Make the app distributable to other GE Aerospace sites (one self-hosted
instance per site, ADR-004). GE values remain the shipped defaults; every
site-specific behavior is now a Setting an admin can change in the UI.
Settings-driven site config:
- Branding: site/QR/badge logos, favicon, primary color (upload endpoints
mirror the map-blueprint pattern; new Settings > Branding section).
- ServiceNow: search/incident/change URL templates ({ticket}), ticket
prefixes, enable toggle. Defaults point at the current
geaerospaceqa.service-now.com global search. Disabled = plain-text tickets.
- Employee-id regex (employeeid_pattern), printer hostname template,
QR label targets (qr_target_printer / qr_target_usb, blank = asset page,
else URL template with placeholders), usb_label_style (barcode|qr).
- West Jefferson floor-plan PNGs removed from the tree; generic placeholder
ships as the map default and sites upload their own blueprint.
Security closeout:
- dashboarddefaults writes now require admin.
- Collector: generic error messages (no str(exc) leak); API key accepted
via X-API-Key header only (BREAKING: querystring api_key removed).
- IP-based login rate limiting (AUTH_RATELIMIT_* knobs) atop account lockout.
- Setting.set() creation race fixed (IntegrityError retry).
Release engineering and docs:
- __version__ 0.5.0 (distinct from __contract_version__, ADR-007),
CHANGELOG.md, Gitea Actions CI config, frontend version aligned.
- One wizard-first install story across README/DEPLOY; new CONFIG.md,
UPGRADE.md, BACKUP-RESTORE.md; CLAUDE.md and ROADMAP de-staled.
- Dockerfile multi-stage build now bundles the frontend; compose binds
MySQL to 127.0.0.1; stale database/schema.sql and one-off SQL removed.
Debt and fixes:
- .query.get() -> db.session.get() sweep; datetime.utcnow() removed
(naive-UTC via timezone-aware now); users.py on authz decorators.
- Fixed 4 stale tests (slides feed shape, shopfloor splitperemployee,
plugin contract purity) and the USB label page field mapping (both usb
modes emit the cmmc shape: device_id/device_desc).
- Health endpoint reports the real version.
248 tests pass; naming/style check green; frontend builds; fresh-DB
flask db upgrade + seeds verified; QR targets verified by decoding
rendered codes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
209 lines
6.5 KiB
Python
209 lines
6.5 KiB
Python
"""Authentication API endpoints."""
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import time
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
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from flask import Blueprint, request, current_app
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from flask_jwt_extended import (
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create_access_token,
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create_refresh_token,
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jwt_required,
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get_jwt_identity,
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current_user
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)
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from werkzeug.security import check_password_hash
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from shopdb.extensions import db, cache
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from shopdb.core.models import User
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from shopdb.utils.responses import success_response, error_response, ErrorCodes
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auth_bp = Blueprint('auth', __name__)
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# Account lockout policy: after MAX_FAILED_LOGINS consecutive bad passwords,
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# lock the account for LOCKOUT_MINUTES. Mitigates password brute-forcing.
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MAX_FAILED_LOGINS = 5
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LOCKOUT_MINUTES = 15
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def _login_ip():
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"""Caller IP for rate limiting, honoring the first X-Forwarded-For hop."""
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forwarded = request.headers.get('X-Forwarded-For')
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if forwarded:
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return forwarded.split(',')[0].strip()
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return request.remote_addr or 'unknown'
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def _login_ratelimited():
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"""Fixed-window per-IP login limiter. Returns True when the caller is over
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budget for the current window.
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Backed by the existing cache extension (no new dependency). Under the
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default SimpleCache the counter is per-process, so with N gunicorn workers
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the effective budget is N x AUTH_RATELIMIT_MAX. This is defense in depth
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layered on top of the per-account lockout (see login()); a shared cache
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backend (Redis/memcached) tightens it to a true global budget.
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"""
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if not current_app.config.get('AUTH_RATELIMIT_ENABLED', True):
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return False
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window = current_app.config.get('AUTH_RATELIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS', 300)
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maxhits = current_app.config.get('AUTH_RATELIMIT_MAX', 30)
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# Time bucket makes this a fixed window: the key rolls over at each window
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# boundary, so a per-hit set() cannot turn it into a sliding window.
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bucket = int(time.time() // window) if window > 0 else 0
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key = f'loginratelimit:{_login_ip()}:{bucket}'
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count = cache.get(key) or 0
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if count >= maxhits:
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return True
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cache.set(key, count + 1, timeout=window)
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return False
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@auth_bp.route('/login', methods=['POST'])
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def login():
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"""
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Authenticate user and return JWT tokens.
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Request:
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{
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"username": "string",
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"password": "string"
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}
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Response:
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{
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"data": {
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"access_token": "...",
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"refresh_token": "...",
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"user": {...}
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}
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}
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"""
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if _login_ratelimited():
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return error_response(
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'RATE_LIMITED',
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'Too many login attempts. Try again later.',
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http_code=429
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)
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data = request.get_json()
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if not data or not data.get('username') or not data.get('password'):
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
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'Username and password required'
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)
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user = User.query.filter_by(
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username=data['username'],
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isactive=True
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).first()
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# Reject a locked account before checking the password, so a lockout can't
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# be probed and a valid password can't reset the clock mid-lockout.
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if user and user.islocked:
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.FORBIDDEN,
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'Account is locked. Try again later or contact an administrator.',
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http_code=403
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)
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if not user or not check_password_hash(user.passwordhash, data['password']):
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# Count the failure and lock the account once the threshold is hit.
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# Only possible when the username matched a real account.
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if user:
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user.failedlogins = (user.failedlogins or 0) + 1
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if user.failedlogins >= MAX_FAILED_LOGINS:
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# Naive UTC to match the naive lockeduntil column comparisons.
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user.lockeduntil = datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(tzinfo=None) \
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+ timedelta(minutes=LOCKOUT_MINUTES)
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user.failedlogins = 0
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db.session.commit()
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.UNAUTHORIZED,
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'Invalid username or password',
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http_code=401
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)
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# Create tokens (identity must be a string in Flask-JWT-Extended 4.x)
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access_token = create_access_token(
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identity=str(user.userid),
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additional_claims={
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'username': user.username,
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'roles': [r.rolename for r in user.roles]
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}
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)
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refresh_token = create_refresh_token(identity=str(user.userid))
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# Update last login and clear any failed-login state
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user.lastlogindate = db.func.now()
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user.failedlogins = 0
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user.lockeduntil = None
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db.session.commit()
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return success_response({
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'access_token': access_token,
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'refresh_token': refresh_token,
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'token_type': 'Bearer',
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'expires_in': 3600,
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'user': {
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'userid': user.userid,
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'username': user.username,
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'email': user.email,
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'firstname': user.firstname,
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'lastname': user.lastname,
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'roles': [r.rolename for r in user.roles]
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}
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})
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@auth_bp.route('/refresh', methods=['POST'])
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@jwt_required(refresh=True)
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def refresh():
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"""Refresh access token using refresh token."""
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user_id = get_jwt_identity()
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user = User.query.get(int(user_id))
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if not user or not user.isactive:
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.UNAUTHORIZED,
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'User not found or inactive',
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http_code=401
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)
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access_token = create_access_token(
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identity=str(user.userid),
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additional_claims={
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'username': user.username,
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'roles': [r.rolename for r in user.roles]
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}
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)
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return success_response({
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'access_token': access_token,
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'token_type': 'Bearer',
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'expires_in': 3600
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})
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@auth_bp.route('/me', methods=['GET'])
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@jwt_required()
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def get_current_user():
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"""Get current authenticated user info."""
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return success_response({
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'userid': current_user.userid,
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'username': current_user.username,
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'email': current_user.email,
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'firstname': current_user.firstname,
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'lastname': current_user.lastname,
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'roles': [r.rolename for r in current_user.roles],
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'permissions': current_user.getpermissions()
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})
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@auth_bp.route('/logout', methods=['POST'])
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@jwt_required()
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def logout():
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"""Logout user (for frontend token cleanup)."""
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# In a full implementation, you'd blacklist the token
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return success_response(message='Successfully logged out')
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