# shopdb-flask single-site docker-compose template.
#
# Per ADR-004, each adopting facility runs its own stack. This template
# brings up MySQL + the API container and exposes the API on port 5001.
# The Vue frontend is served separately by the API in production builds
# (see register_frontend_routes in shopdb/__init__.py); for dev, run
# `npm run dev` in frontend/ on a separate port.
#
# Usage:
#   cp .env.example .env
#   # edit .env with site-specific secrets and origins
#   docker compose up -d
#
# Refresh after pulling new code:
#   docker compose build api
#   docker compose up -d api

services:
  db:
    image: mysql:8.4
    # utf8mb4 server-wide so the auto-created MYSQL_DATABASE is utf8mb4, not the
    # image default. Keeps every site's schema on the same charset/collation.
    command: --character-set-server=utf8mb4 --collation-server=utf8mb4_unicode_ci
    restart: unless-stopped
    environment:
      MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: ${MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD:?MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD must be set}
      MYSQL_DATABASE: shopdb_flask
      MYSQL_USER: shopdb
      MYSQL_PASSWORD: ${MYSQL_PASSWORD:?MYSQL_PASSWORD must be set}
    volumes:
      - db_data:/var/lib/mysql
    # Bind MySQL to loopback only. The api container reaches db over the
    # compose network regardless of this mapping; the published port is just
    # for local admin tools (mysqldump, a client on the host). Exposing 3306
    # on all interfaces would put the database on the facility network.
    ports:
      - "127.0.0.1:${MYSQL_PORT:-3306}:3306"
    healthcheck:
      # 127.0.0.1, not localhost: localhost means the unix socket, and the
      # entrypoint's init pass answers on the socket while running the server
      # with --skip-networking. A socket ping therefore reports healthy DURING
      # init, and the api/migrate services start against a server that is about
      # to restart. Over TCP the probe stays red until the real server listens.
      test: ["CMD", "mysqladmin", "ping", "-h", "127.0.0.1", "-u", "root", "-p${MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD}"]
      interval: 10s
      timeout: 5s
      retries: 5

  # Schema, plugin bootstrap and seed data all happen here, not in the api
  # container. One place, one ordering, and a failure stops the rollout instead
  # of being retried forever: restart "no" means a bad migration exits once and
  # leaves the error as the last thing in the log. The api service below will
  # not start at all until this exits 0, so `up -d api` still migrates first -
  # compose honours service_completed_successfully even when a single service
  # is named on the command line.
  migrate:
    build: .
    restart: "no"
    depends_on:
      db:
        condition: service_healthy
    environment:
      FLASK_ENV: production
      DATABASE_URL: mysql+pymysql://shopdb:${MYSQL_PASSWORD}@db:3306/shopdb_flask?charset=utf8mb4
      SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:?SECRET_KEY must be set}
      JWT_SECRET_KEY: ${JWT_SECRET_KEY:?JWT_SECRET_KEY must be set}
      # Required even though this service never serves a request: create_app()
      # runs config validation before any CLI command dispatches, and the
      # production config refuses to build without an explicit CORS allowlist.
      CORS_ORIGINS: ${CORS_ORIGINS:?CORS_ORIGINS must be set}
      LOG_LEVEL: ${LOG_LEVEL:-INFO}
    # Chained with && so the first failure stops the rest. Ordering is
    # load-bearing: plugin tables cannot be created before the plugins are
    # installed, and seedscopes only links permissions that already exist as
    # rows, so the seeds run last.
    #
    # The seeds are all create-if-missing (see shopdb/cli/__init__.py), so
    # running them on every start is a no-op once the site is current. They run
    # here rather than only on first deploy because a patch that adds a
    # permission or a default setting has to reach an existing site on the
    # upgrade it already performs - that is the whole point of this service.
    # No entrypoint override: the image entrypoint now only waits for the
    # database and execs, which is exactly the preamble this service wants.
    command:
      - sh
      - -c
      - >
        flask db upgrade &&
        /app/scripts/bootstrap-plugins.sh &&
        flask plugin upgrade-all &&
        flask seed permissions &&
        flask seed settings &&
        flask seed reference-data
    volumes:
      - ./plugins:/app/plugins:ro
      - ./scripts:/app/scripts:ro
      # plugins.json is written here by bootstrap-plugins.sh, so this service
      # needs the same instance volume the api uses. They never run at the same
      # time, so the shared mount is not contended.
      - instance_data:/app/instance

  api:
    build: .
    restart: unless-stopped
    depends_on:
      db:
        condition: service_healthy
      migrate:
        condition: service_completed_successfully
    environment:
      FLASK_ENV: production
      DATABASE_URL: mysql+pymysql://shopdb:${MYSQL_PASSWORD}@db:3306/shopdb_flask?charset=utf8mb4
      SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:?SECRET_KEY must be set}
      JWT_SECRET_KEY: ${JWT_SECRET_KEY:?JWT_SECRET_KEY must be set}
      CORS_ORIGINS: ${CORS_ORIGINS:?CORS_ORIGINS must be set}
      LOG_LEVEL: ${LOG_LEVEL:-INFO}
      ZABBIX_URL: ${ZABBIX_URL:-}
      ZABBIX_TOKEN: ${ZABBIX_TOKEN:-}
      COLLECTOR_API_KEY: ${COLLECTOR_API_KEY:-}
      COLLECTOR_API_KEY_ENDPOINTS: ${COLLECTOR_API_KEY_ENDPOINTS:-}
      # This file is the source-build dev stack (wilm/dev-be); stable and edge
      # ship through the pull/airgap compose files, not this one. So default the
      # badge label to DEV here - a raw source build is by definition not a
      # release - while still allowing an override from .env.
      SHOPDB_ENV_LABEL: ${SHOPDB_ENV_LABEL:-DEV}
    ports:
      - "${API_PORT:-5001}:5001"
    # Terminate TLS in gunicorn with the mounted self-signed cert so the browser
    # sees a secure context. navigator.clipboard and other secure-context-only
    # web APIs refuse to run over plain http on a non-localhost origin, so the
    # test box (accessed by FQDN) needs real https. A site swaps in its own cert
    # under ./certs or fronts this with its IIS/nginx proxy.
    command:
      - gunicorn
      - --bind
      - 0.0.0.0:5001
      # Async workers, not threads. The endpoint agent long-polls
      # /api/endpoints/commands/next and re-polls immediately on a 204, so every
      # agent holds a connection essentially continuously and fleet size IS the
      # concurrency. Under gthread that meant 4 x 8 = 32 slots total, and a
      # single worker's 8 threads could fill with sleeping agents while the CPU
      # sat idle - measured: 8 of 9 threads in timed sleep, UI p95 24s.
      #
      # A held connection under gevent is a greenlet, not an OS thread, so idle
      # is nearly free. Measured on this stack (devnotes/gevent-sizing-simulation.md):
      # 700 simulated agents plus UI, integration and kiosk traffic served with
      # zero errors at UI median 7.5ms, peak RSS 479MB. CPU, not memory or DB
      # connections, is the binding resource.
      - --worker-class
      - gevent
      - --workers
      - "4"
      # Per-worker greenlet ceiling. 4 x 2000 is far above any realistic fleet;
      # it exists so a connection spike queues rather than being refused.
      - --worker-connections
      - "2000"
      # 60, not 30: the timeout must exceed _CLAIM_HOLD_SECONDS in
      # plugins/endpoints/api/routes.py or gunicorn kills a healthy long-poll
      # mid-hold. Cheap here because a stuck connection costs a greenlet.
      - --timeout
      - "60"
      - --access-logfile
      - "-"
      # %(D)s is request duration in microseconds. Without it a slow request is
      # indistinguishable from a fast one in the log, and latency has to be
      # reconstructed from outside the container. Keep in sync with the
      # Dockerfile CMD.
      - --access-logformat
      - '%(h)s %(l)s %(u)s %(t)s "%(r)s" %(s)s %(b)s %(D)sus "%(f)s" "%(a)s"'
      - --error-logfile
      - "-"
      - --certfile
      - /app/certs/server.crt
      - --keyfile
      - /app/certs/server.key
      - wsgi:app
    healthcheck:
      # Match the TLS listener: probe over https and accept the self-signed cert
      # (-k). The Dockerfile default probes http and would stay red once gunicorn
      # only speaks TLS.
      # /api/dashboard/health is the public probe route and answers 200 even when
      # the database is down, so the body's status field is what decides health.
      # Probing POST /api/auth/login instead logged a 400 every 30s and exercised
      # the credential path from a health check.
      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "curl --silent --insecure https://localhost:5001/api/dashboard/health | grep -q '\"status\":\"ok\"'"]
      interval: 30s
      timeout: 5s
      start_period: 10s
      retries: 3
    volumes:
      - ./plugins:/app/plugins:ro
      # Standalone operator scripts shipped inside generated bundles (the
      # endpoint-agent uninstaller). Read-only, same pattern as plugins: the
      # site-agent packaging route reads uninstall-shopdbagent.ps1 from here at
      # download time, so it must be visible in the container.
      - ./scripts:/app/scripts:ro
      # Self-signed TLS material for the dev/test https listener. Read-only;
      # generated on the host under ./certs and never baked into the image.
      - ./certs:/app/certs:ro
      # /app/instance is WRITTEN state, not code: plugins.json (which plugins
      # this site has enabled), uploaded floor plans, branding, model and
      # application images, employee photos, warranty proofs, slides,
      # printed-part files, and the Dell OAuth token. Without this volume a
      # `docker compose build api && up -d api` recreates the container and
      # takes all of it with it, so the site comes back with its plugins
      # disabled and MySQL rows pointing at files that no longer exist.
      - instance_data:/app/instance

volumes:
  db_data:
  instance_data: