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shopdb-flask/docker-compose.yml
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Act on the wj architectural review: races, limits, pool and contract gaps
Findings F2, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11 and F13 from
wj-architectural-review.md. F1/F1a (the non-sargable LOWER pattern) and F3
(the warranty sync holding a pooled connection) are being handled separately
and are untouched here.

- A collector check-in that raced another for the same PC lost everything:
  the unique index on the application fingerprint raised, nothing caught it,
  and the whole check-in rolled back, discarding state, events and hardware,
  answering the agent with form copy meant for a person. The insert now runs
  in a savepoint, reconciles what the other transaction already wrote, one row
  per savepoint so a second collision skips a row rather than the batch, and
  the check-in commits with a warning. This is the shape the delete side of
  the same function already had.
- Enrollment is deliberately unauthenticated, so it now carries a per-address
  rate limit and a cap on pending requests, and the cap is a setting an admin
  can see and change. A flood can no longer bury the approval queue or grow
  the table without bound.
- The fleet alert poll no longer formats debug strings on every request.
- BusinessUnit is on the contract surface (0.34.0), so the endpoints plugin
  stops reaching into a core table with raw SQL.
- A test walks every asset type descriptor and proves the endpoint it names
  really refuses a caller without the declared permission.
- The plugin settings routes now need a permission; they were telling anyone
  which modules a site runs and where its components live.
- The connection pool is sized explicitly with a short timeout, and the
  arithmetic against the server's connection ceiling is written next to the
  worker count instead of being left to defaults nobody chose.
- Fleet alerts carry both the correct lowercase keys and the old camelCase
  pair. Trays older than 1.7.0 match keys case-sensitively and would have gone
  quiet on every PC not yet upgraded; the old pair goes when they are.
- The dev server proxy points at localhost again, with environment variables
  for the remote-box workflow, and one developer's address is out of the
  server certificate page.
2026-09-16 08:57:04 -04:00

250 lines
11 KiB
YAML

# shopdb-flask single-site docker-compose template.
#
# Per ADR-004, each adopting facility runs its own stack. This template
# brings up MySQL + the API container and exposes the API on port 5001.
# The Vue frontend is served separately by the API in production builds
# (see register_frontend_routes in shopdb/__init__.py); for dev, run
# `npm run dev` in frontend/ on a separate port.
#
# Usage:
# cp .env.example .env
# # edit .env with site-specific secrets and origins
# docker compose up -d
#
# Refresh after pulling new code:
# docker compose build api
# docker compose up -d api
services:
db:
image: mysql:8.4
# utf8mb4 server-wide so the auto-created MYSQL_DATABASE is utf8mb4, not the
# image default. Keeps every site's schema on the same charset/collation.
command: --character-set-server=utf8mb4 --collation-server=utf8mb4_unicode_ci
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: ${MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD:?MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD must be set}
MYSQL_DATABASE: shopdb_flask
MYSQL_USER: shopdb
MYSQL_PASSWORD: ${MYSQL_PASSWORD:?MYSQL_PASSWORD must be set}
volumes:
- db_data:/var/lib/mysql
# Bind MySQL to loopback only. The api container reaches db over the
# compose network regardless of this mapping; the published port is just
# for local admin tools (mysqldump, a client on the host). Exposing 3306
# on all interfaces would put the database on the facility network.
ports:
- "127.0.0.1:${MYSQL_PORT:-3306}:3306"
healthcheck:
# 127.0.0.1, not localhost: localhost means the unix socket, and the
# entrypoint's init pass answers on the socket while running the server
# with --skip-networking. A socket ping therefore reports healthy DURING
# init, and the api/migrate services start against a server that is about
# to restart. Over TCP the probe stays red until the real server listens.
test: ["CMD", "mysqladmin", "ping", "-h", "127.0.0.1", "-u", "root", "-p${MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD}"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
# Schema, plugin bootstrap and seed data all happen here, not in the api
# container. One place, one ordering, and a failure stops the rollout instead
# of being retried forever: restart "no" means a bad migration exits once and
# leaves the error as the last thing in the log. The api service below will
# not start at all until this exits 0, so `up -d api` still migrates first -
# compose honours service_completed_successfully even when a single service
# is named on the command line.
migrate:
build: .
restart: "no"
depends_on:
db:
condition: service_healthy
environment:
FLASK_ENV: production
DATABASE_URL: mysql+pymysql://shopdb:${MYSQL_PASSWORD}@db:3306/shopdb_flask?charset=utf8mb4
SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:?SECRET_KEY must be set}
JWT_SECRET_KEY: ${JWT_SECRET_KEY:?JWT_SECRET_KEY must be set}
# Required even though this service never serves a request: create_app()
# runs config validation before any CLI command dispatches, and the
# production config refuses to build without an explicit CORS allowlist.
CORS_ORIGINS: ${CORS_ORIGINS:?CORS_ORIGINS must be set}
LOG_LEVEL: ${LOG_LEVEL:-INFO}
# Chained with && so the first failure stops the rest. Ordering is
# load-bearing: plugin tables cannot be created before the plugins are
# installed, and seedscopes only links permissions that already exist as
# rows, so the seeds run last.
#
# The seeds are all create-if-missing (see shopdb/cli/__init__.py), so
# running them on every start is a no-op once the site is current. They run
# here rather than only on first deploy because a patch that adds a
# permission or a default setting has to reach an existing site on the
# upgrade it already performs - that is the whole point of this service.
# No entrypoint override: the image entrypoint now only waits for the
# database and execs, which is exactly the preamble this service wants.
command:
- sh
- -c
- >
flask db upgrade &&
/app/scripts/bootstrap-plugins.sh &&
flask plugin upgrade-all &&
flask seed permissions &&
flask seed settings &&
flask seed reference-data
volumes:
- ./plugins:/app/plugins:ro
- ./scripts:/app/scripts:ro
# plugins.json is written here by bootstrap-plugins.sh, so this service
# needs the same instance volume the api uses. They never run at the same
# time, so the shared mount is not contended.
- instance_data:/app/instance
nginx:
image: nginx:1.27-alpine
restart: unless-stopped
depends_on:
- api
ports:
- "${API_PORT:-5001}:443"
volumes:
- ./nginx.conf:/etc/nginx/nginx.conf:ro
- ./certs:/etc/nginx/certs:ro
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "wget", "--spider", "-q", "--no-check-certificate", "https://localhost/api/dashboard/health"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
api:
build: .
restart: unless-stopped
depends_on:
db:
condition: service_healthy
migrate:
condition: service_completed_successfully
environment:
FLASK_ENV: production
DATABASE_URL: mysql+pymysql://shopdb:${MYSQL_PASSWORD}@db:3306/shopdb_flask?charset=utf8mb4
SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:?SECRET_KEY must be set}
JWT_SECRET_KEY: ${JWT_SECRET_KEY:?JWT_SECRET_KEY must be set}
CORS_ORIGINS: ${CORS_ORIGINS:?CORS_ORIGINS must be set}
LOG_LEVEL: ${LOG_LEVEL:-INFO}
ZABBIX_URL: ${ZABBIX_URL:-}
ZABBIX_TOKEN: ${ZABBIX_TOKEN:-}
COLLECTOR_API_KEY: ${COLLECTOR_API_KEY:-}
COLLECTOR_API_KEY_ENDPOINTS: ${COLLECTOR_API_KEY_ENDPOINTS:-}
# This file is the source-build dev stack (wilm/dev-be); stable and edge
# ship through the pull/airgap compose files, not this one. So default the
# badge label to DEV here - a raw source build is by definition not a
# release - while still allowing an override from .env.
SHOPDB_ENV_LABEL: ${SHOPDB_ENV_LABEL:-DEV}
# Enable ProxyFix for nginx reverse proxy
TRUSTED_PROXY_COUNT: 1
ports:
# Expose on localhost only for debugging (bypass nginx)
- "127.0.0.1:5002:5001"
# Terminate TLS in gunicorn with the mounted self-signed cert so the browser
# sees a secure context. navigator.clipboard and other secure-context-only
# web APIs refuse to run over plain http on a non-localhost origin, so the
# test box (accessed by FQDN) needs real https. A site swaps in its own cert
# under ./certs or fronts this with its IIS/nginx proxy.
command:
- gunicorn
- --bind
- 0.0.0.0:5001
# Async workers, not threads. The endpoint agent long-polls
# /api/endpoints/commands/next and re-polls immediately on a 204, so every
# agent holds a connection essentially continuously and fleet size IS the
# concurrency. Under gthread that meant 4 x 8 = 32 slots total, and a
# single worker's 8 threads could fill with sleeping agents while the CPU
# sat idle - measured: 8 of 9 threads in timed sleep, UI p95 24s.
#
# A held connection under gevent is a greenlet, not an OS thread, so idle
# is nearly free. Measured on this stack (devnotes/gevent-sizing-simulation.md):
# 700 simulated agents plus UI, integration and kiosk traffic served with
# zero errors at UI median 7.5ms, peak RSS 479MB. CPU, not memory or DB
# connections, is the binding resource.
- --worker-class
- gevent
# DATABASE CONNECTION ARITHMETIC. Read this before changing the number.
#
# workers x (pool_size + max_overflow) + migrate + admin vs MySQL
# max_connections
#
# Each worker process owns its own SQLAlchemy pool, so the ceiling is per
# worker multiplied by the worker count. With the defaults in
# shopdb/config.py (DB_POOL_SIZE 10, DB_MAX_OVERFLOW 10):
#
# 4 x (10 + 10) = 80
# + the migrate service (a handful, and it has exited before api
# starts, so it only overlaps during a manual upgrade)
# + whatever a human has open (mysqldump, a client on the host)
# = about 90 against the mysql:8.4 default max_connections of 151.
#
# The `command:` on the db service above sets charset and collation only,
# so that 151 is the server default and nothing else in this repo relates
# the two numbers. Raise --workers to 8 and the ceiling is 160 before any
# overhead, which is ABOVE 151: MySQL then refuses connections, and the
# failure shows up as errors from the database rather than anything in the
# app. So change one of these and change the others deliberately:
# more workers means either a smaller pool or --max-connections on db.
#
# pool_timeout is 5s, not the 30s default, so exhaustion fails fast and
# legibly instead of hanging every request for half a minute.
- --workers
- "4"
# Per-worker greenlet ceiling. 4 x 2000 is far above any realistic fleet;
# it exists so a connection spike queues rather than being refused.
- --worker-connections
- "2000"
# 60, not 30: the timeout must exceed _CLAIM_HOLD_SECONDS in
# plugins/endpoints/api/routes.py or gunicorn kills a healthy long-poll
# mid-hold. Cheap here because a stuck connection costs a greenlet.
- --timeout
- "60"
- --access-logfile
- "-"
# %(D)s is request duration in microseconds. Without it a slow request is
# indistinguishable from a fast one in the log, and latency has to be
# reconstructed from outside the container. Keep in sync with the
# Dockerfile CMD.
# %({X-Real-IP}i)s shows the real client IP from nginx, not the nginx container IP
- --access-logformat
- '%({X-Real-IP}i)s %(l)s %(u)s %(t)s "%(r)s" %(s)s %(b)s %(D)sus "%(f)s" "%(a)s"'
- --error-logfile
- "-"
# NO TLS in gunicorn - nginx handles it
- wsgi:app
healthcheck:
# Probe plain HTTP (nginx handles TLS now)
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "curl --silent http://localhost:5001/api/dashboard/health | grep -q '\"status\":\"ok\"'"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
start_period: 10s
retries: 3
volumes:
- ./plugins:/app/plugins:ro
# Standalone operator scripts shipped inside generated bundles (the
# endpoint-agent uninstaller). Read-only, same pattern as plugins: the
# site-agent packaging route reads uninstall-shopdbagent.ps1 from here at
# download time, so it must be visible in the container.
- ./scripts:/app/scripts:ro
# Core modules for development (auth, settings, etc). Dev stack only.
- ./shopdb:/app/shopdb:ro
# Self-signed TLS material for the dev/test https listener. Read-only;
# generated on the host under ./certs and never baked into the image.
- ./certs:/app/certs:ro
# /app/instance is WRITTEN state, not code: plugins.json (which plugins
# this site has enabled), uploaded floor plans, branding, model and
# application images, employee photos, warranty proofs, slides,
# printed-part files, and the Dell OAuth token. Without this volume a
# `docker compose build api && up -d api` recreates the container and
# takes all of it with it, so the site comes back with its plugins
# disabled and MySQL rows pointing at files that no longer exist.
- instance_data:/app/instance
volumes:
db_data:
instance_data: