The lobby-display and screensaver slide manager was admin-only. Add a shared slides.manage permission so a curator can manage both surfaces without full admin. Admins keep access via the require_permission admin bypass. Backend: - plugins/slides/api/routes.py: all 5 management routes require slides.manage - plugins/slides/plugin.py: declare it via get_permissions(); nav item carries the permission so the frontend can gate visibility - shopdb/core/api/auth.py: login response now returns the user's permissions (matches /me) so the frontend authStore has them on fresh login Frontend: - stores/auth.js: hasPermission(name) getter (admin true, else granted list) - router/index.js: guard supports requiresPermission - views/AppLayout.vue: hide nav items whose permission the user lacks - plugins/slides/frontend/routes.js: slide manager gated requiresPermission Tests: no-perm user 403, curator role with the perm 200 (+ login advertises it), admin 200 via bypass. Deploy: run `flask seed permissions` to create the row, then grant it to a role in Settings > Users & Roles.
260 lines
8.5 KiB
Python
260 lines
8.5 KiB
Python
"""Authentication API endpoints."""
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import time
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
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from flask import Blueprint, request, current_app
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from flask_jwt_extended import (
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create_access_token,
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create_refresh_token,
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jwt_required,
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get_jwt_identity,
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current_user
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)
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from werkzeug.security import check_password_hash, generate_password_hash
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from shopdb.extensions import db, cache
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from shopdb.core.models import User
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from shopdb.utils.responses import success_response, error_response, ErrorCodes
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auth_bp = Blueprint('auth', __name__)
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# Account lockout policy: after MAX_FAILED_LOGINS consecutive bad passwords,
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# lock the account for LOCKOUT_MINUTES. Mitigates password brute-forcing.
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MAX_FAILED_LOGINS = 5
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LOCKOUT_MINUTES = 15
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def _login_ip():
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"""Caller IP for rate limiting, honoring the first X-Forwarded-For hop."""
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forwarded = request.headers.get('X-Forwarded-For')
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if forwarded:
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return forwarded.split(',')[0].strip()
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return request.remote_addr or 'unknown'
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def _login_ratelimited():
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"""Fixed-window per-IP login limiter. Returns True when the caller is over
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budget for the current window.
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Backed by the existing cache extension (no new dependency). Under the
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default SimpleCache the counter is per-process, so with N gunicorn workers
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the effective budget is N x AUTH_RATELIMIT_MAX. This is defense in depth
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layered on top of the per-account lockout (see login()); a shared cache
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backend (Redis/memcached) tightens it to a true global budget.
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"""
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if not current_app.config.get('AUTH_RATELIMIT_ENABLED', True):
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return False
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window = current_app.config.get('AUTH_RATELIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS', 300)
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maxhits = current_app.config.get('AUTH_RATELIMIT_MAX', 30)
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# Time bucket makes this a fixed window: the key rolls over at each window
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# boundary, so a per-hit set() cannot turn it into a sliding window.
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bucket = int(time.time() // window) if window > 0 else 0
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key = f'loginratelimit:{_login_ip()}:{bucket}'
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count = cache.get(key) or 0
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if count >= maxhits:
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return True
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cache.set(key, count + 1, timeout=window)
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return False
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@auth_bp.route('/login', methods=['POST'])
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def login():
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"""
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Authenticate user and return JWT tokens.
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Request:
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{
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"username": "string",
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"password": "string"
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}
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Response:
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{
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"data": {
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"access_token": "...",
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"refresh_token": "...",
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"user": {...}
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}
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}
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"""
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if _login_ratelimited():
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return error_response(
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'RATE_LIMITED',
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'Too many login attempts. Try again later.',
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http_code=429
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)
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data = request.get_json()
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if not data or not data.get('username') or not data.get('password'):
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
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'Username and password required'
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)
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user = User.query.filter_by(
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username=data['username'],
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isactive=True
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).first()
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# Reject a locked account before checking the password, so a lockout can't
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# be probed and a valid password can't reset the clock mid-lockout.
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if user and user.islocked:
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.FORBIDDEN,
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'Account is locked. Try again later or contact an administrator.',
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http_code=403
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)
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if not user or not check_password_hash(user.passwordhash, data['password']):
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# Count the failure and lock the account once the threshold is hit.
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# Only possible when the username matched a real account.
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if user:
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user.failedlogins = (user.failedlogins or 0) + 1
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if user.failedlogins >= MAX_FAILED_LOGINS:
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# Naive UTC to match the naive lockeduntil column comparisons.
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user.lockeduntil = datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(tzinfo=None) \
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+ timedelta(minutes=LOCKOUT_MINUTES)
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user.failedlogins = 0
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db.session.commit()
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.UNAUTHORIZED,
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'Invalid username or password',
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http_code=401
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)
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# Create tokens (identity must be a string in Flask-JWT-Extended 4.x)
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access_token = create_access_token(
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identity=str(user.userid),
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additional_claims={
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'username': user.username,
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'roles': [r.rolename for r in user.roles]
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}
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)
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refresh_token = create_refresh_token(identity=str(user.userid))
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# Update last login and clear any failed-login state
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user.lastlogindate = db.func.now()
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user.failedlogins = 0
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user.lockeduntil = None
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db.session.commit()
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return success_response({
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'access_token': access_token,
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'refresh_token': refresh_token,
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'token_type': 'Bearer',
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'expires_in': 3600,
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'user': {
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'userid': user.userid,
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'username': user.username,
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'email': user.email,
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'firstname': user.firstname,
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'lastname': user.lastname,
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'roles': [r.rolename for r in user.roles],
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'permissions': user.getpermissions(),
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'mustchangepassword': bool(user.mustchangepassword)
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}
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})
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@auth_bp.route('/refresh', methods=['POST'])
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@jwt_required(refresh=True)
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def refresh():
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"""Refresh access token using refresh token."""
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user_id = get_jwt_identity()
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user = db.session.get(User, int(user_id))
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if not user or not user.isactive:
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.UNAUTHORIZED,
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'User not found or inactive',
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http_code=401
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)
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access_token = create_access_token(
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identity=str(user.userid),
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additional_claims={
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'username': user.username,
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'roles': [r.rolename for r in user.roles]
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}
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)
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return success_response({
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'access_token': access_token,
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'token_type': 'Bearer',
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'expires_in': 3600
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})
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@auth_bp.route('/me', methods=['GET'])
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@jwt_required()
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def get_current_user():
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"""Get current authenticated user info."""
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return success_response({
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'userid': current_user.userid,
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'username': current_user.username,
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'email': current_user.email,
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'firstname': current_user.firstname,
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'lastname': current_user.lastname,
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'roles': [r.rolename for r in current_user.roles],
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'permissions': current_user.getpermissions(),
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'mustchangepassword': bool(current_user.mustchangepassword)
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})
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@auth_bp.route('/change-password', methods=['POST'])
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@jwt_required()
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def change_password():
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"""Change the authenticated user's own password.
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Request:
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{ "current_password": "string", "new_password": "string" }
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current_password is required for a normal self-service change. When the
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account is flagged mustchangepassword (an admin set a temporary password),
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the forced-change case accepts new_password alone. On success the flag is
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cleared and any lockout/failed-login state is reset.
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"""
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data = request.get_json() or {}
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new_password = data.get('new_password')
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current_password = data.get('current_password')
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if not new_password:
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR, 'new_password is required')
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if len(new_password) < 8:
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
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'New password must be at least 8 characters')
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user = current_user
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# A normal change must prove knowledge of the current password. The forced
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# first-login case (admin-set temp password) may skip it.
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if not user.mustchangepassword:
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if not current_password:
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR, 'current_password is required')
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if not check_password_hash(user.passwordhash, current_password):
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.UNAUTHORIZED,
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'Current password is incorrect', http_code=401)
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user.passwordhash = generate_password_hash(new_password)
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user.mustchangepassword = False
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user.failedlogins = 0
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user.lockeduntil = None
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db.session.commit()
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return success_response(
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{'mustchangepassword': False}, message='Password changed')
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@auth_bp.route('/logout', methods=['POST'])
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@jwt_required()
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def logout():
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"""Logout user (for frontend token cleanup)."""
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# In a full implementation, you'd blacklist the token
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return success_response(message='Successfully logged out')
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