da91a29155ddea1d651990b1625fc8d70d628ec7
5 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
cproudlock
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066a19052b |
Act on the wj architectural review: races, limits, pool and contract gaps
Findings F2, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11 and F13 from wj-architectural-review.md. F1/F1a (the non-sargable LOWER pattern) and F3 (the warranty sync holding a pooled connection) are being handled separately and are untouched here. - A collector check-in that raced another for the same PC lost everything: the unique index on the application fingerprint raised, nothing caught it, and the whole check-in rolled back, discarding state, events and hardware, answering the agent with form copy meant for a person. The insert now runs in a savepoint, reconciles what the other transaction already wrote, one row per savepoint so a second collision skips a row rather than the batch, and the check-in commits with a warning. This is the shape the delete side of the same function already had. - Enrollment is deliberately unauthenticated, so it now carries a per-address rate limit and a cap on pending requests, and the cap is a setting an admin can see and change. A flood can no longer bury the approval queue or grow the table without bound. - The fleet alert poll no longer formats debug strings on every request. - BusinessUnit is on the contract surface (0.34.0), so the endpoints plugin stops reaching into a core table with raw SQL. - A test walks every asset type descriptor and proves the endpoint it names really refuses a caller without the declared permission. - The plugin settings routes now need a permission; they were telling anyone which modules a site runs and where its components live. - The connection pool is sized explicitly with a short timeout, and the arithmetic against the server's connection ceiling is written next to the worker count instead of being left to defaults nobody chose. - Fleet alerts carry both the correct lowercase keys and the old camelCase pair. Trays older than 1.7.0 match keys case-sensitively and would have gone quiet on every PC not yet upgraded; the old pair goes when they are. - The dev server proxy points at localhost again, with environment variables for the remote-box workflow, and one developer's address is out of the server certificate page. |
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cproudlock
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2557d1967d |
Make the one-line install survive Defender, and approval leave a PC that works
All three found testing the bootstrap installer on Windows. - The published command used the irm-pipe-iex form, which Microsoft Defender detects as Trojan:Win32/Commando.A!ml and kills before it runs, every time, on a default install. The command now downloads the script to a file, runs it, and removes it in a finally block, which Defender does not object to. The UI also offers the script as a plain download for a tech who would rather save it. - Approving a request only linked the asset, so a PC whose pending reason was "unknown hostname" - which is every PC installed this way - kept getting 403 on every call afterwards, because its computer record had no hostname to match the credential against. Approval now stamps the hostname when the record has none, refuses with a 409 naming both when the record has a different one, and overwrites only when the admin confirms. The Credentials tab offers that confirmation. - A hostname that resolves to no record now says so instead of reading as an impostor, while still refusing the request. - While waiting for approval the agent retried on the 15-minute telemetry cadence, so a PC approved immediately enrolled a quarter of an hour later and the installer always ended on "still pending". It now retries about every minute for the first ten minutes, then every five to thirty minutes, then every fifteen, with jitter. A rate limit or server error still uses the slower backoff. |
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cproudlock
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1c2ba677c3 |
Let key-less PCs ask to enroll, and let an admin retry a trust-blocked PC
Found in the Windows VM re-test. - A PC installed without the shared key got 401 from POST /api/endpoints/enroll while the shared key was allowed, so no request was recorded and no admin could approve it. Enroll now never refuses: a valid shared key only decides auto-issue on a clean match; no key or an invalid key creates or updates the one pending request for that hostname and serial. An approved request still issues only to its own nonce. - A PC blocked with "server certificate not trusted by this PC" could never be queued again after trust was fixed, because the blocker comes from its last failed upgrade. Naming the PC in a wave now queues it when trust is its only blocker, and the response lists it under "retried"; "next n" still skips it. The Migration table lets such a PC be selected. - counts.pending on GET /enrollment counts pending requests, including ones for unknown hostnames; counts.pendingcomputers keeps the per-computer figure. |
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cproudlock
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70d5531b4d |
Make rollback, first upgrades and pin changes work as tested on Windows
Found in an end-to-end test on a Windows 11 VM against a self-signed server.
- Rollback: a 1.20 agent re-enrolls within a second of an un-enroll, so an
older agent pushed afterwards arrived on an enrolled PC and was refused.
Revoke now takes {"blockreenroll": true, "reason": ...}; a blocked PC is
never issued a credential and keeps working on the shared key until
POST .../assets/<assetid>/allow-reenroll. The Enrollment page offers the
block when un-enrolling and shows blocked PCs with an allow button.
- First upgrade of old agents: agents before 1.20 check the server
certificate when downloading the upgrade, so a store wave failed on PCs that
do not trust a self-signed server while the Migration tab said ready. A
failed download now marks the PC blocked with "server certificate not
trusted by this PC". New Install-ShopDBServerCertificate.ps1 (GE-Enforce,
SYSTEM) adds a non-CA server certificate to the trusted roots after checking
its thumbprint; the server certificate page offers a .cer download and the
SHA-1 thumbprint.
- The generated installer writes ServerPins (with an optional next pin for a
planned rotation), can leave the shared key out so the PC waits for
approval, never touches an existing credential, and skips the trusted-root
import for a CA certificate.
- The agent re-reads server pins about every 60 seconds and recycles pooled
connections within 2 minutes, so a pin change needs no restart.
- An alert can only be acknowledged by a PC it targets.
- A wave no longer counts a PC as failed after a later wave upgraded it.
- The scripts report a pin mismatch only when the pin really is missing, and
otherwise log the real error.
- Runbook: trust step before the first wave, rollback order, pin re-read,
verifying the pin against the live URL; agent contract updated.
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cproudlock
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7480e4fe3a |
Give each endpoint its own credential and fix the review findings on the server
Per-PC credentials (replaces the 09-14 client-certificate attempt): - POST /api/endpoints/enroll issues a credential to a PC that matches exactly one computer by hostname and BIOS serial and has none yet. Anything else (unknown or duplicate hostname, serial mismatch, already enrolled) waits as a request an admin approves or rejects. The agent's persisted nonce binds an approved request to the PC that asked. - One auth helper serves every agent route. With X-Endpoint-Credential the asset comes from the credential and a request naming another PC gets 403 ASSET_MISMATCH. The shared key still works for PCs that have not enrolled, is refused (401 SHARED_KEY_REFUSED) for any PC that has, and can be switched off. A revoked credential gets 401 CREDENTIAL_INVALID so the agent re-enrolls. - The core collector accepts the credential for the computers, printers and endpoints collectors through two new plugin hooks exposed on shopdb.api (contract 0.33.0), and refuses the shared key for enrolled PCs. - Admin API: enrollment list, approve, reject, revoke (un-enroll), settings. Migration API: per-PC readiness with blockers, and upgrade waves that package the agent once and queue the existing agent upgrade per PC. - Migration 0023 creates endpointcredentials, endpointenrollrequests and endpointmigrationwaves, drops the certificate columns from assets where test databases have them, and renames app_fingerprint to appfingerprint. 0021 and 0022 keep their ids but no longer alter the core assets table. - Removed: client_cert.py, certificate renewal, the unauthenticated /test/client-cert route, nginx client certificate forwarding and the agent certificate script. The client-cert header could be forged on IIS, the key was readable by users, and the shared key remained a fallback. - GET /settings/server-cert returns the SPKI SHA-256 pin for GE-Enforce. Review fixes: - report_command_result used g without importing it; every result was a 500. - collect_log refuses setup answer files, appsettings, agent directories and key files at enqueue. - Fleet alerts: alerttimeout and alertfleet agree with the migration, the scope is validated and a malformed scope no longer reaches the whole fleet, and the ack race no longer raises NameError. - A refused break-glass override leaves no hold and no audit row. - Agent upgrade checks locks and permissions before repackaging, and writes the package atomically. - Server certificate upload validates the pair before replacing files; generation no longer builds an openssl config from user input; audit rows are actually written. - Health evaluation runs in a savepoint so a caught error cannot lose the check-in. - Required-app policies are found by appid, survive renames, and deleting an app deactivates policies that still name it. The UI and API now say such a policy only takes effect inside a business policy. - Backfill handles duplicate fingerprints and rolls back a failed batch. - Plugin settings routes skip a plugin whose hook raises. - The setup token is no longer printed to the log. - The naming gate checks top-level files again and handles odd file names. - Removed root scratch scripts, one of which carried a token. - Rewrote the fleet alert scheduling and app delta tests on real fixtures. |