d4105c2289
Three colour faults on the PC page, each hiding the next. ACTIVITY BADGES WERE ALL GREY. The list renderer reads a badge colour from a ROW FIELD, and the activity panel declared none, so every severity rendered identically. The feed's whole job is to make a critical event visible and it was painting it the same as a logon. The route now emits severitycolor - info grey, warning yellow, critical red - and the panel declares it. PAUSED AND THE TRANSITIONAL STATES WERE RED. statecolor was green-or-red-or- grey, so a paused service looked like a stopped one. They are different: a paused service was paused deliberately, and one stuck in Start Pending is failing to start on a retry cycle - which is exactly what raises event 7011, the thing behind the critical counts on the Fleet page. Both are amber now. NAMED COLOURS ALWAYS GOT WHITE TEXT. readableText only parsed hex and returned white for anything else, but panels emit NAMES. Green, red and grey are dark enough that white worked by luck; amber is not, so the fix above shipped as white-on-yellow and could not be read. Names resolve to hex before the contrast test, so this holds for any named colour anywhere in the app rather than these two panels. colorStyle had no test file at all. It has one now. Every one of these was found by looking at the rendered page. None of them would fail a test that checked markup. Full suite 2131 passed, vitest 273 passed.
1117 lines
46 KiB
Python
1117 lines
46 KiB
Python
"""Endpoints plugin API endpoints (read + dashboard).
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Ingest is NOT here: agent reports arrive on the generic collector route
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POST /api/collector/endpoints (ADR-006), authorized by a collector-scoped
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service token, and are handled by EndpointsPlugin.apply_collector_payload.
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These routes are the human-facing read surface, gated by user JWT + RBAC.
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"""
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import json
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import time
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
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from flask import Blueprint, request, current_app
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from flask_jwt_extended import current_user
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from shopdb.api import (
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db, Asset, Setting, success_response, error_response, paginated_response,
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ErrorCodes, get_pagination_params, paginate_query, require_permission,
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require_role, caller_holds, mint_service_token, list_service_tokens,
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revoke_service_tokens,
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AuditLog, collector_authorized, User,
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)
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from ..models import EndpointState, EndpointEvent, EndpointCommand
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from ..commands import COMMAND_ALLOWLIST, is_allowed_action, ALLOWED_ACTIONS_FOR, row_actions_for, requires_target, action_targetkind, elevated_permission_for
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from ..eventcatalog import CRITICAL_EVENT_IDS, event_severity, event_title
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endpoints_bp = Blueprint('endpoints', __name__)
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def _naive_utcnow():
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return datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(tzinfo=None)
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# A watched service or process reports a STATE STRING, not a boolean, and the
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# vocabulary varies by source. Both the services panel and the fleet health
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# rollup have to agree on what counts as running, so the rule lives here once -
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# reading it wrong makes every service look stopped.
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_RUNNING_STATES = ('running', 'started', 'up', 'ok', 'active')
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def _service_running(entry):
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raw = (entry.get('state') or entry.get('status') or '').strip().lower()
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return raw in _RUNNING_STATES
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# Paused, plus the four transitional states Windows reports while a service is
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# on its way somewhere.
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_TRANSITIONAL_STATES = ('paused', 'start pending', 'stop pending',
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'continue pending', 'pause pending', 'starting',
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'stopping', 'pausing')
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def _service_transitional(raw):
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return (raw or '').strip().lower() in _TRANSITIONAL_STATES
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def _service_name(entry):
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return entry.get('name') or entry.get('service') or 'Unknown'
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def _format_uptime(seconds):
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"""Whole-seconds uptime -> 'Nd Nh Nm', or None."""
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if seconds is None:
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return None
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try:
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seconds = int(seconds)
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except (TypeError, ValueError):
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return None
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days, rem = divmod(seconds, 86400)
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hours, rem = divmod(rem, 3600)
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minutes = rem // 60
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parts = []
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if days:
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parts.append('{}d'.format(days))
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if hours:
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parts.append('{}h'.format(hours))
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parts.append('{}m'.format(minutes))
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return ' '.join(parts)
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# =============================================================================
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# Endpoint state
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# =============================================================================
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@endpoints_bp.route('', methods=['GET'])
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@require_permission('endpoints.fleet')
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def list_endpoints():
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"""List reported endpoint states.
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Registered as '' so the rule is '/api/endpoints', with no trailing slash.
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CONTRIBUTING.md's API section spells endpoints that way ('/api/machines'),
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and every other plugin's list route follows it - this was the only route in
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331 paths that did not.
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It was not cosmetic. A rule ending in a slash makes Flask answer the
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unslashed URL with a 308 to an ABSOLUTE url. On dev that resolves and
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nobody notices. Behind the IIS subpath it does not: with no ProxyFix,
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Werkzeug builds that Location from the scheme and host it believes it has,
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so it emitted http:// and dropped the /shopdb prefix. The browser refuses
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to follow an https page to http, the list request failed, and the page
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rendered "No endpoints found" - indistinguishable from a fleet with nothing
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in it. The agent had been reporting correctly the whole time.
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Joins through Computer so each row carries computerid and can deep-link
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into the existing PC detail page (/pcs/{computerid}). Endpoint state only
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exists for hostnames resolved to a Computer, so the join is not lossy.
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Sorted WORST FIRST by default: never-reported, then quiet, then reporting.
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It used to sort by lastreportedat descending, which floated the healthiest
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endpoints to the top and buried the ones somebody needs to look at.
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Each row also carries what the fleet view is actually for: which MACHINE
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depends on this PC, its PC type, and a health rollup. On a shop floor a PC
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matters because a machine stops without it, so that is the column an
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operator reads first.
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"""
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from plugins.computers.models import Computer, ComputerType
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page, per_page = get_pagination_params(request)
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cutoff = _naive_utcnow() - timedelta(hours=_quiet_hours())
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# Status as a sortable expression rather than a post-hoc label, so
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# worst-first survives pagination. 0 never reported, 1 quiet, 2 reporting.
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statusrank = db.case(
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(EndpointState.lastreportedat.is_(None), 0),
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(EndpointState.lastreportedat < cutoff, 1),
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else_=2,
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)
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query = (db.session.query(EndpointState, Computer.computerid,
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Computer.computertypeid, ComputerType.computertype,
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Asset.assetnumber, statusrank.label('statusrank'))
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.join(Asset, Asset.assetid == EndpointState.assetid)
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.join(Computer, Computer.assetid == EndpointState.assetid)
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.outerjoin(ComputerType,
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ComputerType.computertypeid == Computer.computertypeid)
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.filter(Asset.isactive.is_(True)))
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# Search covers hostname, asset number and the machine number a PC serves.
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# Hostname alone was too narrow: people look a PC up by the bay it runs.
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if search := (request.args.get('search') or '').strip():
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like = f'%{search}%'
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machinehits = _assetids_serving_machine_like(like)
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clauses = [EndpointState.hostname.ilike(like), Asset.assetnumber.ilike(like)]
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if machinehits:
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clauses.append(EndpointState.assetid.in_(machinehits))
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query = query.filter(db.or_(*clauses))
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if status := request.args.get('status'):
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wanted = {'never': 0, 'quiet': 1, 'reporting': 2}.get(status.lower())
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if wanted is not None:
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query = query.filter(statusrank == wanted)
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if computertypeid := request.args.get('computertypeid'):
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query = query.filter(Computer.computertypeid == computertypeid)
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if locationid := request.args.get('locationid'):
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query = query.filter(Asset.locationid == locationid)
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if businessunitid := request.args.get('businessunitid'):
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query = query.filter(Asset.businessunitid == businessunitid)
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sort = (request.args.get('sort') or 'status').lower()
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sorts = {
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'status': (statusrank.asc(), EndpointState.hostname.asc()),
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'hostname': (EndpointState.hostname.asc(),),
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'lastreported': (EndpointState.lastreportedat.desc(),),
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'uptime': (EndpointState.uptimeseconds.desc(),),
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}
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query = query.order_by(*sorts.get(sort, sorts['status']))
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items, total = paginate_query(query, page, per_page)
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# Batch the per-row extras for this PAGE only. Doing them inline would be
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# one query per endpoint for machines and another for events.
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assetids = [state.assetid for state, *_ in items]
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machines = _machines_for_assets(assetids)
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critical = _critical_counts_for_assets(assetids)
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data = []
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for state, computerid, computertypeid, computertype, assetnumber, rank in items:
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row = state.to_dict()
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row['computerid'] = computerid
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row['assetnumber'] = assetnumber
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row['computertypeid'] = computertypeid
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row['computertype'] = computertype
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row['uptimedisplay'] = _format_uptime(state.uptimeseconds)
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row['status'] = ('never', 'quiet', 'reporting')[rank]
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row['machines'] = machines.get(state.assetid, [])
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row['health'] = _health_for(state, critical.get(state.assetid))
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data.append(row)
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return paginated_response(data, page, per_page, total)
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def _assetids_serving_machine_like(like):
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"""Asset ids of PCs whose controlled machine matches a search term.
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Checked in BOTH directions on purpose. The canonical edge is PC controls
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machine, but production also holds reciprocal rows, so matching only
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source->target silently drops half the fleet from a machine-number search.
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"""
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from shopdb.api import AssetRelationship, RelationshipType, AssetType
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controls = (RelationshipType.query
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.filter(db.func.lower(RelationshipType.relationshiptype) == 'controls')
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.first())
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if controls is None:
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return []
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# Only MACHINE assets. A PC also 'controls' printers and other kit, and
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# matching any controlled asset put office locations in the machine column.
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other = db.aliased(Asset)
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othertype = db.aliased(AssetType)
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forward = (db.session.query(AssetRelationship.sourceassetid)
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.join(other, other.assetid == AssetRelationship.targetassetid)
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.join(othertype, othertype.assettypeid == other.assettypeid)
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.filter(AssetRelationship.relationshiptypeid == controls.relationshiptypeid,
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db.func.lower(othertype.assettype) == 'machine',
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other.assetnumber.ilike(like)))
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backward = (db.session.query(AssetRelationship.targetassetid)
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.join(other, other.assetid == AssetRelationship.sourceassetid)
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.join(othertype, othertype.assettypeid == other.assettypeid)
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.filter(AssetRelationship.relationshiptypeid == controls.relationshiptypeid,
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db.func.lower(othertype.assettype) == 'machine',
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other.assetnumber.ilike(like)))
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return [r[0] for r in forward.union(backward).all()]
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def _machines_for_assets(assetids):
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"""{assetid: [{assetid, assetnumber, name}]} for the machines each PC serves.
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Both edge directions again, deduplicated by machine asset id. One query for
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the whole page rather than one per row.
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"""
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from shopdb.api import AssetRelationship, RelationshipType, AssetType
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if not assetids:
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return {}
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controls = (RelationshipType.query
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.filter(db.func.lower(RelationshipType.relationshiptype) == 'controls')
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.first())
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if controls is None:
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return {}
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other = db.aliased(Asset)
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othertype = db.aliased(AssetType)
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forward = (db.session.query(AssetRelationship.sourceassetid.label('pc'),
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other.assetid, other.assetnumber, other.name)
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.join(other, other.assetid == AssetRelationship.targetassetid)
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.join(othertype, othertype.assettypeid == other.assettypeid)
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.filter(AssetRelationship.relationshiptypeid == controls.relationshiptypeid,
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db.func.lower(othertype.assettype) == 'machine',
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AssetRelationship.sourceassetid.in_(assetids)))
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backward = (db.session.query(AssetRelationship.targetassetid.label('pc'),
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other.assetid, other.assetnumber, other.name)
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.join(other, other.assetid == AssetRelationship.sourceassetid)
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.join(othertype, othertype.assettypeid == other.assettypeid)
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.filter(AssetRelationship.relationshiptypeid == controls.relationshiptypeid,
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db.func.lower(othertype.assettype) == 'machine',
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AssetRelationship.targetassetid.in_(assetids)))
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out = {}
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for pc, machineid, assetnumber, name in forward.union(backward).all():
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seen = out.setdefault(pc, [])
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if not any(m['assetid'] == machineid for m in seen):
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seen.append({'assetid': machineid, 'assetnumber': assetnumber, 'name': name})
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return out
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def _critical_counts_for_assets(assetids):
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"""{assetid: (total, dominant_eventid)} of critical events in the window.
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Broken down BY EVENT ID, not just totalled. A bare count says "418
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critical", which tells an operator nothing about what to do; naming the
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event that dominates - service timeout, application crash - is the
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difference between a number and a lead.
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"""
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if not assetids:
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return {}
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cutoff = _naive_utcnow() - timedelta(hours=48)
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rows = (db.session.query(EndpointEvent.assetid, EndpointEvent.eventid,
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db.func.count(EndpointEvent.endpointeventid))
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.filter(EndpointEvent.assetid.in_(assetids),
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EndpointEvent.eventid.in_(CRITICAL_EVENT_IDS),
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EndpointEvent.eventtime.isnot(None),
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EndpointEvent.eventtime >= cutoff)
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.group_by(EndpointEvent.assetid, EndpointEvent.eventid)
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.all())
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perasset = {}
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for assetid, eventid, count in rows:
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total, dominant, best = perasset.get(assetid, (0, None, 0))
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total += count
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if count > best:
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dominant, best = eventid, count
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perasset[assetid] = (total, dominant, best)
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return {assetid: (total, dominant)
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for assetid, (total, dominant, _best) in perasset.items()}
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def _health_for(state, critical):
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"""Worst-of rollup: a stopped watched service, or a recent critical event.
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Deliberately a PHRASE, not a score. "eDNC stopped" tells an operator what
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to do; a percentage does not - and neither does "418 critical", which is
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why the dominant event is named rather than merely counted.
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"""
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if critical:
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total, dominant = critical
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title = event_title(dominant) if dominant else 'critical'
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label = title if total == 1 else '{} x{}'.format(title, total)
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return {'level': 'critical', 'label': label}
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stopped = []
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try:
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for entry in json.loads(state.servicesjson or '[]'):
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if not _service_running(entry):
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stopped.append(_service_name(entry))
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except (TypeError, ValueError):
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# Malformed payload is not a health verdict - say nothing rather than
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# claiming the endpoint is unhealthy.
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return {'level': 'unknown', 'label': None}
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if stopped:
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first = stopped[0]
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extra = f' +{len(stopped) - 1}' if len(stopped) > 1 else ''
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return {'level': 'warning', 'label': f'{first} stopped{extra}'}
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if state.lastreportedat is None:
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return {'level': 'unknown', 'label': 'no agent'}
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return {'level': 'ok', 'label': 'ok'}
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@endpoints_bp.route('/<int:asset_id>', methods=['GET'])
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@require_permission('endpoints.view')
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def get_endpoint(asset_id: int):
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"""Get the current state for one endpoint by asset id.
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Carries the same reporting/quiet/never verdict the fleet list uses. The
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quiet window is a site setting, so the SERVER decides it: a caller that
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guessed a threshold in the browser would disagree with the fleet list on
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the same endpoint the moment a site changed the setting.
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"""
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state = EndpointState.query.filter_by(assetid=asset_id).first()
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if not state:
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND,
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f'No endpoint state for asset {asset_id}',
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http_code=404,
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)
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cutoff = _naive_utcnow() - timedelta(hours=_quiet_hours())
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if state.lastreportedat is None:
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status = 'never'
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elif state.lastreportedat < cutoff:
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status = 'quiet'
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else:
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status = 'reporting'
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data = state.to_dict()
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data['status'] = status
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data['uptimedisplay'] = _format_uptime(state.uptimeseconds)
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return success_response(data)
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|
|
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@endpoints_bp.route('/<int:asset_id>/events', methods=['GET'])
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@require_permission('endpoints.view')
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def list_endpoint_events(asset_id: int):
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"""List curated Windows events for one endpoint, newest first."""
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page, per_page = get_pagination_params(request)
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query = EndpointEvent.query.filter_by(assetid=asset_id)
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|
|
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if eventid := request.args.get('eventid'):
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try:
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query = query.filter(EndpointEvent.eventid == int(eventid))
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except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
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return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
|
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'eventid must be an integer')
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|
|
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query = query.order_by(EndpointEvent.eventtime.desc())
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|
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items, total = paginate_query(query, page, per_page)
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data = [e.to_dict() for e in items]
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|
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return paginated_response(data, page, per_page, total)
|
|
|
|
|
|
# =============================================================================
|
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# Asset panels (ADR-010) - shaped for the generic PluginAssetPanels renderer
|
|
# =============================================================================
|
|
|
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@endpoints_bp.route('/asset/<int:asset_id>/status', methods=['GET'])
|
|
@require_permission('endpoints.view')
|
|
def panel_status(asset_id: int):
|
|
"""Keyvalue panel: the endpoint's current status snapshot.
|
|
|
|
Single indexed lookup on endpointstates.assetid. Returns the {fields:[...]}
|
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shape the keyvalue renderer expects; an absent state yields no fields so the
|
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panel hides itself.
|
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"""
|
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state = EndpointState.query.filter_by(assetid=asset_id).first()
|
|
if not state:
|
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return success_response({'fields': []})
|
|
|
|
def field(label, value, mono=False):
|
|
return {'label': label, 'value': value, 'mono': mono}
|
|
|
|
fields = [
|
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field('Logged in user', state.loggedinuser),
|
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field('Uptime', _format_uptime(state.uptimeseconds)),
|
|
field('Idle', _format_uptime(state.idleseconds)),
|
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field('Last boot',
|
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state.lastboottime.isoformat() + 'Z' if state.lastboottime else None),
|
|
field('CPU %', state.cpupercent),
|
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field('Memory %', state.memorypercent),
|
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field('Agent', state.agentversion, mono=True),
|
|
field('Last reported',
|
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state.lastreportedat.isoformat() + 'Z' if state.lastreportedat else None),
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]
|
|
fields = [f for f in fields if f['value'] not in (None, '')]
|
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return success_response({'fields': fields})
|
|
|
|
|
|
@endpoints_bp.route('/asset/<int:asset_id>/telemetrymeta', methods=['GET'])
|
|
@require_permission('endpoints.view')
|
|
def panel_telemetry_meta(asset_id: int):
|
|
"""Lightweight freshness probe for the panels.
|
|
|
|
Returns just the endpoint's lastreportedat so the WebUI can tell whether a
|
|
genuinely new telemetry snapshot has landed after it forces a collect. The
|
|
UI captures this before enqueuing collect_now (or a row Start/Stop), then
|
|
polls until the stamp advances - a command reaching 'succeeded' only means
|
|
the agent ran it, not that it has yet posted the fresh services snapshot, so
|
|
gating the refresh on this timestamp is what avoids re-rendering stale rows.
|
|
"""
|
|
state = EndpointState.query.filter_by(assetid=asset_id).first()
|
|
stamp = (state.lastreportedat.isoformat() + 'Z'
|
|
if state and state.lastreportedat else None)
|
|
return success_response({'lastreportedat': stamp})
|
|
|
|
|
|
@endpoints_bp.route('/asset/<int:asset_id>/services', methods=['GET'])
|
|
@require_permission('endpoints.view')
|
|
def panel_services(asset_id: int):
|
|
"""List panel: monitored services/processes with a run-state badge per row.
|
|
|
|
Reshapes the latest servicesjson snapshot into rows the list renderer maps
|
|
to name + status badge. Tolerant of a missing or unexpected snapshot shape:
|
|
an unknown state renders as an Unknown badge rather than failing.
|
|
"""
|
|
state = EndpointState.query.filter_by(assetid=asset_id).first()
|
|
if not state or not state.servicesjson:
|
|
return success_response([])
|
|
|
|
maycommand = caller_holds('endpoints.command')
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
services = json.loads(state.servicesjson)
|
|
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
|
return success_response([])
|
|
|
|
rows = []
|
|
for entry in (services or []):
|
|
if isinstance(entry, dict):
|
|
name = entry.get('name') or entry.get('service') or 'Unknown'
|
|
raw = (entry.get('state') or entry.get('status') or '').strip().lower()
|
|
app = entry.get('app')
|
|
kind = entry.get('kind')
|
|
else:
|
|
name, raw, app, kind = str(entry), '', None, None
|
|
running = _service_running(entry)
|
|
row = {
|
|
'name': name,
|
|
'kind': (kind or '').lower() or None,
|
|
'statelabel': 'Running' if running else (raw.title() or 'Unknown'),
|
|
# Amber for paused and the four Windows transitional states. A
|
|
# service stuck in Start Pending is failing to start on a retry
|
|
# cycle - which is what raises event 7011 - and a paused one was
|
|
# paused deliberately. Painting either the same red as Stopped
|
|
# loses the distinction that tells you which to chase.
|
|
'statecolor': ('green' if running
|
|
else 'yellow' if _service_transitional(raw)
|
|
else 'red' if raw else 'gray'),
|
|
}
|
|
# Only offer Start/Stop to a caller who could actually run it. The
|
|
# emission never consulted the caller, so a read-only viewer was shown
|
|
# controls on a shop-floor PC that 403 on click - wrong signal, and it
|
|
# gets worse the moment guests can read this panel.
|
|
targets = row_actions_for(app, kind, name) if maycommand else None
|
|
if targets:
|
|
row['action'] = {
|
|
'running': running,
|
|
'start': targets['start'],
|
|
'stop': targets['stop'],
|
|
'status': targets['status'],
|
|
'target': targets['target'],
|
|
'targetkind': targets['targetkind'],
|
|
}
|
|
rows.append(row)
|
|
return success_response(rows)
|
|
|
|
|
|
@endpoints_bp.route('/asset/<int:asset_id>/recentevents', methods=['GET'])
|
|
@require_permission('endpoints.view')
|
|
def panel_recent_events(asset_id: int):
|
|
"""List panel: the endpoint's most recent curated events, newest first.
|
|
|
|
Indexed range scan on (assetid, eventtime), capped small - this is the
|
|
at-a-glance history card, not the full report (that is the events route
|
|
with pagination).
|
|
"""
|
|
events = (EndpointEvent.query
|
|
.filter_by(assetid=asset_id)
|
|
.order_by(EndpointEvent.eventtime.desc())
|
|
.limit(10)
|
|
.all())
|
|
|
|
rows = [{
|
|
'title': event_title(e.eventid),
|
|
'severity': event_severity(e.eventid),
|
|
'eventtime': e.eventtime.isoformat() + 'Z' if e.eventtime else None,
|
|
} for e in events]
|
|
return success_response(rows)
|
|
|
|
|
|
@endpoints_bp.route('/asset/<int:asset_id>/activity', methods=['GET'])
|
|
@require_permission('endpoints.view')
|
|
def panel_activity(asset_id: int):
|
|
"""List panel: one chronological feed of what happened to this endpoint.
|
|
|
|
Curated Windows events and operator commands merged and sorted newest
|
|
first. They answer the same question - what happened to this box - and
|
|
reading them as two separate cards means interleaving them by eye.
|
|
|
|
Both sources are already keyed by assetid, so this is two indexed reads and
|
|
a merge sort, not a join. The core AuditLog is deliberately NOT a third
|
|
source: its rows carry the action as the entity name and the asset only
|
|
inside a details string, so pulling it in would mean parsing prose.
|
|
|
|
The requester's name is withheld from callers who cannot themselves issue
|
|
commands. A read-only viewer - a guest, on a site that grants this panel -
|
|
has no need for the roster of who restarted what, and the feed is just as
|
|
useful without it.
|
|
"""
|
|
naming = caller_holds('endpoints.command')
|
|
|
|
events = (EndpointEvent.query
|
|
.filter_by(assetid=asset_id)
|
|
.order_by(EndpointEvent.eventtime.desc())
|
|
.limit(15)
|
|
.all())
|
|
|
|
# The newest 15 of ANY severity can be entirely routine logons while the
|
|
# health rollup is shouting about a burst of crashes underneath them - the
|
|
# page then contradicts itself for no visible reason. Pull the newest
|
|
# criticals separately and merge, so what health is reporting is always
|
|
# present in the feed that is supposed to explain it.
|
|
criticals = (EndpointEvent.query
|
|
.filter(EndpointEvent.assetid == asset_id,
|
|
EndpointEvent.eventid.in_(CRITICAL_EVENT_IDS))
|
|
.order_by(EndpointEvent.eventtime.desc())
|
|
.limit(5)
|
|
.all())
|
|
seen = {e.endpointeventid for e in events}
|
|
events.extend(e for e in criticals if e.endpointeventid not in seen)
|
|
|
|
commands = (EndpointCommand.query
|
|
.filter_by(assetid=asset_id)
|
|
.order_by(EndpointCommand.createdat.desc())
|
|
.limit(15)
|
|
.all())
|
|
|
|
# requestedby holds a user ID, not a name. One batched lookup rather than a
|
|
# query per row, and only when the caller is allowed to see the names at all.
|
|
names = {}
|
|
if naming:
|
|
userids = {c.requestedby for c in commands if c.requestedby}
|
|
if userids:
|
|
names = {u.userid: (u.username or '')
|
|
for u in User.query.filter(User.userid.in_(userids)).all()}
|
|
|
|
rows = []
|
|
for event in events:
|
|
rows.append({
|
|
'title': event_title(event.eventid),
|
|
'severity': event_severity(event.eventid),
|
|
'detail': 'Windows event {}'.format(event.eventid),
|
|
'eventtime': event.eventtime,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
for command in commands:
|
|
label = COMMAND_ALLOWLIST.get(command.action, {}).get('label') or command.action
|
|
target = ' on {}'.format(command.target) if command.target else ''
|
|
who = ''
|
|
if naming and command.requestedby:
|
|
username = names.get(command.requestedby)
|
|
if username:
|
|
who = ' by {}'.format(username)
|
|
rows.append({
|
|
'title': '{}{}'.format(label, target),
|
|
# A failed command is the one an operator needs to notice.
|
|
'severity': 'critical' if command.status == EndpointCommand.STATUS_FAILED else 'info',
|
|
'detail': '{}{}'.format((command.status or 'queued').title(), who),
|
|
'eventtime': command.createdat,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
# Undated rows sort last rather than crashing the comparison.
|
|
rows.sort(key=lambda r: (r['eventtime'] is not None, r['eventtime']), reverse=True)
|
|
|
|
# Trim to the cap without dropping the criticals that were fetched on
|
|
# purpose: they keep their place in time, but they survive the cut.
|
|
if len(rows) > 15:
|
|
keep = [r for r in rows if r['severity'] == 'critical'][:5]
|
|
rest = [r for r in rows if r not in keep]
|
|
rows = sorted(keep + rest[:15 - len(keep)],
|
|
key=lambda r: (r['eventtime'] is not None, r['eventtime']),
|
|
reverse=True)
|
|
|
|
# The list renderer reads a badge colour from a ROW FIELD, so without this
|
|
# every badge falls back to grey and the feed loses the one signal it is
|
|
# there to carry.
|
|
colours = {'critical': 'red', 'warning': 'yellow', 'info': 'gray'}
|
|
|
|
return success_response([{
|
|
'title': r['title'],
|
|
'severity': r['severity'],
|
|
'severitycolor': colours.get(r['severity'], 'gray'),
|
|
'detail': r['detail'],
|
|
'eventtime': r['eventtime'].isoformat() + 'Z' if r['eventtime'] else None,
|
|
} for r in rows[:15]])
|
|
|
|
|
|
@endpoints_bp.route('/asset/<int:asset_id>/interfaces', methods=['GET'])
|
|
@require_permission('endpoints.view')
|
|
def panel_interfaces(asset_id: int):
|
|
"""Table panel: every hardware NIC the agent last reported.
|
|
|
|
Reshapes the latest interfacesjson snapshot into one row per adapter with
|
|
the {alias, ipv4, mac, gateway, subnet, dhcp} shape the collector emits. A
|
|
gatewayless adapter is flagged as the likely machine-IPS link (see
|
|
DESIGN-DECISIONS-agent.md 9.3): those NICs speak to the machine, not the
|
|
corporate LAN. Tolerant of a missing or unexpected snapshot: an unreadable
|
|
payload yields no rows so the panel hides itself.
|
|
"""
|
|
state = EndpointState.query.filter_by(assetid=asset_id).first()
|
|
if not state or not state.interfacesjson:
|
|
return success_response([])
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
interfaces = json.loads(state.interfacesjson)
|
|
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
|
return success_response([])
|
|
|
|
rows = []
|
|
for entry in (interfaces or []):
|
|
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
|
|
continue
|
|
gateway = (entry.get('gateway') or '').strip()
|
|
ipv4 = (entry.get('ipv4') or '').strip()
|
|
rows.append({
|
|
'alias': entry.get('alias') or 'Unknown',
|
|
'ipv4': ipv4 or '-',
|
|
'mac': (entry.get('mac') or '').strip() or '-',
|
|
'gateway': gateway or '-',
|
|
'subnet': (entry.get('subnet') or '').strip() or '-',
|
|
'dhcp': 'DHCP' if entry.get('dhcp') else 'Static',
|
|
# A gatewayless NIC with an address is the machine link; the gateway
|
|
# NIC is the corporate LAN.
|
|
'role': 'Machine link' if (ipv4 and not gateway) else 'LAN',
|
|
})
|
|
return success_response(rows)
|
|
|
|
|
|
# =============================================================================
|
|
# Dashboard
|
|
# =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
@endpoints_bp.route('/dashboard/summary', methods=['GET'])
|
|
@require_permission('endpoints.fleet')
|
|
def dashboard_summary():
|
|
"""High-level fleet counts for the endpoints dashboard."""
|
|
total = db.session.query(EndpointState).join(
|
|
Asset, Asset.assetid == EndpointState.assetid
|
|
).filter(Asset.isactive.is_(True)).count()
|
|
|
|
hours = _quiet_hours()
|
|
cutoff = _naive_utcnow() - timedelta(hours=hours)
|
|
|
|
reporting = db.session.query(EndpointState).join(
|
|
Asset, Asset.assetid == EndpointState.assetid
|
|
).filter(
|
|
Asset.isactive.is_(True),
|
|
EndpointState.lastreportedat.isnot(None),
|
|
EndpointState.lastreportedat >= cutoff,
|
|
).count()
|
|
|
|
# Counted separately from quiet. An endpoint that has NEVER reported is a
|
|
# different problem from one that reported and stopped: the first is an
|
|
# enrolment or key failure, the second is a machine that went down. Folding
|
|
# them together (quiet = total - reporting) hid the enrolment failures.
|
|
never = db.session.query(EndpointState).join(
|
|
Asset, Asset.assetid == EndpointState.assetid
|
|
).filter(
|
|
Asset.isactive.is_(True),
|
|
EndpointState.lastreportedat.is_(None),
|
|
).count()
|
|
|
|
return success_response({
|
|
'total': total,
|
|
'reporting': reporting,
|
|
'quiet': total - reporting - never,
|
|
'never': never,
|
|
'quiethours': hours,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
@endpoints_bp.route('/dashboard/quiet', methods=['GET'])
|
|
@require_permission('endpoints.fleet')
|
|
def dashboard_quiet():
|
|
"""Endpoints that reported before, then went quiet past the window.
|
|
|
|
Never-reported endpoints are excluded: those are records without an agent,
|
|
not agents that stopped. Silence is the only signal - there is no heartbeat
|
|
separate from the report.
|
|
"""
|
|
hours = _quiet_hours()
|
|
cutoff = _naive_utcnow() - timedelta(hours=hours)
|
|
now = _naive_utcnow()
|
|
|
|
from plugins.computers.models import Computer
|
|
|
|
rows = (db.session.query(EndpointState, Computer.computerid)
|
|
.join(Asset, Asset.assetid == EndpointState.assetid)
|
|
.join(Computer, Computer.assetid == EndpointState.assetid)
|
|
.filter(Asset.isactive.is_(True),
|
|
EndpointState.lastreportedat.isnot(None),
|
|
EndpointState.lastreportedat < cutoff)
|
|
.all())
|
|
|
|
out = [{
|
|
'computerid': computerid,
|
|
'assetid': s.assetid,
|
|
'hostname': s.hostname,
|
|
'lastreported': s.lastreportedat.isoformat() + 'Z',
|
|
'quietdays': (now - s.lastreportedat).days,
|
|
} for s, computerid in rows]
|
|
|
|
out.sort(key=lambda r: -r['quietdays'])
|
|
return success_response(out[:50])
|
|
|
|
|
|
@endpoints_bp.route('/dashboard/stability', methods=['GET'])
|
|
@require_permission('endpoints.fleet')
|
|
def dashboard_stability():
|
|
"""Endpoints with recent crash/shutdown/corruption events.
|
|
|
|
Bounded to a fixed 48h window and the critical event catalog, capped at 50
|
|
rows: cost is a range scan on eventtime filtered to a short id list, not a
|
|
scan of all history. Joins through Computer so each row links to the PC
|
|
detail page.
|
|
"""
|
|
from plugins.computers.models import Computer
|
|
|
|
if not CRITICAL_EVENT_IDS:
|
|
return success_response([])
|
|
|
|
cutoff = _naive_utcnow() - timedelta(hours=48)
|
|
|
|
rows = (db.session.query(
|
|
Computer.computerid,
|
|
EndpointState.hostname,
|
|
db.func.count(EndpointEvent.endpointeventid),
|
|
db.func.max(EndpointEvent.eventtime),
|
|
)
|
|
.select_from(EndpointEvent)
|
|
.join(Asset, Asset.assetid == EndpointEvent.assetid)
|
|
.join(Computer, Computer.assetid == EndpointEvent.assetid)
|
|
.outerjoin(EndpointState,
|
|
EndpointState.assetid == EndpointEvent.assetid)
|
|
.filter(Asset.isactive.is_(True),
|
|
EndpointEvent.eventid.in_(CRITICAL_EVENT_IDS),
|
|
EndpointEvent.eventtime.isnot(None),
|
|
EndpointEvent.eventtime >= cutoff)
|
|
.group_by(Computer.computerid, EndpointState.hostname)
|
|
.all())
|
|
|
|
out = [{
|
|
'computerid': computerid,
|
|
'hostname': hostname,
|
|
'eventcount': count,
|
|
'lastevent': lasttime.isoformat() + 'Z' if lasttime else None,
|
|
} for computerid, hostname, count, lasttime in rows]
|
|
|
|
out.sort(key=lambda r: -r['eventcount'])
|
|
return success_response(out[:50])
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _quiet_hours() -> int:
|
|
"""Quiet-report window in hours, from a site setting, default 24."""
|
|
hours = 24
|
|
setting = Setting.query.filter_by(key='endpoints_quietreporthours').first()
|
|
if setting and (setting.value or '').strip():
|
|
try:
|
|
hours = int(setting.value)
|
|
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
|
pass
|
|
return hours
|
|
|
|
|
|
# =============================================================================
|
|
# Endpoint agent key (UI-managed collector.ingest.endpoints kill switch)
|
|
# =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
# The single permission the endpoint agent key authorizes. A managed token
|
|
# scoped to ONLY this authorizes the endpoints collector and nothing else, so
|
|
# rotating/revoking it stops endpoint-agent traffic without touching the
|
|
# computers/geenforce collectors.
|
|
AGENT_KEY_SCOPE = 'collector.ingest.endpoints'
|
|
AGENT_KEY_NAME = 'Endpoint agent key'
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _agentkey_status_payload():
|
|
"""Current state of the endpoint agent key for the settings page.
|
|
|
|
Reports whether an active managed key exists (and its non-secret metadata)
|
|
plus whether the bootstrap .env fallback is still accepted. Never exposes a
|
|
secret; the full secret is only ever returned once, at regenerate time.
|
|
"""
|
|
tokens = list_service_tokens(AGENT_KEY_SCOPE)
|
|
active = tokens[0] if tokens else None
|
|
envfallback = Setting.get('plugin.endpoints.envkeyfallback', default=True)
|
|
provisioned = Setting.get('plugin.endpoints.agentkeyprovisioned',
|
|
default=False)
|
|
return {
|
|
'provisioned': bool(provisioned) or active is not None,
|
|
'envkeyfallback': bool(envfallback),
|
|
'key': active.to_dict() if active is not None else None,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
@endpoints_bp.route('/agentkey', methods=['GET'])
|
|
@require_role('admin')
|
|
def get_agentkey():
|
|
"""Report the endpoint agent key state (no secret)."""
|
|
return success_response(_agentkey_status_payload())
|
|
|
|
|
|
@endpoints_bp.route('/agentkey/regenerate', methods=['POST'])
|
|
@require_role('admin')
|
|
def regenerate_agentkey():
|
|
"""Mint a fresh endpoint agent key, revoking any previous one.
|
|
|
|
Hard cutover: the old key is deactivated in the same call, and the .env
|
|
fallback is switched off, so the new managed token becomes the sole
|
|
credential and revoking it is a true kill switch. The full secret is
|
|
returned ONCE here and never again.
|
|
"""
|
|
try:
|
|
token, secret = mint_service_token(
|
|
AGENT_KEY_SCOPE, AGENT_KEY_NAME, current_user.userid)
|
|
except PermissionError as error:
|
|
return error_response(ErrorCodes.FORBIDDEN, str(error), http_code=403)
|
|
|
|
Setting.set('plugin.endpoints.agentkeyprovisioned', True,
|
|
valuetype='boolean', category='plugin.endpoints')
|
|
Setting.set('plugin.endpoints.envkeyfallback', False,
|
|
valuetype='boolean', category='plugin.endpoints')
|
|
|
|
result = _agentkey_status_payload()
|
|
# The secret appears here and NOWHERE else, ever. Not stored, not logged.
|
|
result['secret'] = secret
|
|
result['warning'] = ('Save this key now. It will not be shown again. '
|
|
'Configure it as the agent X-API-Key.')
|
|
return success_response(result, message='Endpoint agent key generated',
|
|
http_code=201)
|
|
|
|
|
|
@endpoints_bp.route('/agentkey', methods=['DELETE'])
|
|
@require_role('admin')
|
|
def revoke_agentkey():
|
|
"""Revoke the endpoint agent key: stop all managed-token endpoint traffic.
|
|
|
|
Leaves envkeyfallback off (the kill switch stays armed). To restore
|
|
reporting an operator regenerates a new key.
|
|
"""
|
|
revoked = revoke_service_tokens(AGENT_KEY_SCOPE)
|
|
Setting.set('plugin.endpoints.agentkeyprovisioned', False,
|
|
valuetype='boolean', category='plugin.endpoints')
|
|
result = _agentkey_status_payload()
|
|
result['revoked'] = revoked
|
|
return success_response(result, message='Endpoint agent key revoked')
|
|
|
|
|
|
# =============================================================================
|
|
# Endpoint commands (WebUI -> agent, allowlisted actions only)
|
|
# =============================================================================
|
|
#
|
|
# Operators enqueue a named, server-allowlisted action for one endpoint (JWT +
|
|
# endpoints.command). The agent long-polls /commands/next with its collector
|
|
# token, claims the single next pending command, runs it locally, and reports
|
|
# the outcome to /commands/<id>/result. The wire never carries a command string
|
|
# - only an allowlisted action name - so a compromised WebUI cannot ask an
|
|
# endpoint to run something arbitrary.
|
|
|
|
# How long the agent claim poll is held open server-side before returning empty.
|
|
# Kept below the agent HttpClient timeout and typical proxy idle timeouts so a
|
|
# quiet fleet re-polls cleanly instead of tripping a read timeout.
|
|
_CLAIM_HOLD_SECONDS = 25
|
|
_CLAIM_POLL_INTERVAL = 1.0
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _collector_auth_or_error():
|
|
"""Authorize an agent-facing command route on the endpoints collector token.
|
|
|
|
Reuses the collector auth path so the command channel shares the endpoint
|
|
agent key (kill switch) and introduces no second secret.
|
|
"""
|
|
return collector_authorized('endpoints')
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _resolve_asset_for_hostname(hostname):
|
|
"""Resolve a reported hostname to its asset id via the computers plugin."""
|
|
from plugins.computers.models import Computer
|
|
|
|
computer = (Computer.query
|
|
.filter(db.func.lower(Computer.hostname) == hostname.lower())
|
|
.first())
|
|
return computer.assetid if computer is not None else None
|
|
|
|
|
|
@endpoints_bp.route('/<int:asset_id>/commands', methods=['GET'])
|
|
@require_permission('endpoints.view')
|
|
def list_endpoint_commands(asset_id: int):
|
|
"""Recent commands for one endpoint, newest first (operator view)."""
|
|
rows = (EndpointCommand.query
|
|
.filter_by(assetid=asset_id)
|
|
.order_by(EndpointCommand.createdat.desc())
|
|
.limit(20)
|
|
.all())
|
|
return success_response([row.to_dict() for row in rows])
|
|
|
|
|
|
@endpoints_bp.route('/<int:asset_id>/commands', methods=['POST'])
|
|
@require_permission('endpoints.command')
|
|
def enqueue_endpoint_command(asset_id: int):
|
|
"""Queue an allowlisted command for one endpoint.
|
|
|
|
Rejects unknown actions and refuses to stack a second pending/running
|
|
command on the same endpoint, so the queue stays at-most-one-in-flight and
|
|
the WebUI toggle cannot race itself.
|
|
"""
|
|
payload = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
|
|
action = (payload.get('action') or '').strip()
|
|
if not is_allowed_action(action):
|
|
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
|
|
f'Unknown or disallowed action: {action!r}')
|
|
|
|
# Destructive actions (for example system_restart) demand a stricter grant
|
|
# ON TOP OF endpoints.command, so a remote reboot cannot ride the routine
|
|
# toggle permission.
|
|
elevated = elevated_permission_for(action)
|
|
if elevated and not current_user.haspermission(elevated):
|
|
return error_response(
|
|
ErrorCodes.FORBIDDEN,
|
|
f'Action {action!r} requires the {elevated} permission',
|
|
http_code=403)
|
|
|
|
if action not in ALLOWED_ACTIONS_FOR(assetid=asset_id):
|
|
return error_response(
|
|
ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
|
|
f'Action not permitted by policy for this endpoint: {action!r}')
|
|
|
|
# Generic actions (service_* / process_*) must carry the subject to act on;
|
|
# fixed-target actions (mtconnect_*) must not. Validate both directions so a
|
|
# caller cannot send a targetless generic action (nothing to act on) or
|
|
# smuggle a target onto a pinned action.
|
|
target = (payload.get('target') or '').strip() or None
|
|
targetkind = action_targetkind(action)
|
|
if requires_target(action):
|
|
if not target:
|
|
return error_response(
|
|
ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
|
|
f'Action {action!r} requires a target')
|
|
elif target is not None:
|
|
return error_response(
|
|
ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
|
|
f'Action {action!r} does not accept a target')
|
|
|
|
state = EndpointState.query.filter_by(assetid=asset_id).first()
|
|
if state is None:
|
|
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND,
|
|
f'No endpoint state for asset {asset_id}',
|
|
http_code=404)
|
|
|
|
pending = (EndpointCommand.query
|
|
.filter(EndpointCommand.assetid == asset_id,
|
|
EndpointCommand.status.in_((
|
|
EndpointCommand.STATUS_PENDING,
|
|
EndpointCommand.STATUS_RUNNING)))
|
|
.first())
|
|
if pending is not None:
|
|
return error_response(
|
|
ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
|
|
'A command is already in flight for this endpoint',
|
|
http_code=409)
|
|
|
|
command = EndpointCommand(
|
|
assetid=asset_id,
|
|
action=action,
|
|
target=target,
|
|
targetkind=targetkind if target else None,
|
|
status=EndpointCommand.STATUS_PENDING,
|
|
requestedby=getattr(current_user, 'userid', None),
|
|
)
|
|
db.session.add(command)
|
|
|
|
AuditLog.log('created', 'EndpointCommand',
|
|
entityname=action,
|
|
details=f'action={action} target={target} asset={asset_id}')
|
|
|
|
db.session.commit()
|
|
return success_response(command.to_dict(),
|
|
message='Command queued', http_code=201)
|
|
|
|
|
|
@endpoints_bp.route('/commands/next', methods=['GET'])
|
|
def claim_next_command():
|
|
"""Agent long-poll: claim the next pending command for a hostname.
|
|
|
|
Collector-token auth (not JWT). Holds the request open briefly and returns
|
|
the single oldest pending command for the caller's endpoint, atomically
|
|
marking it running so no other poll claims it. Returns 204 when nothing is
|
|
queued within the hold window - the agent simply re-polls.
|
|
"""
|
|
error = _collector_auth_or_error()
|
|
if error is not None:
|
|
return error
|
|
|
|
hostname = (request.args.get('hostname') or '').strip()
|
|
if not hostname:
|
|
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
|
|
'hostname is required')
|
|
|
|
asset_id = _resolve_asset_for_hostname(hostname)
|
|
if asset_id is None:
|
|
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND,
|
|
f'Unknown hostname: {hostname!r}', http_code=404)
|
|
|
|
deadline = time.monotonic() + _CLAIM_HOLD_SECONDS
|
|
while True:
|
|
command = (EndpointCommand.query
|
|
.filter_by(assetid=asset_id,
|
|
status=EndpointCommand.STATUS_PENDING)
|
|
.order_by(EndpointCommand.createdat.asc())
|
|
.first())
|
|
if command is not None:
|
|
command.status = EndpointCommand.STATUS_RUNNING
|
|
command.claimedat = _naive_utcnow()
|
|
db.session.commit()
|
|
return success_response({
|
|
'endpointcommandid': command.endpointcommandid,
|
|
'action': command.action,
|
|
'target': command.target,
|
|
'targetkind': command.targetkind,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
# Nothing queued: release the session so a concurrent enqueue is visible
|
|
# on the next poll, wait a beat, then re-check until the hold expires.
|
|
db.session.rollback()
|
|
if time.monotonic() >= deadline:
|
|
return ('', 204)
|
|
time.sleep(_CLAIM_POLL_INTERVAL)
|
|
|
|
|
|
@endpoints_bp.route('/commands/<int:command_id>/result', methods=['POST'])
|
|
def report_command_result(command_id: int):
|
|
"""Agent reports a claimed command's outcome (collector-token auth).
|
|
|
|
Finalizes the command row and, for MTConnect actions that observed the run
|
|
state, caches it on the EndpointState so the WebUI toggle reflects reality
|
|
between polls. Both writes land in one commit.
|
|
"""
|
|
error = _collector_auth_or_error()
|
|
if error is not None:
|
|
return error
|
|
|
|
command = db.session.get(EndpointCommand, command_id)
|
|
if command is None:
|
|
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND,
|
|
f'No command {command_id}', http_code=404)
|
|
|
|
payload = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
|
|
succeeded = bool(payload.get('succeeded'))
|
|
command.status = (EndpointCommand.STATUS_SUCCEEDED if succeeded
|
|
else EndpointCommand.STATUS_FAILED)
|
|
command.resultmessage = (payload.get('message') or '')[:2000] or None
|
|
detail = payload.get('detail')
|
|
command.resultjson = json.dumps(detail, separators=(',', ':')) \
|
|
if detail is not None else None
|
|
command.completedat = _naive_utcnow()
|
|
|
|
# Cache the observed MTConnect state so the toggle shows a real value. The
|
|
# agent sends mtconnectrunning on any mtconnect_* result that probed it.
|
|
if 'mtconnectrunning' in payload:
|
|
state = EndpointState.query.filter_by(assetid=command.assetid).first()
|
|
if state is not None:
|
|
running = payload.get('mtconnectrunning')
|
|
state.mtconnectrunning = bool(running) if running is not None else None
|
|
state.mtconnectcheckedat = _naive_utcnow()
|
|
|
|
db.session.commit()
|
|
return success_response(command.to_dict(), message='Result recorded')
|
|
|