Global search is gated on assets.view, and that was the whole check.
Behind it the route queried twelve domains: applications, the knowledge
base, guides, the staff directory, assets, measuring tools, USB devices,
printed parts, custom fields, notifications, hostnames, and vendor and
model reference data, plus addresses and subnets for an IP-shaped query.
None of them consulted their own permission.
So anyone who could look up an asset number could also read the staff
directory out of the HR database, the USB checkout history and who holds
which drive, and the network inventory. The SEARCH_DOMAINS settings look
like they bound this but they are site feature toggles, not
authorization.
Each domain now answers only to a caller who holds its permission.
Assets, custom fields and vendor/model stay on assets.view because all
three emit asset rows routed to asset pages.
caller_holds rather than require_permission: refusing the whole request
because one domain is off-limits would make search useless to anyone
holding less than everything. A domain the caller cannot see contributes
nothing and the rest still answers.
This is what makes assets.view safe to grant the guest role again. It
left the grantable set in 3474028 because of the leak above, and that
took the shop floor's asset lookup with it - a signed-out visitor at a
machine could no longer search for the asset number in front of them.
Now the grant reaches assets and nothing else.
The first version of the leak test passed with the gates removed. The
staff directory is an external HR database and is unreachable under
test, so the domain silently returned nothing and the assertion proved
nothing. It patches _employee_rows now, and fails when the gate goes.
Scope: product
365 lines
14 KiB
Python
365 lines
14 KiB
Python
"""User and authentication models."""
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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from shopdb.extensions import db
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from .base import BaseModel
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# Association table for user roles (many-to-many)
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userroles = db.Table(
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'userroles',
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db.Column('userid', db.Integer, db.ForeignKey('users.userid'), primary_key=True),
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db.Column('roleid', db.Integer, db.ForeignKey('roles.roleid'), primary_key=True)
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)
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# Association table for role permissions (many-to-many)
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rolepermissions = db.Table(
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'rolepermissions',
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db.Column('roleid', db.Integer, db.ForeignKey('roles.roleid'), primary_key=True),
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db.Column('permissionid', db.Integer, db.ForeignKey('permissions.permissionid'), primary_key=True)
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)
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class Permission(db.Model):
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"""
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Permission model for granular access control.
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Permissions are predefined and assigned to roles.
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"""
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__tablename__ = 'permissions'
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permissionid = db.Column(db.Integer, primary_key=True)
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name = db.Column(db.String(50), unique=True, nullable=False)
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description = db.Column(db.String(255))
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category = db.Column(db.String(50), default='general') # For grouping in UI
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# Core permission catalog. This is CORE ONLY - permissions for a plugin
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# domain (machines, computers, printers, network, knowledgebase,
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# notifications, usb, warranty, measuringtools) live in that plugin's
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# BasePlugin.get_permissions() hook, not here (plugin-is-the-product). The
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# merged core+plugins view is full_permission_catalog() below.
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CORE_PERMISSIONS = [
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# Assets
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('assets.view', 'View assets', 'assets'),
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('assets.create', 'Create assets', 'assets'),
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('assets.edit', 'Edit assets', 'assets'),
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('assets.delete', 'Delete assets', 'assets'),
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# Applications
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('applications.view', 'View applications', 'applications'),
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# Deliberately NOT '.view': reading the catalogue and pulling the bytes
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# are different acts. A script body is SYSTEM-context PowerShell and an
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# installer is a vendor binary, so the routes that serve them are gated
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# here rather than on the metadata permission a site may hand to guests.
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('applications.download',
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'Download application installers and script bodies', 'applications'),
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('applications.create', 'Create applications', 'applications'),
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('applications.edit', 'Edit applications', 'applications'),
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('applications.delete', 'Delete applications', 'applications'),
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# Reports
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('reports.view', 'View reports', 'reports'),
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('reports.export', 'Export reports', 'reports'),
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# Settings
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('settings.view', 'View settings', 'admin'),
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('settings.edit', 'Edit settings', 'admin'),
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# Users
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('users.view', 'View users', 'admin'),
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('users.create', 'Create users', 'admin'),
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('users.edit', 'Edit users', 'admin'),
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('users.delete', 'Delete users', 'admin'),
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# Audit
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('audit.view', 'View audit logs', 'admin'),
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# Deliberately separate from audit.view: reading the log and destroying
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# history are different acts, and many people need only the first.
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('audit.purge', 'Delete audit log entries past the retention period', 'admin'),
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# API tokens
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('apitokens.create', 'Create and manage API tokens', 'apitokens'),
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# Collector service tokens. A token scoped to ONLY this permission is a
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# collector service token: it authorizes the collector ingest API and
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# nothing else (scoped tokens pass require_permission only for listed
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# perms, and this perm gates no other route). See collector.py.
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('collector.ingest', 'Submit collector payloads (fleet reporting)',
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'collector'),
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]
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def __repr__(self):
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return f"<Permission {self.name}>"
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@classmethod
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def seed_entries(cls, entries):
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"""Idempotently create Permission rows from (name, desc, category)
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tuples (or equivalent dicts). Returns how many were created."""
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created = 0
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for name, description, category in normalize_permission_entries(entries):
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if not cls.query.filter_by(name=name).first():
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perm = cls(name=name, description=description, category=category)
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db.session.add(perm)
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created += 1
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return created
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@classmethod
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def seed(cls):
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"""Seed the full permission catalog (core plus enabled plugins)."""
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return cls.seed_entries(full_permission_catalog())
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def normalize_permission_entries(entries):
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"""Coerce catalog entries to (name, description, category) tuples.
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Accepts tuples/lists in that order, or dicts with those keys, so a plugin
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may return either shape from get_permissions().
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"""
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normalized = []
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for entry in entries or []:
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if isinstance(entry, dict):
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normalized.append((
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entry['name'],
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entry.get('description', ''),
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entry.get('category', 'general'),
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))
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else:
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name, description, category = entry
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normalized.append((name, description, category))
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return normalized
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def full_permission_catalog(include_disabled=False):
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"""The full permission catalog: core permissions plus every LOADED plugin's
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get_permissions().
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By default only ENABLED plugins contribute, so a disabled plugin's
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permissions are not offered for new scope grants or role edits (existing
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Permission rows and role links persist - see the get_permissions docstring).
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Pass include_disabled=True to include all installed plugins.
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Follows the dashboard.py consumer pattern: a broken plugin is re-raised in
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dev/test and isolated (logged) in prod. Returns (name, description,
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category) tuples.
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"""
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from flask import current_app, has_app_context
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catalog = list(Permission.CORE_PERMISSIONS)
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if not has_app_context():
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return catalog
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pm = current_app.extensions.get('plugin_manager')
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if not pm:
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return catalog
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for name, plugin in pm.get_all_plugins().items():
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if not include_disabled and not pm.registry.is_enabled(name):
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continue
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try:
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catalog.extend(
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normalize_permission_entries(plugin.get_permissions()))
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except Exception:
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if current_app.config.get('DEBUG') or current_app.config.get('TESTING'):
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raise
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current_app.logger.exception(
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'Plugin %s get_permissions failed', name)
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return catalog
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# Core permissions a site MAY grant the guest role. Declared, not derived.
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# Each one has been read against what its routes actually return.
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#
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# Deliberately absent, with the reason, so nobody re-adds them by reflex:
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# settings.view - every setting row, and secret masking is a substring test
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# audit.view - usernames, addresses, and the before/after of every change
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# users.view - gates nothing; list_users is require_role('admin')
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CORE_GUEST_GRANTABLE = {
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# Aggregate counts only; no row-level data reaches the caller.
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'reports.view',
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# Catalogue metadata. Safe only because the bytes moved to
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# applications.download, which is not grantable.
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'applications.view',
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# Assets, and the global search over them. Safe only because search now
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# gates each domain on its own permission: holding this reaches assets and
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# nothing else, where it used to reach the staff directory and the USB,
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# notification and network domains too.
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'assets.view',
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}
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def guest_grantable_permissions():
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"""Which permissions the guest role may be granted.
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Every entry is DECLARED, by core below or by a plugin through
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get_guest_grantable_permissions(). Nothing qualifies by being spelled a
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particular way.
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It used to: any name ending `.view` or `.read` was grantable, on the
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reasoning that reading is the safe default. That is true of a permission
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that gates a list of asset numbers and false of one that gates bytes, and
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the suffix cannot tell them apart. `applications.view` reached the
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SYSTEM-context PowerShell bodies and the installer binaries;
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`backups.view` returned the full payload the separate backups.download
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permission exists to protect; `assets.view` gated a global search that
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queries the staff directory. None of those were decided. They were named.
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So the rule is inverted: a permission is grantable when somebody wrote it
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down, having looked at what it actually serves. Adding one is a code
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change, which is the point - it puts the decision in a diff rather than in
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a suffix.
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Naming one here does not open it. It makes the checkbox available in the
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role grid; a site still has to tick it.
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The bar, for a read: could an anonymous visitor hold this, forever, and
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would the site be content with everything it returns? For a write, add
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that the act can never be attributed to anybody.
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"""
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from flask import current_app, has_app_context
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catalog = full_permission_catalog()
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known = {name for name, _, _ in catalog}
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grantable = {name for name in CORE_GUEST_GRANTABLE if name in known}
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if not has_app_context():
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return grantable
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pm = current_app.extensions.get('plugin_manager')
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if not pm:
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return grantable
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for name, plugin in pm.get_all_plugins().items():
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if not pm.registry.is_enabled(name):
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continue
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try:
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blessed = plugin.get_guest_grantable_permissions() or []
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except Exception:
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if current_app.config.get('DEBUG') or current_app.config.get('TESTING'):
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raise
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current_app.logger.exception(
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'Plugin %s get_guest_grantable_permissions failed', name)
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continue
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# A plugin may only bless permissions that exist and that it owns the
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# naming of; a typo must not silently widen anything.
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grantable |= {p for p in blessed if p in known}
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return grantable
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class Role(BaseModel):
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"""User role model."""
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__tablename__ = 'roles'
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roleid = db.Column(db.Integer, primary_key=True)
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rolename = db.Column(db.String(50), unique=True, nullable=False)
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description = db.Column(db.Text)
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color = db.Column(db.String(20), comment='CSS color for the role badge')
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# Permissions relationship
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permissions = db.relationship(
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'Permission',
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secondary=rolepermissions,
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backref=db.backref('roles', lazy='dynamic')
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)
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def __repr__(self):
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return f"<Role {self.rolename}>"
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# The role a caller with no account is treated as holding.
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#
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# Guest access used to be a per-feature boolean setting - one for the
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# Secure Send page, one for each kiosk, one proposed for guides - which
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# meant every new question about what a signed-out visitor may see was
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# answered by writing more code. It is a permissions question, and this app
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# already administers permissions per role, so a guest is now simply a role
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# holding no permissions until somebody grants it some.
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GUEST = 'guest'
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def haspermission(self, permission_name: str) -> bool:
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"""Check if role has a specific permission."""
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# Admin role has all permissions
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if self.rolename == 'admin':
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return True
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return any(p.name == permission_name for p in self.permissions)
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@classmethod
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def guest(cls):
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"""The guest role, or None on a site that has not been seeded yet."""
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return cls.query.filter_by(rolename=cls.GUEST).first()
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@classmethod
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def seedguest(cls):
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"""Create the guest role if it is missing. Returns True if created.
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Seeded with NO permissions, which is the same behaviour every site has
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today: an unauthenticated request is refused. What a guest may do is a
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decision each site makes in the role grid, not one it inherits from an
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upgrade.
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"""
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if cls.query.filter_by(rolename=cls.GUEST).first() is not None:
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return False
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db.session.add(cls(
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rolename=cls.GUEST,
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description=('Anyone who is not signed in. Holds nothing by '
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'default; grant it a permission to open that up to '
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'people with no account.'),
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color='#6C757D',
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))
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return True
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def getpermissionnames(self) -> list:
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"""Get list of permission names."""
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if self.rolename == 'admin':
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return [p[0] for p in full_permission_catalog()]
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return [p.name for p in self.permissions]
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class User(BaseModel):
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"""User model for authentication."""
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__tablename__ = 'users'
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userid = db.Column(db.Integer, primary_key=True)
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username = db.Column(db.String(100), unique=True, nullable=False, index=True)
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email = db.Column(db.String(255), unique=True, nullable=False)
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passwordhash = db.Column(db.String(255), nullable=False)
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# Profile
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firstname = db.Column(db.String(100))
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lastname = db.Column(db.String(100))
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# Status
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lastlogindate = db.Column(db.DateTime)
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failedlogins = db.Column(db.Integer, default=0)
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lockeduntil = db.Column(db.DateTime)
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# Forced password change: set true when an admin creates the account, so the
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# user is steered through a password change before landing in the app.
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mustchangepassword = db.Column(db.Boolean, default=False, nullable=False)
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# Relationships
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roles = db.relationship(
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'Role',
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secondary=userroles,
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backref=db.backref('users', lazy='dynamic')
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)
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def __repr__(self):
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return f"<User {self.username}>"
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@property
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def islocked(self):
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"""Check if account is locked."""
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if self.lockeduntil:
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return datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(tzinfo=None) < self.lockeduntil
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return False
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def hasrole(self, rolename: str) -> bool:
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"""Check if user has a specific role."""
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return any(r.rolename == rolename for r in self.roles)
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def haspermission(self, permission_name: str) -> bool:
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"""Check if user has a specific permission through any role."""
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# Admin role has all permissions
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if self.hasrole('admin'):
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return True
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return any(r.haspermission(permission_name) for r in self.roles)
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def getpermissions(self) -> list:
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"""Get list of all permission names from all roles."""
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if self.hasrole('admin'):
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return [p[0] for p in full_permission_catalog()]
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perms = set()
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for role in self.roles:
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perms.update(role.getpermissionnames())
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return list(perms)
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