaws, and timing attacks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 13:58:02 -04:00
ff9ae693a6 Remediate the 2026-09-03 feature-test findings 2026-09-03 17:14:53 -04:00
fbd99041b0 Buildings and levels for the floor map, and make every identifier searchable 2026-08-17 13:03:54 -04:00
a9d0dfff4a Initial import: shopdb-flask multi-site asset platform
Flask + Vue rewrite of the classic-ASP shopdb, built as a plugin
framework so sister GE Aerospace sites can adopt it. Product version
0.7.0-pre-0.8.0, plugin contract 0.11.0, 966 backend tests.

Key entry points:
- docs/INSTALL-WINDOWS-IIS.md - tested Windows + IIS install runbook
  (own-site and subpath deployment methods)
- docs/PILOT-DEPLOY.md - production pilot: stand up + import + verify
- docs/IMPORT-API.md - schema-agnostic legacy data import contract
- scripts/site_imports/wjf/ - West Jefferson reference import loader
- docs/adr/ - twelve accepted architecture decision records
2026-07-14 07:58:51 -04:00