Endpoint locks -------------- Adds EndpointLock so an admin can hold an endpoint against automated and operator action, with migration 0018 and enforcement in the enqueue path rather than only in the UI, so a lock cannot be bypassed by calling the API directly. Split endpoints.deploy ---------------------- endpoints.deploy bundled three actions of very different risk behind a single name: scheduledtask_run -> starts a task already registered and allowlisted update_app -> runs a pinned installer run_script -> arbitrary code as SYSTEM unless the descriptor pins a user context Because they shared one grant there was no way to let an operator push an application update without also handing them arbitrary SYSTEM code execution on every endpoint they could reach. The permission name described the lightest of the three while silently carrying the heaviest. commands.ELEVATED_ACTION_PERMISSIONS now maps each action to its own permission (endpoints.corptools, endpoints.updateapp, endpoints.runscript). The enqueue route reads that table, so no route logic changed. Migration 7d42 preserves existing access exactly: anyone holding endpoints.deploy receives all three replacements.
390 lines
17 KiB
Python
390 lines
17 KiB
Python
"""Endpoints plugin smoke + collector-contract tests.
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Asserts the plugin loads cleanly, satisfies the framework contract, and that
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its ADR-006 collector schema is well formed. Extend with DB-backed ingest tests
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as the plugin grows.
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"""
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from flask import Blueprint
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from plugins.endpoints.plugin import EndpointsPlugin, CURATED_EVENT_IDS
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from plugins.endpoints.eventcatalog import EVENT_CATALOG, CRITICAL_EVENT_IDS
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from plugins.endpoints.commands import (
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COMMAND_ALLOWLIST, is_allowed_action, elevated_permission_for,
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requires_target,
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)
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def test_endpoints_plugin_meta_is_valid():
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"""meta returns a PluginMeta with the expected name and prefix."""
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plugin = EndpointsPlugin()
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assert plugin.meta.name == 'endpoints'
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assert plugin.meta.api_prefix == '/api/endpoints'
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assert 'computers' in plugin.meta.dependencies
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def test_endpoints_plugin_get_blueprint_returns_blueprint():
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"""get_blueprint returns a Flask Blueprint, not None."""
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plugin = EndpointsPlugin()
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assert isinstance(plugin.get_blueprint(), Blueprint)
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def test_endpoints_plugin_get_models_returns_models():
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"""get_models returns the two telemetry tables."""
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plugin = EndpointsPlugin()
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models = plugin.get_models()
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assert len(models) >= 2
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for model in models:
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assert hasattr(model, '__tablename__')
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def test_endpoints_collector_schema_identity_is_hostname():
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"""ADR-006 schema declares hostname as the identity field."""
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plugin = EndpointsPlugin()
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schema = plugin.get_collector_schema()
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assert schema is not None
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assert schema['identityfield'] == 'hostname'
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assert 'hostname' in schema['fields']['required']
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def test_endpoints_curated_event_ids_include_core_security_ids():
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"""The curated catalog covers the agreed logon/stability IDs."""
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for eventid in (4624, 4625, 4634, 4672, 4697, 4698, 41, 4618, 55, 7011,
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10016, 1001):
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assert eventid in CURATED_EVENT_IDS
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def test_curated_ids_match_the_event_catalog():
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"""Ingest filter and display catalog cannot drift apart."""
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assert CURATED_EVENT_IDS == frozenset(EVENT_CATALOG)
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def test_critical_event_ids_are_a_subset_of_the_catalog():
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"""Dashboard stability card only queries known critical IDs."""
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assert set(CRITICAL_EVENT_IDS)
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assert set(CRITICAL_EVENT_IDS).issubset(set(EVENT_CATALOG))
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def test_endpoints_asset_panels_are_computer_scoped():
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"""Every asset panel targets computer assets only, with an endpoint."""
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plugin = EndpointsPlugin()
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panels = plugin.get_asset_panels()
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assert len(panels) == 14
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for panel in panels:
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assert panel['assettypes'] == ['computer']
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assert panel['endpoint'].startswith('/api/endpoints/')
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assert '{assetid}' in panel['endpoint']
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assert panel['render'] in ('keyvalue', 'list', 'table', 'tabs', 'operatorreports')
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def test_services_and_processes_are_split_into_two_filtered_cards():
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"""The single services card is now two cards filtered by row kind, both
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reading the same services snapshot so a future top-20 collector is just
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another filtered panel over the same feed."""
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plugin = EndpointsPlugin()
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panels = {p['id']: p for p in plugin.get_asset_panels()}
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services = panels['endpoints-tracked-services']
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processes = panels['endpoints-tracked-processes']
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assert services['title'] == 'Tracked Services'
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assert processes['title'] == 'Tracked Processes'
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assert services['filter'] == {'key': 'kind', 'equals': 'service'}
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assert processes['filter'] == {'key': 'kind', 'equals': 'process'}
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# Both slice one endpoint feed.
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assert services['endpoint'] == processes['endpoint']
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assert services['endpoint'].endswith('/services')
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# Command wiring carries over to both cards.
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assert services['permission'] == 'endpoints.command'
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assert processes['permission'] == 'endpoints.command'
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def test_activity_card_starts_collapsed_and_sits_below_live_state():
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"""The activity feed is history, so it must not push live state down.
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Renamed from the events card when events and commands merged into one feed.
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It is no longer the LAST panel - installed software sits below it - so the
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assertion is that it ranks below every live-state panel rather than being
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the maximum, which would break again the next time a reference panel is
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added underneath.
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"""
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plugin = EndpointsPlugin()
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panels = plugin.get_asset_panels()
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activity = next(p for p in panels if p['id'] == 'endpoints-activity')
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# NOT collapsed by default, unlike the events card it replaced. The feed
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# surfaces critical events, and a card that hides the one thing worth seeing
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# is the reason the health dot and the visible rows disagreed. Collapsible,
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# so a reader can put it away.
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assert activity.get('collapsible') is True
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assert activity.get('collapsedDefault') is not True
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live = [p['position'] for p in panels
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if p['id'] in ('endpoints-status', 'endpoints-tracked-services',
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'endpoints-tracked-processes', 'endpoints-interfaces')]
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assert activity['position'] > max(live)
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def test_endpoints_dashboard_widgets_declared():
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"""Quiet + stability exception cards are declared and hide when empty."""
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plugin = EndpointsPlugin()
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widgets = plugin.get_dashboard_widgets()
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ids = {w['id'] for w in widgets}
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assert {'endpoints-quiet', 'endpoints-stability'} <= ids
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for widget in widgets:
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assert widget['render'] == 'exceptions'
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assert widget['empty'] == 'hide'
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# The fleet-wide cards read the whole roster, so they are gated on
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# endpoints.fleet, not the per-endpoint endpoints.view a guest may hold.
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assert widget['permission'] == 'endpoints.fleet'
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def test_endpoints_navigation_item_points_at_fleet_view():
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"""The fleet list view is exposed as a single /endpoints nav item."""
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plugin = EndpointsPlugin()
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items = plugin.get_navigation_items()
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routes = {item['route'] for item in items}
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assert '/endpoints' in routes
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def test_system_restart_is_allowlisted_and_policy_selectable():
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"""Restart is a real allowlisted action, so the policy builder (which
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reads COMMAND_ALLOWLIST) surfaces it as a selectable action."""
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assert is_allowed_action('system_restart')
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assert 'system_restart' in COMMAND_ALLOWLIST
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assert COMMAND_ALLOWLIST['system_restart']['label'] == 'Restart computer'
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def test_system_restart_requires_the_elevated_restart_permission():
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"""Restart maps to endpoints.restart so the enqueue route can demand a
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heavier grant than the routine endpoints.command toggle. Routine actions
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carry no elevated requirement."""
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assert elevated_permission_for('system_restart') == 'endpoints.restart'
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assert elevated_permission_for('mtconnect_start') is None
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def test_endpoints_declares_the_restart_permission():
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"""The dedicated restart permission is declared for role-grid seeding."""
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plugin = EndpointsPlugin()
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permissions = {name for name, *_ in plugin.get_permissions()}
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assert 'endpoints.restart' in permissions
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assert 'endpoints.command' in permissions
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def test_collect_now_is_allowlisted_targetless_and_routine():
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"""collect_now forces an off-cadence telemetry report. It is allowlisted so
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the enqueue route accepts it, carries no wire target (fixed action), and
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needs no elevated grant beyond endpoints.command."""
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assert is_allowed_action('collect_now')
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assert 'collect_now' in COMMAND_ALLOWLIST
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assert not requires_target('collect_now')
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assert elevated_permission_for('collect_now') is None
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def test_collect_now_survives_a_policy_that_never_mentions_it():
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"""Refresh Status must not be narrowed away by an unrelated policy.
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A non-empty effective policy skips the permissive fallback in
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ALLOWED_ACTIONS_FOR, so any action the policy does not name is intersected
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out. collect_now only asks an agent to report state it already has, so
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Configuration Policy is not the authority on it - without the exemption
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every policied endpoint refused Refresh Status with "Action not permitted
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by policy", a denial the operator could not act on because the policy was
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never about that action.
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"""
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from plugins.endpoints.commands import POLICY_EXEMPT_ACTIONS
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assert 'collect_now' in POLICY_EXEMPT_ACTIONS
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# Exemption from POLICY is not exemption from PERMISSION: it stays gated by
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# the base endpoints.command grant, which is what keeps guests out.
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assert elevated_permission_for('collect_now') is None
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def test_run_script_and_update_app_are_allowlisted_delivery_actions():
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"""The two software-delivery actions are allowlisted with a targetkind so
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the enqueue route accepts them and carries their subject on the wire:
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run_script carries a script name, update_app carries an appversionid."""
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for action in ('run_script', 'update_app'):
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assert is_allowed_action(action)
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assert action in COMMAND_ALLOWLIST
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assert requires_target(action)
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assert COMMAND_ALLOWLIST['run_script']['targetkind'] == 'script'
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assert COMMAND_ALLOWLIST['update_app']['targetkind'] == 'app'
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def test_big_four_actions_each_require_their_own_elevated_permission():
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"""The four scope-gated actions map to four INDEPENDENT permissions.
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They previously shared endpoints.deploy, which meant granting an operator
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application updates also granted arbitrary SYSTEM code execution through
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run_script. Keeping these distinct is the whole point of the split, so a
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regression that re-bundles them must fail here.
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"""
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assert elevated_permission_for('system_restart') == 'endpoints.restart'
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assert elevated_permission_for('run_script') == 'endpoints.runscript'
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assert elevated_permission_for('update_app') == 'endpoints.updateapp'
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assert elevated_permission_for('scheduledtask_run') == 'endpoints.corptools'
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granted = {
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elevated_permission_for(action)
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for action in ('system_restart', 'run_script', 'update_app',
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'scheduledtask_run')
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}
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assert len(granted) == 4
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def test_endpoints_declares_the_split_delivery_permissions():
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"""Each split grant is declared so role seeding can offer it, and the
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retired bundle is gone so the role grid stops offering a dead permission."""
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plugin = EndpointsPlugin()
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permissions = {name for name, *_ in plugin.get_permissions()}
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assert 'endpoints.runscript' in permissions
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assert 'endpoints.updateapp' in permissions
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assert 'endpoints.corptools' in permissions
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assert 'endpoints.restart' in permissions
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assert 'endpoints.deploy' not in permissions
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def test_known_payload_keys_cover_persisted_and_relayed_fields():
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"""The ingest allow-set must list every key the handler consumes today, so
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those keys are never mislogged as 'unpersisted'. Anything the agent sends
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outside this set is logged for observability before columns exist."""
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from plugins.endpoints.plugin import KNOWN_PAYLOAD_KEYS
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persisted_or_relayed = {
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'hostname', 'adopt', 'loggedinuser', 'serialnumber', 'pctype',
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'machinenumber', 'vendorname', 'modelnumber', 'osname', 'ipaddress',
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'agentversion', 'lastboottime', 'uptimeseconds', 'idleseconds',
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'cpupercent', 'memorypercent', 'services', 'ports', 'interfaces',
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'scheduledtasks', 'events',
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}
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assert persisted_or_relayed <= KNOWN_PAYLOAD_KEYS
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def test_hardware_telemetry_keys_are_persisted_not_merely_logged():
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"""Disk/bios/memory/processor/osinfo inventory was collected at the agent and
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logged as unknown keys for several versions while the shapes were proven
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against real endpoint traffic. They have columns now (endpoints migration
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0013), so they must be INSIDE the known set - leaving them out would log
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every report as carrying unpersisted keys while the ingest quietly stores
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them, which is the most misleading combination available."""
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from plugins.endpoints.plugin import KNOWN_PAYLOAD_KEYS
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for key in ('disks', 'bios', 'memory', 'processor', 'osinfo', 'domain',
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'pendingreboot', 'usercontext'):
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assert key in KNOWN_PAYLOAD_KEYS
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# 'applications' followed this same staging path earlier and is likewise
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# persisted, to its own endpointapplications table rather than a state blob.
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assert 'applications' in KNOWN_PAYLOAD_KEYS
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def test_telemetrymeta_route_is_registered_for_freshness_gating():
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"""The WebUI gates panel refreshes on lastreportedat advancing, so the
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lightweight freshness probe must be exposed on the plugin blueprint."""
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from flask import Flask
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application = Flask(__name__)
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# A url_prefix is REQUIRED here: the fleet list registers as route(''), which
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# Flask rejects as a bare rule and accepts under a prefix. That is deliberate
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# - CONTRIBUTING says API routes carry no trailing slash - so the test has to
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# mount the blueprint the way the app does.
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application.register_blueprint(EndpointsPlugin().get_blueprint(),
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url_prefix='/api/endpoints')
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rules = {rule.rule for rule in application.url_map.iter_rules()}
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assert any(rule.endswith('/asset/<int:asset_id>/telemetrymeta') for rule in rules)
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def test_fleet_list_route_resolves_without_trailing_slash():
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"""The Fleet list route must match the slash-less URL the SPA calls.
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The list is the only route on the bare blueprint prefix. If it demands a
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trailing slash, Flask 308-redirects /api/endpoints to /api/endpoints/, and
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behind the /shopdb reverse proxy that redirect drops the path prefix and
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the list call fails while the detail routes (which carry a path suffix)
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keep working. strict_slashes=False makes both forms resolve directly.
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"""
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from flask import Flask
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application = Flask(__name__)
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application.register_blueprint(
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EndpointsPlugin().get_blueprint(), url_prefix='/api/endpoints')
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adapter = application.url_map.bind('localhost')
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endpoint, _ = adapter.match('/api/endpoints', method='GET')
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assert endpoint.endswith('list_endpoints')
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endpoint_slash, _ = adapter.match('/api/endpoints/', method='GET')
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assert endpoint_slash.endswith('list_endpoints')
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# --- agent timestamps are UTC on the wire and UTC in the column --------------
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#
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# _parse_dt used astimezone(tz=None), which converts to the SERVER's local
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# zone. An agent reporting 17:26:16Z was stored as 13:26:16 on an EDT server
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# and re-served labelled 'Z', while the same row's server-written
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# lastreportedat stayed true UTC - one row, two time bases, four hours apart.
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# The dashboard's 48-hour stability window compares a real UTC cutoff against
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# these values, so events left it four hours early.
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#
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# It is invisible on a UTC server, which is how it survived, and nothing in the
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# Dockerfile, the compose files or the Windows deploy pins TZ.
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def _in_zone(zonename, call):
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"""Run call() with the process in a named zone, then put it back.
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time.tzset() is POSIX-only and absent on Windows, where the process zone
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cannot be moved this way at all. Rather than fail three tests permanently on
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every Windows checkout - which teaches the developer to ignore a red suite -
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the shift is skipped there and the assertions still run in whatever zone the
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machine is in. That is weaker locally but not worthless: _parse_dt must
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return the same UTC answer in EVERY zone, so the assertion is correct in all
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of them, and CI runs on Linux where the real shift happens.
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"""
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import os
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import time
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tzset = getattr(time, 'tzset', None)
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if tzset is None:
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return call()
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before = os.environ.get('TZ')
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os.environ['TZ'] = zonename
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tzset()
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try:
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return call()
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finally:
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if before is None:
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os.environ.pop('TZ', None)
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else:
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os.environ['TZ'] = before
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tzset()
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def test_a_utc_timestamp_survives_a_non_utc_server():
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from datetime import datetime
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from plugins.endpoints.plugin import _parse_dt
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parsed = _in_zone('America/New_York',
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lambda: _parse_dt('2026-09-03T17:26:16Z'))
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assert parsed == datetime(2026, 9, 3, 17, 26, 16), \
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'the wire value is UTC and the column is UTC; no local conversion'
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def test_an_offset_timestamp_is_converted_to_utc_not_to_server_local():
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from datetime import datetime
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from plugins.endpoints.plugin import _parse_dt
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parsed = _in_zone('America/New_York',
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lambda: _parse_dt('2026-09-03T17:26:16+05:00'))
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assert parsed == datetime(2026, 9, 3, 12, 26, 16)
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def test_a_naive_timestamp_is_taken_as_utc_already():
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"""AGENT-CONTRACT.md mandates UTC on the wire, so a value with no offset is
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UTC rather than a guess about the agent's zone."""
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from datetime import datetime
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from plugins.endpoints.plugin import _parse_dt
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parsed = _in_zone('Asia/Tokyo',
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lambda: _parse_dt('2026-09-03T17:26:16'))
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assert parsed == datetime(2026, 9, 3, 17, 26, 16)
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