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cproudlock 534f179ee6 Make main the lean product a site receives

main was 16 days and 259 commits behind the line the product is actually built
on, at contract 0.30.0 against 0.35.0, with no per-PC credential code at all. It
was neither current nor curated - just stale. This brings it forward and, at the
same time, makes it mean something: main is what a receiving site installs, and
nothing else.

WHAT IT CARRIES. Twelve plugins - backups, computers, endpoints, guides,
knowledgebase, machines, network, notifications, printers, slides, tools,
warranty - plus applications, which is manifest-less core and always ships. The
only manifest dependency inside that set is endpoints on computers, and both are
in it, so the closure is self-contained.

WHAT IT DOES NOT. employees, geenforce, measuringtools, printedparts and usb
stay on the site line. So do the Windows installer tree, the VM rehearsal
helpers, the agent tooling config, one site's data loader, the internal audit
and findings records, and the planner spreadsheet. 1,135 tracked files against
1,438.

A REMOVAL THAT BREAKS THE APP IS NOT A REMOVAL, and two nearly shipped:

deploy/site-profile-universal.json still named all seventeen plugins. It is the
file docs/DEPLOY.md tells a site to provision from, so a fresh install would
have failed at `flask plugin apply-profile` with PluginError - the first thing a
receiving site does, broken by the branch meant to serve them. It now names the
twelve that exist, and its comment says the two must agree.

agent/ was never refreshed. Whoever populated this branch copied shopdb/,
plugins/, frontend/ and tests/ from the site line and left the agent tree at its
September state: 22 C# and PowerShell sources missing, including AgentCredentials,
EnrollmentService, AgentHttpFactory and the fleet-alert client, plus one file the
site line had deleted still present. The old tree is internally consistent, so it
compiles, and nothing in CI builds it - every gate was green over a server that
speaks enrollment and per-PC credentials to a bundled agent source that cannot.
Resynced whole.

DECISIONS THIS ENCODES, rather than defers:

- The plugin-authoring lab builds printedparts, whose manifest depends on
  employees, so it could not stay. The lab remains on the site line and main
  ships no build-along tutorial. That is a real loss for an adopting developer
  and is recorded here rather than discovered later.
- Recognition, Training and Recertification notifications are no longer seeded.
  Each splits one notification into a card per employee and renders a photo,
  which needs a plugin this branch does not bundle. Seeding them would offer an
  author a type that cannot resolve anybody. A site that installs employees gets
  them from that plugin's own seed.
- Windows/IIS is documented as the legacy path throughout, and the README leads
  with Docker, because that is what a receiving site gets.

The API description is regenerated for THIS branch - 347 paths and 483
operations, down from 415 and 573 - so the published contract describes what is
here rather than what the site line serves. docs/CONFIG.md lost the two
measuring-tool label keys the code no longer declares, which two lanes had
decided opposite ways.

Suite: 3124 passed, 6 skipped. Naming and style gates pass. The docs gates run
rather than skip, and every index line count is derived from the file it names.

2026-09-19 11:24:40 -04:00

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Dependency security

Two scripts, one question each.

question	script	output
what are we running	`scripts/generate_sbom.py`	`sbom.cdx.json`, CycloneDX 1.6, shipped with every release
are we exposed	`scripts/scan_sbom.py`	a report, and an exit code

The SBOM was already generated and installed onto every server. Nothing read it, so "are we exposed to this advisory" was still a person going and looking. The scanner closes that.

Running it

venv/bin/python scripts/scan_sbom.py                  # report, exit 0
venv/bin/python scripts/scan_sbom.py --gate           # exit 1 on a shipped finding
venv/bin/python scripts/scan_sbom.py --json out.json  # machine-readable too

With no --sbom, it generates one first, so there is never a stale input.

It needs outbound HTTPS to api.osv.dev. Run it where the repository lives, not on a customer's server - a deployed instance is frequently air-gapped and has nothing to query. That is also why the SBOM ships as a file: it is the artefact a security team scans on their own terms.

Why OSV

It takes a purl and returns the advisories that apply. No account, no API key, no agent installed anywhere, no vulnerability database to keep current. The SBOM is already the input it wants, so this is a lookup against what shipped rather than a second scan of the tree that could disagree with it.

Shipped and build-only are not the same finding

Two thirds of the components in the SBOM are build tooling - bundlers, test runners, their transitive dependencies. They never reach a server, and the SBOM already marks them scope: excluded.

Both are reported. Only shipped components can fail a build.

This is deliberate. At the time of writing, the highest-severity match in the whole tree is a CRITICAL against the test runner, which is not installed anywhere a release reaches. A gate that fails on that teaches everybody to pass --no-verify within a month, and then it catches nothing at all.

Severity is taken, not computed

Where an advisory records a plain word - GHSA gives LOW, MODERATE, HIGH, CRITICAL - that word is used. Where there is only a CVSS vector, the report says UNKNOWN rather than parsing the vector into a score it might get wrong.

UNKNOWN is shown and never gates. A guessed score is worse than an honest gap, because somebody would act on it.

The allowlist is a record, not a mute button

scripts/vulnerability-allowlist.json holds advisories that were reviewed and accepted. An entry carries the advisory id, the reason, who accepted it, the date, and what would invalidate the reasoning.

A good reason names the precondition that is absent. The file has held exactly one entry so far, and how it ended is the point.

A PyJWT advisory rated HIGH - algorithm confusion, forged HS256 tokens - needs a verifier configured with both symmetric and asymmetric algorithms AND a raw JSON JWK passed as the key. This application configures neither: there is no JWT_ALGORITHM or JWT_DECODE_ALGORITHMS anywhere in the tree, so flask-jwt-extended runs HS256-only against a string secret. That was written down, with invalidatedby recording what would make it untrue - SSO issuing tokens verified against a JWK.

Then PyJWT was upgraded, the advisory stopped matching, and the entry was deleted. The allowlist is empty again, which is the state to aim for.

invalidatedby is the field that earns its keep. A reason stops being true when the code that made it true changes, and nobody re-reads an allowlist looking for that. Write down what would break it.

Upgrading is almost always cheaper than defending a decision to skip it. Do not add an entry to make a build pass.

What the report tells you to do

The report ends with a per-component upgrade rollup: the smallest upgrade that clears every advisory against that component, and how many it clears.

"Smallest" is doing real work there. An advisory patched on several release branches lists a fix per branch - nanoid's is fixed in both 3.3.18 and 5.1.16 - and taking the highest recommends a major upgrade when a patch on the current branch would do. Where the package is transitive that major may not even be reachable: nanoid arrives under postcss, pinned ^3.3.11, a range 5.x cannot satisfy. So the target is the lowest published fix above the version in use. Fixes on older branches are ignored rather than offered as a downgrade.

A target on a different major version is still labelled MAJOR, but now that label means something: no fix exists on the current branch, so the upgrade is genuinely a different job - it can be ESM-only, or drop an API.

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