Add defense-in-depth validation to prevent path traversal attacks when
enabling/installing plugins via the UI or CLI.
Layer 1 - Input Validation (enable_plugin):
- Validate plugin names with regex ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$
- Reject reserved names (., .., empty string)
- Blocks attempts like ../../../etc/passwd at entry point
Layer 2 - Path Boundary Check (load_manifest):
- Verify resolved manifest path stays within plugins_dir
- Defense in depth even if name validation is bypassed
- Compatible with Python 3.8+ (fallback for < 3.9)
Risk Assessment: LOW
- Requires admin role (already trusted)
- Multiple existing validation layers
- No known exploitation in the wild
Rationale: Defense in depth best practice. Admins are trusted, but input
validation should not rely solely on authorization checks.
Tested:
- Valid names pass (backups, my-plugin, plugin-name)
- Path traversal blocked (../../../etc/passwd)
- Reserved names blocked (..)
- Both validation layers confirmed working
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Flask + Vue rewrite of the classic-ASP shopdb, built as a plugin
framework so sister GE Aerospace sites can adopt it. Product version
0.7.0-pre-0.8.0, plugin contract 0.11.0, 966 backend tests.
Key entry points:
- docs/INSTALL-WINDOWS-IIS.md - tested Windows + IIS install runbook
(own-site and subpath deployment methods)
- docs/PILOT-DEPLOY.md - production pilot: stand up + import + verify
- docs/IMPORT-API.md - schema-agnostic legacy data import contract
- scripts/site_imports/wjf/ - West Jefferson reference import loader
- docs/adr/ - twelve accepted architecture decision records
